Transcriber's note

Table of Contents

HISTORY OF GREECE

BY
GEORGE GROTE, Esq.

VOL. IX.

REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.

NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
1880.

CONTENTS.
VOL. IX.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LXIX.

CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

Spartan empire. — March of the Ten Thousand Greeks. — Persian kings — Xerxes — Artaxerxes Longimanus. — Darius Nothus. — Cyrus the younger in Ionia — his vigorous operations against Athens. — Youth and education of Cyrus. — His esteem for the Greeks — his hopes of the crown. — Death of Darius Nothus — succession of Artaxerxes Mnemon. — Secret preparations of Cyrus for attacking his brother. — Klearchus and other Greeks in the service of Cyrus. — Strict administration, and prudent behavior, of Cyrus. — Cyrus collects his army at Sardis. — The Ten Thousand Greeks — their position and circumstances. — Xenophon. — How Xenophon came to join the Cyreian army. — Cyrus marches from Sardis — Kolossæ — Kelænæ. — Peltæ — Keramôn-Agora, Käystru-Pedion. — Distress of Cyrus for money — Epyaxa supplies him. — Thymbrium. — Tyriæum — Review of the Greeks by Cyrus. — Ikonium — Lykaonia — Tyana. — Pass over Taurus into Kilikia. — Syennesis of Kilikia — his duplicity — he assists Cyrus with money. — Cyrus at Tarsus — mutiny of the Greeks — their refusal to go farther. — Klearchus tries to suppress the mutiny by severity — he fails. — He tries persuasion — his discourse to the soldiers. — His refusal to march farther — well received. — Deceitful manœuvres of Klearchus to bring the soldiers round to Cyrus. — The soldiers agree to accompany Cyrus farther — increase of pay. — March onward — from Tarsus to Issus. — Flight of Abrokomas — abandonment of the passes. — Gates of Kilikia and Syria. — Desertion of Xenias and Pasion — prudence of Cyrus. — Cyrus marches from the sea to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. — Partial reluctance of the army — they ford the Euphrates. — Separate manœuvre of Menon. — Abrokomas abandons the defence of the river — his double dealing. — Cyrus marches along the left bank of the Euphrates — the Desert — privations of the army. — Pylæ — Charmandê — dangerous dispute between the soldiers of Klearchus and those of Menon. — Entry into Babylonia — treason of Orontes — preparation for battle. — Discourse of Cyrus to his officers and soldiers. — Conception formed by Cyrus of Grecian superiority. — Present of Cyrus to the prophet Silanus. — Cyrus passes the undefended trench — Kunaxa — sudden appearance of the king’s army — preparation of Cyrus for battle. — Last orders of Cyrus. — Battle of Kunaxa — easy victory of the Greeks on their side. — Impetuous attack of Cyrus upon his brother — Cyrus is slain. — Flight of Ariæus and the Asiatic force of Cyrus. — Plunder of the Cyreian camp by Artaxerxes. Victorious attitude of the Greeks. — Character of Cyrus. — If Cyrus had succeeded, he would have been the most formidable enemy to Greece.

1-51

CHAPTER LXX.

RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

Dismay of the Greeks on learning the death of Cyrus. Klearchus offers the throne to Ariæus. — Artaxerxes summons the Greeks to surrender — their reply — language of Phalinus. — Ariæus refuses the throne, but invites the Greeks to join him for retreat. — The Greeks rejoin Ariæus — interchange of oaths — resolution to retreat together. — Position of the Greeks — to all appearance hopeless. — Commencement of the retreat, along with Ariæus — disorder of the army. — Heralds from the Persians to treat about a truce. — The heralds conduct the Greeks to villages furnished with provisions. March over the canals. — Abundant supplies obtained in the villages. — Visit of Tissaphernes — negotiations. — Convention concluded with Tissaphernes, who engages to conduct the Greeks home. — Motives of the Persians — favorable dispositions of Parysatis towards Cyrus. — Long halt of the Greeks — their quarrel with Ariæus. — Secret despair of Klearchus. — Retreating march begun, under Tissaphernes — they enter within the Wall of Media — march to Sittakê. — Alarm and suspicions of the Greeks — they cross the Tigris. — Retreating march up the left bank of the Tigris — to the Great Zab. — Suspicions between the Greeks and Tissaphernes. — Klearchus converses with Tissaphernes — and is talked over. — Klearchus, with the other Grecian generals, visits Tissaphernes in his tent. — Tissaphernes seizes the Greek generals. They are sent prisoners to the Persian court, and there put to death. — Menon is reserved to perish in torture — sentiments of queen Parysatis. — How Klearchus came to be imposed upon. — Plans of Tissaphernes — impotence and timidity of the Persians. — The Persians summon the Grecian army to surrender. — Indignant refusal of the Greeks — distress and despair prevalent among them. — First appearance of Xenophon — his dream. — He stimulates the other captains to take the lead and appoint new officers. — Address of Xenophon to the officers. New generals are named, Xenophon being one. — The army is convened in general assembly — speech of Xenophon. — Favorable augury from a man sneezing. — Encouraging topics insisted on by Xenophon. — Great impression produced by his speech — the army confirm the new generals proposed. — Great ascendency acquired over the army at once by Xenophon — qualities whereby he obtained it. — Combination of eloquence and confidence, with soldier-like resource and bravery. — Approach of the Persian Mithridates — the Greeks refuse all parley. — The Greeks cross the Zab and resume their march, harassed by the Persian cavalry. — Sufferings of the Greeks from marching under the attacks of the cavalry. Successful precautions taken. — Tissaphernes renews the attack, with some effect. — Comfortable quarters of the Greeks. They halt to repel the cavalry, and then march fast onward. — Victory of the Greeks — prowess of Xenophon. — The Greeks embarrassed as to their route — impossibility either of following the Tigris farther, or of crossing it. — The strike into the mountains of the Karduchians. — They burn much of their baggage — their sufferings from the activity and energy of the Karduchians. — Extreme danger of their situation. — Xenophon finds out another road to turn the enemy’s position. — The Karduchians are defeated and the road cleared. — Danger of Xenophon with the rear division and baggage. — Anxiety of the Greeks to recover the bodies of the slain. — They reach the river Kentritês, the northern boundary of Karduchia. — Difficulties of passing the Kentritês — dream of Xenophon. — They discover a ford and pass the river. — Xenophon with the rear-guard repels the Karduchians and effects his passage. — March through Armenia. Heavy snow and severe cold. — They ford the Eastern Euphrates or Murad. — Distressing marches — extreme misery from cold and hunger. — Rest in good quarters — subterranean villages well stocked with provisions. — After a week’s rest, they march onward — their guide runs away. — They reach a difficult pass occupied by the Chalybes — raillery exchanged between Xenophon and Cheirisophus about stealing. — They turn the pass by a flank-march, and force their way over the mountain. — March through the country of the Taochi — exhaustion of provisions — capture of a hill-fort. — Through the Chalybes, the bravest fighters whom they had yet seen — the Skythini. — They reach the flourishing city of Gymnias. — First sight of the sea from the mountain-top Thêchê — extreme delight of the soldiers. — Passage through the Makrônes. — Through the Kolchians — who oppose them and are defeated. — Kolchian villages — unwholesome honey. — Arrival at Trapezus on the Euxine (Trebizond). — Joy of the Greeks — their discharge of vows to their gods — their festivals and games. — Appendix.

52-120

CHAPTER LXXI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.

Greek cities on the Euxine — Sinôpê with her colonies Kerasus, Kotyôra, and Trapezus. — Indigenous inhabitants — their relations with the Greek colonists. — Feelings of the Greeks on the Euxine when the Ten Thousand descended among them. — Uncertainty and danger of what they might do. — Plans of the army — Cheirisophus is sent to Byzantium to procure vessels for transporting them. — Regulations for the army proposed by Xenophon during his absence. — Adopted by the army — their intense repugnance to farther marching. — Measures for procuring transports. Marauding expeditions for supplies, against the Colchians and the Drilæ. — The army leave Trapezus, and march westward along the coast to Kerasus. — Acts of disorder and outrage committed by various soldiers near Kerasus. — March to Kotyôra — hostilities with the Mosynœki. — Long halt at Kotyôra — remonstrance from the Sinopians. — Speech of Hekatonymus of Sinôpê to the army — reply of Xenophon. — Success of the reply — good understanding established with Sinôpê. — Consultation of the army with Hekatonymus, who advises going home by sea. — Envoys sent by the army to Sinôpê to procure vessels. — Poverty and increasing disorganization or the army. — Ideas of Xenophon about founding a new city in the Euxine, with the army. — Sacrifice of Xenophon to ascertain the will of the gods — treachery of the prophet Silanus. — Silanus, Timasion, and others raise calumnies against Xenophon. General assembly of the army. — Accusations against Xenophon — his speech in defence. — He carries the soldiers with him — discontent and flight of Silanus. — Fresh manœuvres of Timasion — fresh calumnies circulated against Xenophon — renewed discontent of the army. — Xenophon convenes the assembly again. — his address in defence of himself. — His remonstrance against the disorders in the army. — Vote of the army unanimously favorable to Xenophon — disapproving the disorders, and directing trial. — Xenophon’s appeal to universal suffrage, as the legitimate political authority. Success of his appeal. — Xenophon recommends trial of the generals before a tribunal formed of the lochages or captains. Satisfaction of the army with Xenophon. — Manner in which discipline was upheld by the officers. — Complete triumph of Xenophon. His influence over the army, derived from his courage, his frankness, and his oratory. — Improved feeling of the army — peace with the Paphlagonian Korylas. — The army pass by sea to Sinôpê. — Return of Cheirisophus — resolution of the army to elect a single general — they wish to elect Xenophon, who declines — Cheirisophus is chosen. — The army pass by sea to Herakleia — they wish to extort money from the Herakleots — opposition of Cheirisophus and Xenophon. — Dissatisfaction of the army — they divide into three factions. 1. The Arcadians and Achæans. 2. A division under Cheirisophus. 3. A division under Xenophon. — Arcadian division start first and act for themselves — they get into great danger, and are rescued by Xenophon — the army reünited at Kalpê — old board of generals reëlected, with Neon in place of Cheirisophus. — Distress for provisions at Kalpê — unwillingness to move in the face of unfavorable sacrifices — ultimate victory over the troops of the country. — Halt at Kalpê — comfortable quarters — idea that they were about to settle there as a colony. — Arrival of Kleander, the Spartan harmost, from Byzantium, together with Dexippus. — Disorder in the army: mutiny against Kleander, arising from the treachery of Dexippus. — Indignation and threats of Kleander — Xenophon persuades the army to submit — fear of Sparta. — Satisfaction given to Kleander, by the voluntary surrender of Agasias with the mutinous soldier. — Appeal to the mercy of Kleander, who is completely soothed. — Kleander takes the command, expressing the utmost friendship both towards the army and towards Xenophon. — Unfavorable sacrifices make Kleander throw up the command and sail away. — March of the army across the country from Kalpê to Chalkêdon. — Pharnabazus bribes Anaxibius to carry the army across the Bosphorus into Europe — false promises of Anaxibius to the army. — Intention of Xenophon to leave the army immediately and go home — first proposition addressed to him by Seuthes of Thrace. — The army cross over to Byzantium — fraud and harsh dealing of Anaxibius, who sends the army at once out of the town. — Last orders of Anaxibius as the soldiers were going out of the gates. — Wrath and mutiny of the soldiers, in going away — they rush again into the gates, and muster within the town. — Terror of Anaxibius and all within the town. — The exasperated soldiers masters of Byzantium — danger of all within it — conduct of Xenophon. — Xenophon musters the soldiers in military order and harangues them. — Xenophon calms the army, and persuades them to refrain from assaulting the town — message sent by them to Anaxibius — they go out of Byzantium, and agree to accept Kœratadas as their commander. — Remarkable effect produced by Xenophon — evidence which it affords of the susceptibility of the Greek mind to persuasive influences. Xenophon leaves the army, and goes into Byzantium with the view of sailing home. Kœratadas is dismissed from the command. — Dissension among the commanders left. — Distress of the army — Aristarchus arrives from Sparta to supersede Kleander — Polus on his way to supersede Anaxibius. — Pharnabazus defrauds Anaxibius, who now employs Xenophon to convey the Cyreians across back to Asia. — Aristarchus hinders the crossing — his cruel dealing towards the sick Cyreians left in Byzantium. — His treacherous scheme for entrapping Xenophon. — Xenophon is again implicated in the conduct of the army — he opens negotiations with Seuthes. — Position of Seuthes — his liberal offers to the army. — Xenophon introduces him to the army, who accept the offers. — Service of the army with Seuthes, who cheats them of most of their pay. — The army suspect the probity of Xenophon — unjust calumnies against him — he exposes it in a public harangue, and regains their confidence. — Change of interest in the Lacedæmonians, who become anxious to convey the Cyreians across into Asia, in order to make war against the satraps. — Xenophon crosses over with the army to Asia — his poverty — he is advised to sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios — beneficial effects. — He conducts the army across Mount Ida to Pergamus. — His unsuccessful attempt to surprise and capture the rich Persian Asidates. — In a second attempt he captures Asidates — valuable booty secured. — General sympathy expressed for Xenophon — large share personally allotted to him. — The Cyreians are incorporated in the army of the Lacedæmonian general Thimbron — Xenophon leaves the army, depositing his money in the temple at Ephesus. — His subsequent return to Asia, to take command of Cyreians as a part of the Lacedæmonian army. — Xenophon in the Spartan service, with Agesilaus against Athens — he is banished. — He settles at Skillus near Olympia, on an estate consecrated to Artemis. — Charms of the residence — good hunting — annual public sacrifice offered by Xenophon. — Later life of Xenophon — expelled from Skillus after the battle of Leuktra — afterwards restored at Athens. — Great impression produced by the retreat of the Ten Thousand upon the Greek mind.

121-180

CHAPTER LXXII.

GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE.

Sequel of Grecian affairs generally — resumed. — Spartan empire — how and when it commenced. — Oppression and suffering of Athens under the Thirty. — Alteration of Grecian feeling towards Athens — the Thirty are put down and the democracy restored. — The Knights or Horsemen, the richest proprietors at Athens, were the great supporters of the Thirty in their tyranny. — The state of Athens, under the Thirty, is a sample of that which occurred in a large number of other Grecian cities, at the commencement of the Spartan empire. — Great power of Lysander — he establishes in most of the cities Dekarchies, along with a Spartan harmost. — Intimidation exercised everywhere by Lysander in favor of his own partisans. — Oppressive action of these Dekarchies. — In some points, probably worse than the Thirty at Athens. — Bad conduct of the Spartan harmosts — harsh as well as corrupt. No justice to be obtained against them at Sparta. — Contrast of the actual empire of Sparta, with the promises of freedom which she had previously held out. — Numerous promises of general autonomy made by Sparta — by the Spartan general Brasidas, especially. — Gradual change in the language and plans of Sparta towards the close of the Peloponnesian war. — Language of Brasidas contrasted with the acts of Lysander. — Extreme suddenness and completeness of the victory of Ægospotami left Lysander almost omnipotent. — The dekarchies became partly modified by the jealousy at Sparta against Lysander. The harmosts lasted much longer. — The Thirty at Athens were put down by the Athenians themselves, not by any reformatory interference of Sparta. — The empire of Sparta much worse and more oppressive than that of Athens. — Imperial Athens deprived her subject-allies of their autonomy, but was guilty of little or no oppression. — Imperial Sparta did this, and much worse — her harmosts and decemvirs are more complained of than the fact of her empire. — This more to be regretted, as Sparta had now an admirable opportunity for organizing a good and stable confederacy throughout Greece. — Sparta might have reörganized the confederacy of Delos, which might now have been made to work well. — Insupportable arrogance of Lysander — bitter complaints against him, as well as against the dekarchies. — Lysander offends Pharnabazus, who procures his recall. His disgust and temporary expatriation. — Surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, according to the treaty concluded with Sparta. — Their condition is affected by the position and ambitious schemes of Cyrus, whose protection they seek against Tissaphernes. — After the death of Cyrus, Tissaphernes returns as victor and satrap to the coast of Asia Minor. — Alarm of the Asiatic Greeks, who send to ask aid from Sparta. The Spartans send Thimbron with an army to Asia. His ill-success and recall — he is superseded by Derkyllidas. — Conduct of the Cyreians loose as to pillage. — Derkyllidas makes a truce with Tissaphernes, and attacks Pharnabazus in the Troad and Æolis. — Distribution of the Persian empire; relation of king, satrap, sub-satrap. — Mania, widow of Zênis, holds the subsatrapy of Æolis under Pharnabazus. Her regular payment and vigorous government. — Military force, personal conquests, and large treasures, of Mania. — Assassination of Mania, and of her son, by her son-in-law Meidias, who solicits the satrapy from Pharnabazus, but is indignantly refused. — Invasion and conquest of Æolis by Derkyllidas, who gets possession of the person of Meidias. — Derkyllidas acquires and liberates Skêpsis and Gergis, deposing Meidias, and seizing the treasures of Mania. — Derkyllidas concludes a truce with Pharnabazus, and takes winter quarters in Bithynia. — Command of Derkyllidas — satisfaction of Sparta with the improved conduct of the Cyreians. — Derkyllidas crosses into Europe, and employs his troops in fortifying the Chersonesus against the Thracians. — He captures and garrisons Atarneus. — He makes war upon Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, upon the Mæander. — Timidity of Tissaphernes — he concludes a truce with Derkyllidas. — Derkyllidas is superseded by Agesilaus. — Alienation towards Sparta had grown up among her allies in Central Greece. — Great energy imparted to Spartan action by Lysander immediately after the victory of Ægospotami; an energy very unusual with Sparta. — The Spartans had kept all the advantages of victory to themselves — their allies were allowed nothing. — Great power of the Spartans — they take revenge upon those who had displeased them — their invasion of Elis. — The Spartan king Agis invades the Eleian territory. He retires from it immediately in consequence of an earthquake. — Second invasion of Elis by Agis — he marches through Triphylia and Olympia; victorious march, with much booty. — Insurrection of the oligarchical party in Elis — they are put down. — The Eleians are obliged to submit to hard terms of peace. — Sparta refuses to restore the Pisatans to the Olympic presidency. — Triumphant position of Sparta — she expels the Messenians from Peloponnesus and its neighborhood.

181-229

CHAPTER LXXIII.

AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA. — THE CORINTHIAN WAR.

Triumphant position of Sparta at the close of the war — introduction of a large sum of gold and silver by Lysander — opposed by some of the Ephors. — The introduction of money was only one among a large train of corrupting circumstances which then became operative on Sparta. — Contrast between Sparta in 432 B.C., and Sparta after 404 B.C. — Increase of peculation, inequality, and discontent at Sparta. — Testimonies of Isokrates and Xenophon to the change of character and habits at Sparta. — Power of Lysander — his arrogance and ambitious projects — flattery lavished upon him by sophists and poets. — Real position of the kings at Sparta. — His intrigues to make himself king at Sparta — he tries in vain to move the oracles in his favor — scheme laid for the production of sacred documents, as yet lying hidden, by a son of Apollo. — His aim at the kingship fails — nevertheless he still retains prodigious influence at Sparta. — Death of Agis, king of Sparta — doubt as to the legitimacy of his son Leotychides. Agesilaus, seconded by Lysander, aspires to the throne. — Character of Agesilaus. — Conflicting pretensions of Agesilaus and Leotychides. — Objection taken against Agesilaus on the ground of his lameness, — oracle produced by Diopeithes — eluded by the interpretation of Lysander. — Agesilaus is preferred as king — suspicions which always remained attached to Lysander’s interpretation. — Popular conduct of Agesilaus — he conciliates the ephors — his great influence at Sparta — his energy, combined with unscrupulous partisanship. — Dangerous conspiracy at Sparta — terror-striking sacrifices. — Character and position of the chief conspirator Kinadon — state of parties at Sparta — increasing number of malcontents. — Police of the ephors — information laid before them. — Wide-spread discontent reckoned upon by the conspirators. — Alarm of the ephors — their manœuvres for apprehending Kinadon privately. — Kinadon is seized, interrogated, and executed — his accomplices are arrested, and the conspiracy broken up. — Dangerous discontent indicated at Sparta. — Proceedings of Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus in Asia. — Persian preparations for reviving the maritime war against Sparta — renewed activity of Konon. — Agesilaus is sent with a land-force to Asia, accompanied by Lysander. — Large plans of Agesilaus, for conquest in the interior of Asia. — General willingness of the Spartan allies to serve in the expedition, but refusal from Thebes, Corinth, and Athens. — Agesilaus compares himself with Agamemnon — goes to sacrifice at Aulis — is contemptuously hindered by the Thebans. — Arrival of Agesilaus at Ephesus — he concludes a fresh armistice with Tissaphernes. — Arrogant behavior and overweening ascendency of Lysander — offensive to the army and to Agesilaus. — Agesilaus humbles and degrades Lysander, who asks to be sent away. — Lysander is sent to command at the Hellespont — his valuable service there. — Tissaphernes breaks the truce with Agesilaus, who makes war upon him and Pharnabazus — he retires for the purpose of organizing a force of cavalry. — Agesilaus indifferent to money for himself, but eager in enriching his friends. — His humanity towards captives and deserted children. — Spartan side of his character — exposure of naked prisoners — different practice of Asiatics and Greeks. — Efforts of Agesilaus to train his army, and to procure cavalry. — Agesilaus renews the war against Tissaphernes, and gains a victory near Sardis. — Artaxerxes causes Tissaphernes to be put to death and superseded by Tithraustes. — Negotiations between the new satrap and Agesilaus — the satraps in Asia Minor hostile to each other. — Commencement of action at sea against Sparta — the Athenian Konon, assisted by Persian ships and money, commands a fleet of eighty sail on the coast of Karia. — Rhodes revolts from the Spartan empire — Konon captures an Egyptian corn-fleet at Rhodes. — Anxiety of the Lacedæmonians — Agesilaus is appointed to command at sea as well as on land. — Severity of the Lacedæmonians towards the Rhodian Dorieus — contrast of the former treatment of the same man by Athens. — Sentiment of a multitude compared with that of individuals. — Efforts of Agesilaus to augment the fleet — he names Peisander admiral. — Operations of Agesilaus against Pharnabazus. — He lays waste the residence of the satrap, and surprises his camp — offence given to Spithridates. — Personal conference between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus. — Friendship established between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus — character of Agesilaus. — Promising position and large preparations for Asiatic land-warfare, of Agesilaus — he is recalled with his army to Peloponnesus. — Efforts and proceedings of Konon in command of the Persian fleet — his personal visit to the Persian court. — Pharnabazus is named admiral jointly with Konon. — Battle of Knidus — complete defeat of the Lacedæmonian fleet — death of Peisander the admiral.

230-283

CHAPTER LXXIV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS.

War in Central Greece against Sparta — called the Corinthian war. — Relations of Sparta with the neighboring states and with her allies after the accession of Agesilaus. Discontent among the allies. — Great power of Sparta, stretching even to Northern Greece — state of Herakleia. — Growing disposition in Greece to hostility against Sparta, when she becomes engaged in the war against Persia. — The satrap Tithraustes sends an envoy with money into Greece, to light up war against Sparta — his success at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos. — The Persian money did not create hostility against Sparta, but merely brought out hostile tendencies pre-existing. Philo-Laconian sentiment of Xenophon. — War between Sparta and Thebes — the Bœotian war. — Active operations of Sparta against Bœotia — Lysander is sent to act from Herakleia on the northward — Pausanias conducts an army from Peloponnesus. — The Thebans apply to Athens for aid — remarkable proof of the altered sentiment in Greece. — Speech of the Theban envoy at Athens. — Political feeling at Athens — good effects of the amnesty after the expulsion of the Thirty. — Unanimous vote of the Athenians to assist Thebes against Sparta. — State of the Bœotian confederacy — Orchomenus revolts and joins Lysander, who invades Bœotia with his army and attacks Haliartus. — Lysander is repulsed and slain before Haliartus. — Pausanias arrives in Bœotia after the death of Lysander — Thrasybulus and an Athenian army come to the aid of the Thebans. — Pausanias evacuates Bœotia, on receiving the dead bodies of Lysander and the rest for burial. — Anger against Pausanias at Sparta; he escapes into voluntary exile; he is condemned in his absence. — Condemnation of Pausanias not deserved. — Sparta not less unjust in condemning unsuccessful generals than Athens. — Character of Lysander — his mischievous influence, as well for Sparta as for Greece generally. — His plans to make himself king at Sparta — discourse of the sophist Kleon. — Encouragement to the enemies of Sparta, from the death of Lysander — alliance against her between Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos — the Eubœans and others join the alliance. — Increased importance of Thebes — she now rises to the rank of a primary power — the Theban leader Ismenias. — Successful operations of Ismenias to the north of Bœotia — capture of Herakleia from Sparta. — Synod of anti-Spartan allies at Corinth — their confident hopes — the Lacedæmonians send to recall Agesilaus from Asia. — Large muster near Corinth of Spartans and Peloponnesians on one side, of anti-Spartan allies on the other. — Boldness of the language against Sparta — speech of the Corinthian Timolaus. — The anti-Spartan allies take up a defensive position near Corinth — advance of the Lacedæmonians to attack them. — Battle of Corinth — victory of the Lacedæmonians in their part of the battle; their allies in the other parts being worsted. — Lacedæmonian ascendency within Peloponnesus is secured, but no farther result gained. — Agesilaus — his vexation on being recalled from Asia — his large plans of Asiatic conquest. — Regret of the Asiatic allies when he quits Asia — he leaves Euxenus in Asia with four thousand men. — Agesilaus crosses the Hellespont and marches homeward through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. — Agesilaus and his army on the northern frontier of Bœotia — eclipse of the sun — news of the naval defeat at Knidus. — Bœotians and their allies mustered at Korôneia. — Battle of Korôneia — Agesilaus with most of his army is victorious; while the Thebans on their side are also victorious. — Terrible combat between the Thebans and Spartans; on the whole, the result is favorable to the Thebans. — Victory of Agesilaus, not without severe wounds — yet not very decisive — his conduct after the battle. — Army of Agesilaus withdraws from Bœotia — he goes to the Pythian games — sails homeward across the Corinthian Gulf — his honorable reception at Sparta. — Results of the battles of Corinth and Korôneia. Sparta had gained nothing by the former, and had rather lost by the latter. — Reverses of Sparta after the defeat of Knidus. Loss of the insular empire of Sparta. Nearly all her maritime allies revolt to join Pharnabazus and Konon. — Abydos holds faithfully to Sparta, under Derkyllidas. — Derkyllidas holds both Abydos and the Chersonesus opposite, in spite of Pharnabazus — anger of the latter. — Pharnabazus and Konon sail with their fleet to Peloponnesus and Corinth. — Assistance and encouragement given by Pharnabazus to the allies at Corinth — Remarkable fact of the Persian satrap and fleet at Corinth. — Pharnabazus leaves the fleet with Konon in the Saronic Gulf, and aids him, with money, to rebuild the Long Walls of Athens. — Konon rebuilds the Long Walls — hearty coöperation of the allies. — Great importance of this restoration — how much it depended upon accident — Maintenance of the lines of Corinth against Sparta, was one essential condition to the power of rebuilding the Long Walls. The lines were not maintained longer than the ensuing year.

284-324

CHAPTER LXXV.

FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS.

Large plans of Konon — organization of a mercenary force at Corinth. — Naval conflicts of the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians, in the Corinthian Gulf. — Land-warfare — the Lacedæmonians established at Sikyon — the anti-Spartan allies occupying the lines of Corinth from sea to sea. — Sufferings of the Corinthians from the war being carried on in their territory. Many Corinthian proprietors become averse to the war. — Growth and manifestation of the philo-Laconian party in Corinth. Oligarchical form of the government left open nothing but an appeal to force. — The Corinthian government forestall the conspiracy by a coup d’état. — Numerous persons of the philo-Laconian party are banished; nevertheless Pasimêlus the leader is spared, and remains at Corinth. — Intimate political union and consolidation between Corinth and Argos. — Pasimêlus admits the Lacedæmonians within the Long Walls of Corinth. Battle within those walls. — The Lacedæmonians are victorious — severe loss of the Argeians. — The Lacedæmonians pull down a portion of the Long Walls between Corinth and Lechæum, so as to open a free passage across. They capture Krommyon and Sidus. — Effective warfare carried on by the light troops under Iphikrates at Corinth — Military genius and improvements of Iphikrates. — The Athenians restore the Long Walls between Corinth and Lechæum — expedition of the Spartan king Agesilaus, who, in concert with Teleutias, retakes the Long Walls and captures Lechæum. — Alarm of Athens and Thebes at the capture of the Long Walls of Corinth. Propositions sent to Sparta to solicit peace. The discussions come to no result. — Advantages derived by the Corinthians from possession of Peiræum. At the instigation of the exiles, Agesilaus marches forth with an army to attack it. — Isthmian festival — Agesilaus disturbs the celebration. The Corinthian exiles, under his protection, celebrate it; then, when he is gone, the Corinthians from the city perform the ceremony over again. — Agesilaus attacks Peiræum, which he captures, together with the Heræum, many prisoners, and much booty. — Triumphant position of Agesilaus. Danger of Corinth. The Thebans send fresh envoys to solicit peace — contemptuously treated by Agesilaus. — Sudden arrival of bad news, which spoils the triumph. — Destruction of a Lacedæmonian mora by the light troops under Iphikrates. — Daring and well-planned manœuvres of Iphikrates. — Few of the mora escape to Lechæum. — The Lacedæmonians bury the bodies of the slain, under truce asked and obtained. Trophy erected by Iphikrates. — Great effect produced upon the Grecian mind by this event. Peculiar feelings of Spartans; pride of the relatives of the slain. — Mortification of Agesilaus — he marches up to the walls of Corinth and defies Iphikrates — he then goes back humiliated to Sparta. — Success of Iphikrates — he retakes Krommyon, Sidus, and Peiræum — Corinth remains pretty well undisturbed by enemies. The Athenians recall Iphikrates. — Expedition of Agesilaus against Akarnania — successful, after some delay — the Akarnanians submit, and enrol themselves in the Lacedæmonian confederacy. — The Lacedæmonians under Agesipolis invade Argos. — Manœuvre of the Argeians respecting the season of the holy truce. Agesipolis consults the oracles at Olympia and Delphi. — Earthquake in Argos after the invasion of Agesipolis — he disregards it. — He marches up near to Argos — much plunder taken — he retires. — Transactions in Asia — efforts of Sparta to detach the Great King from Athens. — The Spartan Antalkidas is sent as envoy to Tiribazus. Konon and other envoys sent also, from Athens and the anti-Spartan allies. — Antalkidas offers to surrender the Asiatic Greeks, and demands universal autonomy throughout the Grecian world — the anti-Spartan allies refuse to accede to those terms. — Hostility of Sparta to all the partial confederacies of Greece, now first proclaimed under the name of universal autonomy. — Antalkidas gains the favor of Tiribazus, who espouses privately the cause of Sparta, though the propositions for peace fail. Tiribazus seizes Konon — Konon’s career is now closed, either by death or imprisonment. — Tiribazus cannot prevail with the Persian court, which still continues hostile to Sparta. Struthas is sent down to act against the Lacedæmonians in Ionia. — Victory of Struthas over Thimbron and the Lacedæmonian army. Thimbron is slain. — Diphridas is sent to succeed Thimbron. — Lacedæmonian fleet at Rhodes — intestine disputes in the island. — The Athenians send aid to Evagoras at Cyprus. Fidelity with which they adhered to him, though his alliance had now become inconvenient. — Thrasybulus is sent with a fleet from Athens to the Asiatic coast — his acquisitions in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. — Victory of Thrasybulus in Lesbos — he levies contributions along the Asiatic coast — he is slain near Aspendus. — Character of Thrasybulus. — Agyrrhius succeeds Thrasybulus — Rhodes still holds out against the Lacedæmonians. — Anaxibius is sent to command at the Hellespont in place of Derkyllidas — his vigorous proceedings — he deprives Athens of the tolls of the strait. — The Athenians send Iphikrates with his peltasts and a fleet to the Hellespont. His stratagem to surprise Anaxibius. — Defeat and death of Anaxibius. — The Athenians are again masters of the Hellespont and the strait dues. — The island of Ægina — its past history. — The Æginetans are constrained by Sparta into war with Athens. The Lacedæmonian admiral Teleutias at Ægina. He is superseded by Hierax. His remarkable popularity among the seamen. — Hierax proceeds to Rhodes, leaving Gorgôpas at Ægina. Passage of the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas to Asia. — Gorgôpas is surprised in Ægina, defeated, and slain, by the Athenian Chabrias; who goes to assist Evagoras in Cyprus. — The Lacedæmonian seamen at Ægina unpaid and discontented. Teleutias is sent thither to conciliate them. — Sudden and successful attack of Teleutias upon the Peiræus. — Unprepared and unguarded condition of Peiræus — Teleutias gains rich plunder, and sails away in safety. — He is enabled to pay his seamen — activity of the fleet — great loss inflicted upon Athenian commerce. — Financial condition of Athens. The Theôrikon. — Direct property-taxes. — Antalkidas goes up with Tiribazus to Susa — his success at the Persian court — he brings down the terms of peace asked for by Sparta, ratified by the Great King, to be enforced by Sparta in his name. — Antalkidas in command of the Lacedæmonian and Syracusan fleets in the Hellespont, with Persian aid. His successes against the Athenians. — Distress and discouragement of Athens — anxiety of the anti-Spartan allies for peace. — Tiribazus summons them all to Sardis, to hear the convention which had been sent down by the Great King. — Terms of the convention, called the peace of Antalkidas. — Congress at Sparta for acceptance or rejection. All parties accept. The Thebans at first accept under reserve for the Bœotian cities. — Agesilaus refuses to allow the Theban reserve, and requires unconditional acceptance. His eagerness, from hatred of Thebes, to get into a war with them single-handed. The Thebans are obliged to accept unconditionally. — Agesilaus forces the Corinthians to send away their Argeian auxiliaries. The philo-Argeian Corinthians go into exile; the philo-Laconian Corinthians are restored.

326-388

HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CHAPTER LXIX.
CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

In my last volume, I brought down the History of Grecian affairs to the close of the Peloponnesian war, including a description of the permanent loss of imperial power, the severe temporary oppression, the enfranchisement and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of defeated Athens. The defeat of that once powerful city, accomplished by the Spartan confederacy,—with large pecuniary aid from the young Persian prince Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard,—left Sparta mistress, for the time, of the Grecian world. Lysander, her victorious admiral, employed his vast temporary power for the purpose of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils of Ten, composed of his own partisans; with a Lacedæmonian Harmost and garrison to enforce their oligarchical rule. Before I proceed, however, to recount, as well as it can be made out, the unexpected calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with their eventual consequences,—it will be convenient to introduce here the narrative of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the heart of the Persian empire and their still more celebrated Retreat. This incident, lying apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs, would form an item, strictly speaking, in Persian history rather than in Grecian. But its effects on the Greek mind, and upon the future course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and important; while as an illustration of Hellenic character and competence measured against that of the contemporary Asiatics, it stands preeminent and full of instruction.

This march from Sardis up to the neighborhood of Babylon, conducted by Cyrus the younger and undertaken for the purpose of placing him on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother Artaxerxes Mnemon,—was commenced about March or April in the year 401 B.C. It was about six months afterwards, in the month of September or October of the same year, that the battle of Kunaxa was fought, in which, though the Greeks were victorious, Cyrus himself lost his life. They were then obliged to commence their retreat, which occupied about one year, and ultimately brought them across the Bosphorus of Thrace to Byzantium, in October or November, 400 B.C.

The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of Artaxerxes and Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 B.C., a short time after the entire ruin of the force of Athens at Ægospotami. His reign of nineteen years, with that of his father Artaxerxes Longimanus which lasted nearly forty years, fill up almost all the interval from the death of Xerxes in 465 B.C. The close of the reigns both of Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had indeed been marked by those phenomena of conspiracy, assassination, fratricide, and family tragedy, so common in the transmission of an Oriental sceptre. Xerxes was assassinated by the chief officer of the palace, named Artabanus,—who had received from him at a banquet the order to execute his eldest son Darius, but had not fulfilled it. Artabanus, laying the blame of the assassination upon Darius, prevailed upon Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying the latter; he then attempted the life of Artaxerxes himself, but failed, and was himself killed, after carrying on the government a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after reigning about forty years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the second, who was slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus; who again was put to death after seven months, by a third brother Darius Nothus mentioned above.[1]

The wars between the Persian empire, and Athens as the head of the confederacy of Delos (477-449 B.C.), have been already related in one of my earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian empire during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us; except a formidable revolt of the satrap Megabyzus, obscurely noticed in the Fragments of Ktesias.[2] About 414 B.C. the Egyptians revolted. Their native prince Amyrtæus maintained his independence,—though probably in a part only, and not the whole, of that country,[3]—and was succeeded by a native Egyptian dynasty for the space of sixty years. A revolt of the Medes, which took place in 408 B.C., was put down by Darius, and subsequently a like revolt of the Kadusians.[4] The peace concluded in 449 B.C., between Athens and the Persian empire, continued without open violation, until the ruinous catastrophe which befel the former near Syracuse, in 413 B.C. Yet there had been various communications and envoys from Sparta to the Persian court, endeavoring to procure aid from the Great King during the early years of the war; communications so confused and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter addressed to the Spartans, in 425 B.C., and carried by his envoy Artaphernes who was captured by the Athenians), complained of being unable to understand what they meant,—no two Spartans telling the same story.[5] It appears that Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, revolted from the Persian king, shortly after this period, and that Tissaphernes was sent by the Great King to suppress this revolt; in which having succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander of the satrap’s mercenary troops, he was rewarded by the possession of the satrapy.[6] We find Tissaphernes satrap in the year 413 B.C., commencing operations jointly with the Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from Athens, after her reverses in Sicily; and employing the Spartans successfully against Amorges, the revolted son of Pissuthnes, who occupied the strong maritime town of Iasus.[7]

The increased vigor of Persian operations against Athens, after Cyrus, the younger son of Darius Nothus, came down to the Ionic coast in 407 B.C., has been recounted in my preceding volume; together with the complete prostration of Athenian power, accomplished during the ensuing three years. Residing at Sardis and placed in active coöperation with Greeks, this ambitious and energetic young prince soon became penetrated with their superior military and political efficiency, as compared with the native Asiatics. For the abilities and character of Lysander, the Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted so much admiration, that, when summoned to court during the last illness of his father Darius in 405 B.C., he even confided to that officer the whole of his tribute and treasure, to be administered in furtherance of the war;[8] which during his absence was brought to a victorious close.

Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the throne, was not more than eighteen years of age when first sent down to Sardis (in 407 B.C.) as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Kappadokia, and as commander of that Persian military division which mustered at the plain of Kastôlus; a command not including the Ionic Greeks on the seaboard, who were under the satrapy of Tissaphernes.[9] We cannot place much confidence in the account which Xenophon gives of his education; that he had been brought up with his brother and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace,—under the strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits, with the reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of them, and upon him with peculiar success.[10] It is contradicted by all the realities which we read about the Persian court, and is a patch of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment, better suited to the romance of the Cyropædia that to the history of the Anabasis. But in the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship, mastery of the bow and of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance in hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without being intoxicated,—Cyrus stood preeminent; and especially so when compared with his elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at least unwarlike, if not lazy and timid.[11] And although the peculiar virtue of the Hellenic citizen,—competence for alternate command and obedience,—formed no part of the character of Cyrus, yet it appears that Hellenic affairs and ideas became early impressed upon his mind; insomuch that on first coming down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with him strong interest for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy to that ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally humbled and repressed. How zealously he coöperated with Lysander and the Peloponnesians in putting down Athens, has been shown in my last preceding volume.[12]

An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having once learnt from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow in divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power to himself. To coöperate effectively in the war, it was necessary that he should act to a certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and conciliate the good will of the Ionic Greeks; so that he came to combine the imperious and unsparing despotism of a Persian prince, with something of the regularity and system belonging to a Grecian administrator. Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems to have calculated from the first upon succeeding to the Persian crown at the death of his father. So undetermined was the law of succession in the Persian royal family, and so constant the dispute and fratricide on each vacancy of the throne, that such ambitious schemes would appear feasible to a young man of much less ardor than Cyrus. Moreover he was the favorite son of queen Parysatis,[13] who greatly preferred him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was born after the accession of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes had been born prior to that event; and, as this latter consideration had been employed seventy years earlier by queen Atossa[14] in determining her husband Darius son of Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime) her son Xerxes as his intended successor, to the exclusion of an elder son by a different wife, and born before his accession,—so Cyrus, perhaps, anticipated the like effective preference to himself from the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were farther inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of the monarchy; whose memory every Persian reverenced. How completely he reckoned on becoming king, is shown by a cruel act performed about the early part of 405 B.C. It was required as a part of Persian etiquette that every man who came into the presence of the king should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large sleeves, which rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use; but such deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins of Cyrus,—sons of Hieramenês, (seemingly one of the satraps or high Persian dignitaries in Asia Minor), by a sister of Darius,—appeared in his presence without thus concealing their hands;[15] upon which Cyrus ordered them both to be put to death. The father and mother preferred bitter complaints of this atrocity to Darius; who was induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on the ground, not at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.

If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was important that he should be on the spot when his father died. He accordingly went up from Sardis to Media, along with his body guard of three hundred Greeks, under the Arcadian Xenias; who were so highly remunerated for this distant march, that the rate of pay was long celebrated.[16] He also took with him Tissaphernes as an ostensible friend; though there seems to have been a real enmity between them. Not long after his arrival, Darius died; but without complying with the request of Parysatis that he should declare in favor of Cyrus as his successor. Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed king, went to Pasargadæ, the religious capital of the Persians, to perform the customary solemnities. Thus disappointed, Cyrus was farther accused by Tissaphernes of conspiring the death of his brother; who caused him to be seized, and was even on the point of putting him to death, when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis saved his life.[17] He was sent down to his former satrapy at Sardis, whither he returned with insupportable feelings of anger and wounded pride, and with a determined resolution to leave nothing untried for the purpose of dethroning his brother. This statement, given to us by Xenophon, represents doubtless the story of Cyrus and his friends, current among the Cyreian army. But if we look at the probabilities of the case, we shall be led to suspect that the charge of Tissaphernes may well have been true, and the conspiracy of the disappointed Cyrus against his brother, a reality instead of a fiction.[18]

The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly favorable to his plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded by the capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many Greeks, after having acquired military tastes and habits, were now thrown out of employment; many others were driven into exile, by the establishment of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout all the cities at once. Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service like that of Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a certain number of Greek mercenaries, distributed throughout the various garrisons in his satrapy, he directed the officers in command to strengthen their garrisons by as many additional Peloponnesian soldiers as they could obtain. His pretext was,—first, defence against Tissaphernes, with whom, since the denunciation by the latter, he was at open war,—next, protection of the Ionic cities on the seaboard, who had been hitherto comprised under the government of Tissaphernes, but had now revolted of their own accord, since the enmity of Cyrus against him had been declared. Miletus alone had been prevented from executing this resolution, for Tissaphernes, reinforcing his garrison in that place, had adopted violent measures of repression, killing or banishing several of the leading men. Cyrus, receiving these exiled Milesians with every demonstration of sympathy, immediately got together both an army and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos,[19] to besiege Miletus by land and sea. He at the same time transmitted to court the regular tribute due from these maritime cities, and attempted, through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure that they should be transferred from Tissaphernes to himself. Hence the Great King was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus were only intended for private war between him and Tissaphernes; an event not uncommon between two neighboring satraps. Nor was it displeasing to the court that a suspected prince should be thus occupied at a distance.[20]

Besides the army thus collected around Miletus, Cyrus found means to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and unsuspected. A Lacedæmonian officer named Klearchus, of considerable military ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at Sardis. He appears to have been banished, (as far as we can judge amidst contradictory statements,) for gross abuse of authority, and extreme tyranny, as Lacedæmonian Harmost at Byzantium, and even for having tried to maintain himself in that place after the Ephors had formally dismissed him. The known efficiency, and restless warlike appetite of Klearchus,[21] procured for him the confidence of Cyrus, who gave him the large sum of ten thousand Darics, (about £7600), which he employed in levying an army of mercenary Greeks for the defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese against the Thracian tribes in their neighborhood; thus maintaining the troops until they were required by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon,—Thessalians of the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa, who had maintained their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family ever since the time of Xerxes, and were now in connection with Cyrus,[22]—received from him funds to maintain a force of two thousand mercenaries for their political purposes in Thessaly, subject to his call whenever he should require them. Other Greeks, too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality with Cyrus by service during the late war,—Proxenus, a Bœotian; Agias and Sophænetus, Arcadians; Sokrates, an Achæan, etc.,—were also empowered by him to collect mercenary soldiers. His pretended objects were, partly the siege of Miletus; partly an ostensible expedition against the Pisidians,—warlike and predatory mountaineers who did much mischief from their fastnesses in the south-east of Asia Minor.

Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys to the Lacedæmonians to invoke their aid, in requital for the strenuous manner in which he had seconded their operations against Athens,—and received a favorable answer. He farther got together a considerable native force, taking great pains to conciliate friends as well as to inspire confidence. “He was straightforward and just, like a candidate for command,”—to use the expression of Herodotus respecting the Median Dëiokês;[23] maintaining order and security throughout his satrapy, and punishing evil doers in great numbers, with the utmost extremity of rigor; of which the public roads exhibited abundant living testimony, in the persons of mutilated men, deprived of their hands, feet, or eyesight.[24] But he was also exact in rewarding faithful service, both civil and military. He not only made various expeditions against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians, but was forward in exposing his own person, and munificent, rewarding the zeal of all soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached men to his person both by a winning demeanor and by seasonable gifts. As it was the uniform custom, (and is still the custom in the East), for every one who approached Cyrus to come with a present in his hand,[25] so he usually gave away again these presents as marks of distinction to others. Hence he not only acquired the attachment of all in his own service, but also of those Persians whom Artaxerxes sent down on various pretences for the purpose of observing his motions. Of these emissaries from Susa, some were even sent to obstruct and enfeeble him. It was under such orders that a Persian named Orontes, governor of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against Cyrus; who twice subdued him, and twice pardoned him, on solemn assurance of fidelity for the future.[26] In all agreements, even with avowed enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly; so that his word was trusted by every one.

Of such virtues, (rare in an Oriental ruler, either ancient or modern,)—and of such secret preparations,—Cyrus sought to reap the fruits at the beginning of 401 B.C. Xenias, his general at home, brought together all the garrisons, leaving a bare sufficiency for defence of the towns. Klearchus, Menon, and the other Greek generals were recalled, and the siege of Miletus was relinquished; so that there was concentrated at Sardis a body of seven thousand seven hundred Grecian hoplites, with five hundred light armed.[27] Others afterwards joined on the march, and there was, besides, a native army of about one hundred thousand men. With such means Cyrus set forth, (March or April, 401 B.C.), from Sardis. His real purpose was kept secret; his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood by every one except himself and Klearchus, was to conquer and root out the Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedæmonian and Persian fleet, under the Lacedæmonian admiral Samius, at the same time coasted round the south of Asia Minor, in order to lend coöperation from the sea-side.[28] This Lacedæmonian coöperation passed for a private levy effected by Cyrus himself; for the ephors would not formally avow hostility against the Great King.[29]

The body of Greeks, immortalized under the name of the Ten Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected perils,—though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were by no means outcasts, or even men of extreme poverty. They were for the most part persons of established position, and not a few even opulent. Half of them were Acadians or Achæans.

Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honorable and munificent dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from their fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted to leave their wives and children; and there were even some who had embarked their own money in advance of outfit for other poorer men, as well as for themselves.[30] All calculated on a year’s campaign in Pisidia; which might perhaps be hard, but would certainly be lucrative, and would enable them to return with a well-furnished purse. So the Greek commanders at Sardis all confidently assured them; extolling, with the emphasis and eloquence suitable to recruiting officers, both the liberality of Cyrus[31] and the abundant promise of all men of enterprise.

Among others, the Bœotian Proxenus wrote to his friend Xenophon, at Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and offering to present him to Cyrus, whom he, (Proxenus,) “considered as a better friend to him than his own country;[32]” a striking evidence of the manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian patriotism, which we shall recognize more and more as we advance forward. This able and accomplished Athenian,—entitled to respectful gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from the Cyreian army and the intellectual world generally,—was one of the class of Knights or Horsemen, and is said to have served in that capacity at the battle of Delium.[33] Of his previous life we know little or nothing, except that he was an attached friend and diligent hearer of Sokrates; the memorials of whose conversation we chiefly derive from his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the Cyreian march. In my last preceding chapter on Sokrates, I have made ample use of the Memorabilia of Xenophon; and I am now about to draw from his Anabasis (a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative) the account of the adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are fortunate in knowing from so authentic a source.

On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which three years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the Thirty, (how far he was personally concerned, we cannot say,) it is probable that residence in Athens was in those times not peculiarly agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokrates; who, apprehensive lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens, might expose him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an application to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went; but in truth he had already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead of asking, “whether he ought to go or refuse,”—he simply put the question, “To which of the gods must I sacrifice, in order to obtain safety and success in a journey which I am now meditating?” The reply of the oracle,—indicating Zeus Basileus as the god to whom sacrifice was proper,—was brought back by Xenophon; upon which Sokrates, though displeased that the question had not been fairly put as to the whole project, nevertheless advised, since an answer had now been given, that it should be literally obeyed. Accordingly Xenophon, having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took his departure first to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found the army about to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who entreated him earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him as soon as the campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.[34] He was thus induced to stay, yet only as a volunteer or friend of Proxenus, without accepting any special post in the army, either as officer or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service under Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokrates, of rendering him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards banished, this sentence was not passed against him until after the battle of Korôneia in 394 B.C., where he was in arms as a conspicuous officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen and their Theban allies,—nor need we look farther back for the grounds of the sentence.

Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of his brother’s ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch him, yet Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies, and had masked his preparations so skilfully, that no intimation was conveyed to Susa until the march was about to commence. It was only then that Tissaphernes, seeing the siege of Miletus relinquished, and the vast force mustering at Sardis, divined that something more was meant than the mere conquest of Pisidian freebooters, and went up in person to warn the king; who began his preparations forthwith.[35] That which Tissaphernes had divined was yet a secret to every man in the army, to Proxenus as well as the rest,—when Cyrus, having confided the provisional management of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen, and to his admiral the Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a south-easterly direction from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.[36] Three days’ march, a distance stated at twenty-two parasangs,[37] brought him to the Mæander; one additional march of eight parasangs, after crossing that river, forwarded him to Kolossæ, a flourishing city in Phrygia, where Menon overtook him with a reinforcement of one thousand hoplites, and five hundred peltasts,—Dolopes, Ænianes, and Olynthians. He then marched three days onward to Kelænæ, another Phrygian city, “great and flourishing,” with a citadel very strong both by nature and art. Here he halted no less than thirty days, in order to await the arrival of Klearchus, with his division of one thousand hoplites, eight hundred Thracian peltasts, and two hundred Kretan bowmen; at the same time Sophænetus arrived with one thousand farther hoplites, and Sosias with three hundred. This total of Greeks was reviewed by Cyrus in one united body at Kelænæ; eleven thousand hoplites and two thousand peltasts.[38]

As far as Kelænæ, his march had been directed straight towards Pisidia, near the borders of which territory that city is situated. So far, therefore, the fiction with which he started was kept up. But on leaving Kelænæ, he turned his march away from Pisidia, in a direction nearly northward; first in two days, ten parasangs, to the town of Peltæ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs, to Keramôn-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia. At Peltæ, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lykæa, with its usual games and matches, in the presence of Cyrus. From Keramôn-Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of thirty parasangs,[39] to a city called Käystru-Pedion, (the plain of Käystrus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no pay for three months, (Xenophon had before told us that they were mostly men who had some means of their own), and who now flocked around his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was Cyrus by previous disbursements,—perhaps also by remissions of tribute for the purpose of popularizing himself,—that he was utterly without money, and was obliged to put them off again with promises. And his march might well have ended here, had he not been rescued from embarrassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the Kilikian prince Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money, and enabled him to give to the Greek soldiers four months’ pay at once. As to the Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received little beyond their maintenance.

Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the army to Thymbrium; two more to Tyriæum. Each day’s march is called five parasangs[40]. It was here that Cyrus, halting three days, passed the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess Epyaxa, who was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic troops were first made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry in their separate divisions; after which he himself in a chariot, and Epyaxa in a Harmamaxa, (a sort of carriage or litter covered with an awning which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along the front of the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were marshalled four deep, all in their best trim; brazen helmets, purple tunics, greaves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just taken out of the wrappers in which they were carried during a mere march.[41] Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on the right; the other generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly, the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all the Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their property,—Epyaxa herself among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had among her personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never before seen a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified; much to the satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of his coming success.[42]

Three days of farther march, (called twenty parasangs in all) brought the army to Ikonium, (now Konieh), the extreme city of Phrygia; where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five days (thirty parasangs) through Lykaonia; which country, as being out of his own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks to plunder. Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia, its inhabitants were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they were of the like predatory character:[43] so that Cyrus would be partially realizing the pretended purpose of his expedition. He thus, too, approached near to Mount Taurus, which separated him from Kilikia; and he here sent the Kilikian princess, together with Menon and his division, over the mountain, by a pass shorter and more direct, but seemingly little frequented, and too difficult for the whole army; in order that they might thus get straight into Kilikia,[44] in the rear of Syennesis, who was occupying the regular pass more to the northward. Intending to enter with his main body through this latter pass, Cyrus first proceeded through Kappadokia (four days’ march, twenty-five parasangs) to Dana or Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia; where he halted three days, and where he put to death two Persian officers, on a charge of conspiring against him.[45]

This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated Tauri-Pylæ or Kilikian Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for vehicles, it was yet three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the sea, narrow, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and crossed by a wall with gates, so that it could not be forced if ever so moderately defended.[46] But the Kilikian prince, alarmed at the news that Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less frequented pass to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing along the coast, evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell back to Tarsus; from whence he again retired, accompanied by most of the inhabitants, to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains. Accordingly Cyrus, ascending without opposition the great pass thus abandoned, reached Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining Menon and Epyaxa. Two lochi or companies of the division of Menon, having dispersed on their march for pillage, had been cut off by the natives; for which the main body of Greeks now took their revenge, plundering both the city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince, though invited by Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, but was at length prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to return under a safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, to exchange presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money towards his expedition, together with a contingent of troops; in return for which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther plundered, and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever they were found.[47]

It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so, that the resistance of Syennesis, (this was a standing name or title of the hereditary princes of Kilikia under the Persian crown), was a mere feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a supply of money to Cyrus, and the admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were manœuvres in collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the same time to give himself the air of having been overpowered, in case Artaxerxes should prove victorious.[48]

At first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days. The army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of the expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not one of them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary, except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to be conducted against the Persian king. Besides the resentment at such delusion, they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any fear of Persian armies, but from the terrors of a march of three months inward from the coast, and the impossibility of return, which had so powerfully affected the Spartan King Kleomenes,[49] a century before; most of them being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and family in their respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their determination to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to fight against the Great King.[50]

Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Xenias, etc.) commanded his own separate division, without any generalissimo except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized more or less in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated as a commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof of the great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military discipline. For though he had great military merits, being brave, resolute, and full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the subsistence of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and hardship,—yet his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his soldiers; who accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders required them,—but preferred service under other commanders, when they could obtain it.[51] Finding his orders to march forward disobeyed, Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself with the cattle who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward, and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a regular assembly, and to essay persuasion.

On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping; a remarkable point in Grecian manners,—and exceedingly impressive to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At length he addressed them: “Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me ten thousand Darics, which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, and in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against Thracian depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness. But now, since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the necessity either of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him. Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot say; but I shall stand by you, and share your fate. No one shall say of me that, having conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed the Greeks and chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies; while you are with me, I can help a friend, and repel an enemy. Understand me well; I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune.”[52]

This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers with much delight; in which those of the other Greek divisions sympathized, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had yet announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among the soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that two thousand of them left their commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the encampment of Klearchus.

Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered, sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He, however, at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at last,—and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be sent, in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals. He then again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those who had recently deserted Xenias to join him. “Soldiers (said he), we must recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks we have wronged him,—so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near him. He is a good friend,—but a formidable enemy; and has a powerful force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This is no time for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether to stay or go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as to obtain provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest.”

Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be impatient for immediate departure. “If Klearchus does not choose to conduct us back (said this speaker) let us immediately elect other generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to ask Cyrus for merchant-vessels,—or at any rate for guides in our return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes.” Klearchus here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other commander who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker, who demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus, either for a guide, or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible. The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really wanted; which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their resolution accordingly.

To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days’ march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again consult what step was fit to be taken.

The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, but nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They required only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per cent. upon the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each soldier, he agreed to give a daric and a half.[53]

This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal made to their reason and judgment,—the habit, established more or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves to this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look at the actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best to be done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood, against the wish of Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty and danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by the best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.

As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five days’ march,—crossing the rivers Sarus[54] and Pyramus. At Issus, a flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called, Cyrus was joined by his fleet of fifty triremes,—thirty-five Lacedæmonian and twenty-five Persian triremes; bringing a reinforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the Spartan Ephors.[55] He also received a farther reinforcement of four hundred Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in his army fourteen thousand, from which are to be deducted the one hundred soldiers of Menon’s division, slain in Kilikia.

The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of some importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three hundred thousand men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom they now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning amidst the king’s army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement, that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior; abandoning three defensible positions in succession—1. The Gates of Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus. 3. The passage of the Euphrates.—He appears to have been alarmed by the easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more, probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis with the invader.[56]

Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria stoutly defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing up his fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one day’s march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by walls and gates; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this pass against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it undefended.[57] And here we cannot but notice the superior ability and forethought of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties of his march, beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting them; whereas, on the king’s side, all the numerous means and opportunities of defence are successively abandoned; the Persians have no confidence, except in vast numbers,—or when numbers fail, in treachery.

Five parasangs, or one day’s march from this pass, Cyrus reached the Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great commerce, with its harbor full of merchantmen. While he rested here seven days, his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him; privately engaging a merchant vessel to carry them away with their property. They could not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting Klearchus to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted may have been unwilling to return to their original commanders, after having taken so offensive a step. And this may partly account for the policy of Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could not but feel as a great wrong, in which a large portion of the army sympathized. The general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus would immediately despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives. But instead of this, he summoned the remaining generals, and after communicating to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone, added,—“I have plenty of triremes to overtake their merchantmen if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will do no such thing. No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man while he is with me,—and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him, when he wishes to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as hostages, at Tralles;[58] but even these shall be given up to them, in consideration of their good behavior down to the present day. Let them go if they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave worse towards me than I towards them.” This behavior, alike judicious and conciliating, was universally admired, and produced the best possible effect upon the spirits of the army; imparting a confidence in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the prevailing discouragement, in the unknown march upon which they were entering.[59]

At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back his fleet,[60] and striking with his land-force eastward into the interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross mount Amanus, by the pass of Beilan; an eminently difficult road, which he was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might easily have defended it, if he had chosen.[61] Four days’ march brought the army to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred by the neighboring inhabitants; five more days, to the sources of the river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys; three days farther, to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the important ford or transit of the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude about 35° 40′ N.[62] The river, when the Cyreians arrived, was four stadia, or somewhat less than half an English mile, in breadth.

Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled formally to make known to his soldiers the real object of the march, hitherto, in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent for the Greek generals, and desired them to communicate publicly the fact, that he was on the advance to Babylon against his brother,—which to themselves, probably, had been for some time well known. Among the soldiers, however, the first announcement excited loud murmurs, accompanied by accusation against the generals, of having betrayed them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to the strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus. Evidently they suspected, and had almost made up their minds to, the real truth; so that their complaint was soon converted into a demand for a donation to each man, as soon as they should reach Babylon; as much as that which Cyrus had given to his Grecian detachment on going up thither before. Cyrus willingly promised them five minæ per head (about £19 5s.), equal to more than a year’s pay, at the rate recently stipulated of a daric and a half per month. He engaged to give them, besides, the full rate of pay until they should have been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the Greeks, and served to counterbalance at least, if not to efface, the terrors of that unknown region which they were about to tread.

But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced their formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was already in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to decide separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, before the others had given any answer. “By acting thus (said he) you will confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward. If the others follow you across, he will suppose that they do so because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you could for him.” Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however, completely; for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents to Menon separately.[63] He passed with his whole army immediately afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.

What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not defend this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? We are told that he had been there a little before, and that he had thought it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to have been never before fordable,—always passed by means of boats; insomuch that they treated the actual low state of the water as a providential interposition of the gods in favor of Cyrus; “the river made way for him to come and take the sceptre.” When we find that Abrokomas came too late afterwards for the battle of Kunaxa, we shall be led to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in Kilikia, was playing a double game between the two royal brothers, and that he was content with destroying those vessels which formed the ordinary means of communication between the banks, without taking any means to inquire whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to Cyrus, could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact, that they had never seen the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or not), so long as there were regular ferry-boats.[64]

After crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus proceeded, for nine days’ march,[65] southward along its left bank, until he came to its affluent, the river Araxes or Chaboras, which divided Syria from Arabia. From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated, he supplied himself with a large stock of provisions, to confront the desolate march through Arabia on which they were about to enter, following the banks of the Euphrates still further southward. It was now that he entered on what may be called the Desert,—an endless breadth or succession of undulations, “like the sea,” without any cultivation or even any tree; nothing but wormwood and various aromatic shrubs.[66] Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the first time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which afforded sport, and occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused themselves by chasing them; though the wild ass was swifter than any horse, and the ostrich altogether unapproachable. Five days’ march brought them to Korsôtê, a town which had been abandoned by its inhabitants,—probably, however, leaving the provision dealers behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Kilikia;[67] since the army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that they could obtain was required, and was indeed insufficient, for the trying journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and ninety computed parasangs, did they march along the left bank of the Euphrates, without provisions, and even without herbage except in some few places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers lived for some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals perished of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal efforts of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular junctures; efforts in which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under his express orders, took zealous part, toiling in the dirt with their ornamented attire.[68] After these thirteen days of hardship, they reached Pylæ; near the entrance of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest and refresh.[69] There was on the opposite side of the river, at or near this point, a flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of the soldiers crossed over (by means of skins stuffed with hay), and procured plentiful supplies, especially of date-wine and millet.[70]

It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division, subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of Menon’s soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged. The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to such a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of the river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only through the encampment of Menon,—one of the soldiers who happened to be cutting wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at the head of his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile attitude against Menon’s division; who on their side ran to arms, with Menon himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of defence. A slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company of his hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two disputing parties, and entreated Klearchus to desist from farther assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that his recent insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so lightly, he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, until Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came galloping up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand. “Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to blows, it will be the hour of my destruction,—and of your own also, shortly after me. For if your force be ruined, all these natives whom you see around, will become more hostile to us even than the men now serving with the King.” On hearing this (says Xenophon) Klearchus came to his senses, and the troops dispersed without any encounter.[71]

After passing Pylæ, the territory called Babylonia began. The hills flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto been passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.[72] Traces were now discovered, the first throughout their long march, of a hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country and burning the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined in his tent, in the presence of various Persians possessing his intimate confidence, as well as of Klearchus with a guard of three thousand hoplites. Orontes was examined, found guilty, and privately put to death.[73]

After three days’ march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve parasangs, Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the reports of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand, and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians; but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. His numbers were counted at this spot, and it was found that there were, of Greeks ten thousand four hundred hoplites, and two thousand five hundred peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, one hundred thousand men with twenty scythed chariots. The numbers of the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters described the army of Artaxerxes at one million two hundred thousand men, besides the six thousand horse-guards commanded by Artagerses, and two hundred scythed chariots, under the command of Abrokomas, Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however, that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.

In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals as well as the Lochages (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause. Few points in this narrative are more striking than the language addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on other occasions.

“It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you will have to encounter,—vast numbers and plenty of noise; but if you despise these, I am ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff you will find in these native men. Behave well,—like brave men, and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your friends at home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to prefer my service to your own homes.”

“Some of us are remarking, Cyrus, (said a Samian exile named Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when danger is over.... As to ability, (replied Cyrus), my father’s empire reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in satrapies among my brother’s friends; all, if we are victorious, will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present a wreath of gold.”

Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him,—“Do you really think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you?... Yes, by Zeus, (was the reply); assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not win this prize without a battle.” All the Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to expose his own person, but to take post in the rear of their body.[74] We shall see presently how this advice was followed.

The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions employed before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers of Menon near Charmandê—being, as they are, genuine and authentic, and not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus in the Persæ, nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed to Xerxes in Herodotus,—are among the most valuable evidences respecting the Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the superior courage and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared with the cowardice of Asiatics,—but also their fidelity and sense of obligation which he contrasts with the time-serving treachery of the latter;[75] connecting these superior qualities with the political freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince expressing such strong admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and such ardent personal preference for it above all the splendor of his own position,—was doubtless the most flattering of all compliments which he could pay to the listening citizen-soldiers. That a young Persian prince should be capable of conceiving such a sentiment, is no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level both of his family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is expressed by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus[76] in Herodotus. To Xerxes, the conception of free citizenship,—and of orderly, self-sufficing courage planted by a public discipline, patriotic as well as equalizing,—was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible. He understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed themselves and that there was no man who had any rights of his own over them,—that the law was their only master, and that in rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else but for themselves.[77] Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment of Hellenic honor, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost their political freedom by the hands of the Macedonians, and exchanged for that intellectual quickness, combined with moral degeneracy, which Cicero and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these once high-toned communities.

Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating the appearance of the king’s forces. Nothing of the kind was seen, however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were evident. The day’s march, (called three parasangs) having been concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic prophet Silanus, and presented him with three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time; upon which Cyrus had told him,—“If your prophecy comes true, I will give you three thousand darics. My brother will not fight at all, if he does not fight within ten days.”[78]

In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply to Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle would be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course of this last day’s march, he came to a broad and deep trench (thirty feet broad and eighteen feet deep), approaching so near to the Euphrates as to leave an interval of only twenty feet for passage. This trench had been dug by order of Artaxerxes across the plain, for a length said to be of twelve parasangs (about forty-two English miles, if the parasang be reckoned at thirty stadia), so as to touch at its other extremity what was called the walls of Media.[79] It had been dug as a special measure of defence against the approaching invaders. Yet we hear with surprise, and the invaders themselves found with equal surprise, that not a man was on the spot to defend it; so that the whole Cyreian army and baggage passed without resistance through the narrow breadth of twenty feet. This is the first notice of any defensive measures taken to repel the invasion,—except the precaution of Abrokomas in burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus had been allowed to traverse all this immense space, and to pass through so many defensible positions, without having yet struck a blow. And now Artaxerxes, after having cut a prodigious extent of trench at the cost of so much labor,—provided a valuable means of resistance, especially against Grecian heavy-armed soldiers,—and occupied it seemingly until the very last moment,—throws it up from some unaccountable panic, and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed through this very narrow gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so formidable an obstacle, Cyrus as well as the Greeks imagined that Artaxerxes would never think of fighting in the open plain. All began to relax in that careful array which had been observed since the midnight review, insomuch that he himself proceeded in his chariot instead of on horseback, while many of the Greek soldiers lodged their arms on the waggons or beasts of burden.[80]

On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they were surprised, at a spot called Kunaxa,[81] just when they were about to halt for the mid-day meal and repose, by the sudden intimation that the king’s army was approaching in order of battle on the open plain. Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback, to arm himself, and to put his forces in order, while the Greeks on their side halted and formed their line with all possible speed.[82] They were on the right wing of the army, adjoining the river Euphrates; Ariæus with the Asiatic forces being on the left, and Cyrus himself, surrounded by a body-guard of six hundred well-armed Persian horsemen, in the centre. Among the Greeks, Klearchus commanded the right division of hoplites, with Paphlagonian horsemen and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme right, close to the river; Proxenus with his division stood next; Menon commanded on the left. All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus had breastplates, helmets, short Grecian swords, and two javelins in their right hands; the horses also were defended by facings both over the breast and head. Cyrus himself, armed generally like the rest, stood distinguished by having an upright tiara instead of the helmet. Though the first news had come upon them by surprise, the Cyreians had ample time to put themselves in complete order; for the enemy did not appear until the afternoon was advanced. First, was seen dust, like a white cloud,—next, an undefined dark spot, gradually nearing, until the armor began to shine, and the component divisions of troops, arranged in dense masses, became discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left, opposite to the Greeks, at the head of the Persian horsemen, with white cuirasses; on his right, stood the Persian bowmen, with their gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so as to be fastened in the ground while arrows were shot from behind them; next, the Egyptian infantry with long wooden shields covering the whole body and legs. In front of all was a row of chariots with scythes attached to the wheels, destined to begin the charge against the Grecian phalanx.[83]

As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the front, and desired Klearchus to make his attack with the Greeks upon the centre of the enemy; since it was there that the king in person would be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory was gained. But such was the superiority of Artaxerxes in numbers, that his centre extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly Klearchus, afraid of withdrawing his right from the river, lest he should be taken both in flank and rear, chose to keep his position on the right,—and merely replied to Cyrus, that he would manage everything for the best. I have before remarked[84] how often the fear of being attacked on the unshielded side and on the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements inconsistent with military expediency; and it will be seen presently that Klearchus, blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution, was induced here to commit the capital mistake of keeping on the right flank, contrary to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.[85] The latter continued for a short time riding slowly in front of the lines, looking alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon, one of the small total of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of Proxenus, rode forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had any orders to give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that the sacrifices were favorable. Hearing a murmur going through the Grecian ranks, he inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received for answer, that the watchword was now being passed along for the second time. He asked, with some surprise, who gave the watchword? and what it was? Xenophon replied that it was “Zeus the Preserver, and Victory.”—“I accept it,” replied Cyrus; “let that be the word;” and immediately rode away to his own post in the centre, among the Asiatics.

The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and without noise, were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when the Greek troops raised the pæan or usual war-cry, and began to move forward. As they advanced, the shout became more vehement, the pace accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.[86] This might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other than Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the charge. They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly within bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the scythed chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with the rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass. The left division of the king’s army was thus routed without a blow, and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way of one of the chariots.[87] Tissaphernes alone,—who, with the body of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian left, close to the river,—formed an exception to this universal flight. He charged and penetrated through the Grecian peltasts, who stood opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These peltasts, commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, opened their ranks to let him pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without losing any one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear of the Greeks, who continued, on their side, to pursue the flying Persians before them.[88]

Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field. Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left of the Cyreians.[89] Finding no one directly opposed to him, he began to wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies; not noticing the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other hand, when he saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was overjoyed; and received from every one around him salutations, as if he were already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command enough not yet to rush forward as if the victory was already gained,[90] but remained unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse around him, watching the movements of Artaxerxes. As soon as he saw the latter wheeling round his right division to get upon the rear of the Cyreians, he hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge upon the centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the body-guard of six thousand horse, under Artagerses. So vigorous was the attack of Cyrus, that with his six hundred horse, he broke and dispersed this body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own hand. His own six hundred horse rushed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, leaving Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select few, called his “Table-Companions,” around him. It was under these circumstances that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes, whose person had been exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight filled him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,[91] that he lost all thought of safety or prudence,—cried out, “I see the man,”—and rushed forward with his mere handful of companions to attack Artaxerxes, in spite of the numerous host behind him. Cyrus made directly at his brother, darting his javelin with so true an aim as to strike him in the breast, and wound him through the cuirass; though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ktesias) could not have been very severe, since Artaxerxes did not quit the field, but, on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those around him, against this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat did not last long. Cyrus, being severely wounded under the eye by the javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast from his horse and slain. The small number of faithful companions around him all perished in his defence. Artasyras, who stood first among them in his confidence and attachment, seeing him mortally wounded and fallen, cast himself down upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this position either slew himself, or was slain by order of the king.[92]

The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were immediately cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited conspicuously to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the entire contest was at an end; and so it was understood by Ariæus, who, together with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the field and fled back to the camp. Not even there did they defend themselves, when the king and his forces pursued them; but fled yet farther back to the resting-place of the previous night. The troops of Artaxerxes got into the camp and began to plunder it without resistance. Even the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two Grecian women,—of free condition, good family, and education,—one from Phokæa, the other from Miletus, brought to him, by force, from their parents to Sardis. The elder of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto, distinguished alike for beauty and accomplished intelligence, was made prisoner and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxes; the other, a younger person, found means to save herself, though without her upper garments,[93] and sought shelter among some Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the Grecian baggage. These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those reserved waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that his Grecian auxiliaries might be certain, under all circumstances, of a supply.[94]

While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he was joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had charged through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time, there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia or three and a half miles between him and Klearchus with the Grecian division; so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the Persian fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the king’s troops had been victorious on the left and centre, and were masters of the camp,—but not yet knowing of the death of Cyrus,—Klearchus marched back his troops, and met the enemy’s forces also returning. He was apprehensive of being surrounded by superior numbers, and therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In this position, Artaxerxes again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack him, but the Greeks, anticipating his movement, were first in making the attack themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even more terror-stricken than before. Klearchus, thus relieved from all enemies, waited awhile in hopes of hearing news of Cyrus. He then returned to the camp, which was found stripped of all its stores; so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night without supper, while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour at which the battle had commenced.[95] It was only on the next morning that they learnt, through Proklês (descendant of the Spartan king Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece), that Cyrus had been slain; news which converted their satisfaction at their own triumph into sorrow and dismay.[96]

Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the ambitious hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His character and proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in the conduct of this expedition, and in the two or three years of administration in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed qualities such as are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in any other member of the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any other Persian general throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a large and long-sighted combination,—a power of foreseeing difficulties, and providing means beforehand for overcoming them,—a dexterity in meeting variable exigencies, and dealing with different parties, Greeks or Asiatics, officers or soldiers,—a conviction of the necessity, not merely of purchasing men’s service by lavish presents, but of acquiring their confidence by straightforward dealing and systematic good faith,—a power of repressing displeasure when policy commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first conspiracies of Orontes; although usually the punishments which he inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when we contrast this portrait, by Xenophon, with the description of the Persian satraps by Isokrates.[97] That many persons deserted from Artaxerxes to Cyrus,—none, except Orontes, from Cyrus to Artaxerxes,—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Kunaxa, the judgment of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. The two matters of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take care of the person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of Artaxerxes with the central division around him. Now it was the fault of Klearchus, and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted; and that the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him, like a madman, against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put to death two first cousins, because they omitted, in his presence, an act of deference never paid except to the king in person,—this same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother, and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in regal families,[98] blinded him, for the moment, to all rational calculation.

We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and become king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestall the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus as recorded by Xenophon[99]) have thought him a better friend to them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each Grecian city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomanus, had ability or perseverance enough to follow out; none of them knew either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to employ them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands,—and an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias.

CHAPTER LXX.
RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

The first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay and sorrow; accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture into which he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus himself too repented, and with good reason, of having displayed, in his manner of fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so little regard either to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus. Nevertheless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the field, and after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince, desired Proklês and Glus to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that the Greeks on their side were conquerors without any enemy remaining; that they were about to march onward against Artaxerxes; and that if Ariæus would join them, they would place him on the throne which had been intended for Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by his particular friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks procured a meal as well as they could, having no bread, by killing some of the baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts.[100]

Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds appeared coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek from Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was in the service of the Persian king.[101] Phalinus, an officer of some military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, addressed himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the king, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for victorious men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to examine the sacrifice which was going on, he left the interview to the other officers, who met the summons of Phalinus by an emphatic negative. “If the king thinks himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them.” “The king (rejoined Phalinus) thinks that you are in his power, being in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by impassable rivers, and encompassed by his innumerable subjects.”—“Our arms and our valor are all that remain to us (replied a young Athenian); we shall not be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but shall employ them still to have a fight for your treasure.”[102] But though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting others disposed to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else. In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested by Phalinus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first asked the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common feeling of Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little judgment, that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out. “If (replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your favor, in the event of a contest with the king, I should advise you to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance of safety for you against the king’s consent, I recommend you to look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself.” Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question, Klearchus rejoined,—“That is your opinion; now report our answer: We think we shall be better friends to the king, if we are to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are to be his enemies,—with our arms, than without them.” Phalinus, in retiring, said that the king proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in their present position,—but war, if they moved, either onward or backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without declaring which he intended to do.[103]

Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to Ariæus returned; communicating his reply, that the Persian grandees would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against the king,—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason, from having since learnt that the king was on the other side of the Tigris, and therefore out of their reach,—but that it was favorable for rejoining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming symptom, however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the king, at the head of three hundred and forty of his countrymen, partly horse, partly foot.

The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus. According to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a ram, were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow of a shield; in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus, with his chief companions, a spear.[104] The latter, besides the promise of alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks, in good faith, down to the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what route he proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they had come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that he intended to choose another road, which, though longer, would be sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was, however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days’ marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get out of the reach of the king’s forces, who would hardly be able to overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.

They had now come ninety-three days’ march[105] from Ephesus, or ninety from Sardis.[106] The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is, according to Colonel Chesney, about twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles, or fourteen hundred and sixty-four English miles. There had been at least ninety-six days of rest, enjoyed at various places, so that the total of time elapsed must have at least been one hundred and eighty-nine days, or a little more than half a year;[107] but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not specified in number of days.

How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field, indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more the undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no serious apprehensions.[108] In spite of this great extent, population, and riches, they had been allowed to pass through the most difficult and defensible country, and to ford the broad Euphrates, without a blow; nay, the king had shrunk from defending the long trench which he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia. But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were of a very different character. How were they to find their way back, or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry, which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle would be most formidable in opposing their retreat? The line of their upward march had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus;—yet even under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing, in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called upon to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either roads or distances,—without trustworthy guides,—without any one to furnish or even to indicate supplies,—and with a territory all hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means of crossing. Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of any other river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed, in his heart, seem to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of the king.[109] The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and imagines the situation of this Greek division on the left bank of the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33° 30′—will hardly be surprised at any measure of despair, on the part either of general or soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not even the advantage of such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape his course.

In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult Ariæus who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and promised to conduct them home by another road,—longer indeed, yet better supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should reach some villages of the Babylonian territory, as in fact they did;[110] yet not before they had been alarmed in the afternoon by the supposed approach of some of the enemy’s horse, and by evidences that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence they did not reach the first villages before dark; and these too had been pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that only the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, while the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they could without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamor, dispute, and even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be obtained. Early the next morning Klearchus ordered them under arms; and desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the herald to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had let the ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded with a talent of silver.[111]

What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot ascertain;[112] since it was not farther pursued. For the effect of the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy,—and even the clamor and shouting of the camp during the night—so intimidated the Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next morning to treat about a truce. The contrast between this message, and the haughty summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms, was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive demeanor. When Klearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds, he desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at leisure; then, having put his troops into the best possible order, with a phalanx compact on every side to the eye, and the unarmed persons out of sight, he desired the heralds to be admitted. He marched out to meet them with the most showy and best-armed soldiers immediately around him, and when they informed him that they had come from the king with instructions to propose a truce, and to report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Klearchus replied abruptly,—“Well then,—go and tell the king, that our first business must be to fight; for we have nothing to eat, nor will any man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, without first providing dinner for them.” With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned very speedily; thus making it plain that the king, or the commanding officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the king thought their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a place where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be concluded.

After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon the Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that the guides would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could be had. He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during the march, himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut for the purpose of irrigation; some so broad and deep that they could not be crossed without bridges. The army had to put together bridges for the occasion, from palm trees either already fallen, or expressly cut down. This was a troublesome business, which Klearchus himself superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried his spear in the left hand, his stick in the right; employing the latter to chastise any soldier who seemed remiss,—and even plunging into the mud and lending his own hands in aid wherever it was necessary.[113] As it was not the usual season of irrigation for crops, he suspected that the canals had been filled on this occasion expressly to intimidate the Greeks, by impressing them with the difficulties of their prospective march; and he was anxious to demonstrate to the Persians that these difficulties were no more than Grecian energy could easily surmount.

At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory, which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision. Large quantities of corn,—dates not only in great numbers, but of such beauty, freshness, size and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece, was disregarded and left for the slaves,—wine and vinegar, both also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quanity, brought upon himself and others.[114]

After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees and a suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation with Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter, he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy to Greece impressed him with a strong interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks, and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate situation; that he had solicited the king’s permission to save them, as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus, after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied, that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march, without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favor or assistance. With this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned on the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the King’s permission to save the Grecian army,—though not without great opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it was unworthy of the King’s dignity, to suffer those who had assailed him to escape. “I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country. If I do not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to take them where you can find them.” Well were the Greeks content to enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their side,—and by Tissaphernes with the King’s brother-in-law on the other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would go back to the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home; going himself to his own satrapy.[115]

The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly and not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his contest for the throne,—that the first report conveyed to her of the battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of his death,—that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all those, who though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of Artaxerxes, had any participation in the death of Cyrus—and that she showed favorable dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.[116] It seems probable, farther, that her influence may have been exerted to procure for them an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the use afterwards made by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king had an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance which rendered retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous to him in their actual position. They were in the heart of the Persian empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country not only teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible; especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt.[117] And Klearchus might say to his Grecian soldiers,—what Xenophon was afterwards preparing to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias also affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he conducted away from Syracuse[118]—that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently numerous and well-organized to become at once a city. A body of such troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps encourage, the Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate themselves from the prodigious tribute which they now paid to the satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of Artaxerxes thought it advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of Babylonia, beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary to conciliate the good-will of the Greeks, because there seems to have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge could only be reached by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the interior of Babylonia.

Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. For twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian kinsmen, and friendly messages from the king, promising amnesty for his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were painfully felt in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the king had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements, until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus replied,—“I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike our tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration of war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides; Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any cavalry,—while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of our enemies. If the king, having all these advantages, really wishes to destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the eyes both of Greeks and barbarians.”[119]

Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his own complete despair of the situation,—certainly a very natural despair,—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and also his ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes.

That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with his army prepared to return to Ionia,—with the king’s daughter whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another grandee named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march, providing supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and his division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the rear, with a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and mistrust, sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting wood or forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three days’ march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the moment when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the Wall of Media, and passed through it,[120] prosecuting their march onward through the country on its other or interior side. It was of bricks cemented with bitumen, one hundred feet high, and twenty feet broad; it was said to extend a length of twenty parasangs (or about seventy miles, if we reckon the parasang at thirty stadia), and to be not far distant from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed as eight parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days they crossed two great ship canals, one of them over a permanent bridge, the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats. Canals of such magnitude must probably have been two among the four stated by Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a parasang distant from the other. They were one hundred feet broad, and deep enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by means of numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of the soil; and they were said to fall into the Euphrates; or rather, perhaps, they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittakê, near which the Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick grove full of all kinds of trees; while the Persians all crossed the Tigris, at the neighboring bridge.

As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp after supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at the advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions from Ariæus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there were troops concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of attacking them during the night,—and also to send and occupy the bridge over the Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it down, in order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility of escape between the river and the canal. On discussing this information with Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young Greek present remarked that the two matters stated by the informant contradicted each other; for that if Tissaphernes intended to attack the Greeks during the night, he would not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his own troops on the other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive those on this side of all retreat if they were beaten,—while, if the Greeks were beaten, there was no escape open to them, whether the bridge continued or not. This remark induced Klearchus to ask the messenger, what was the extent of ground between the Tigris and the canal. The messenger replied, that it was a great extent of country, comprising many large cities and villages. Reflecting on this communication, the Greek officers came to the conclusion that the message was a stratagem on the part of Tissaphernes to frighten them and accelerate their passage across the Tigris; under the apprehension that they might conceive the plan of seizing or breaking the bridge and occupying a permanent position in the spot where they were; which was an island, fortified on one side by the Tigris,—on the other sides, by intersecting canals between the Euphrates and the Tigris.[121] Such an island was a defensible position, having a most productive territory with numerous cultivators, so as to furnish shelter and means of hostility for all the king’s enemies. Tissaphernes calculated that the message now delivered would induce the Greeks to become alarmed with their actual position and to cross the Tigris with as little delay as possible. At least this was the interpretation which the Greek officers put upon his proceeding; an interpretation highly plausible, since, in order to reach the bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged to conduct the Greek troops into a position sufficiently tempting for them to hold,—and since he knew that his own purposes were purely treacherous. But the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers, were animated only by the wish of reaching home. They trusted, though not without misgivings, in the promise of Tissaphernes to conduct them; and never for a moment thought of taking permanent post in this fertile island. They did not, however, neglect the precaution of sending a guard during the night to the bridge over the Tigris, which no enemy came to assail. On the next morning they passed over it in a body, in cautious and mistrustful array, and found themselves on the eastern bank of the Tigris,—not only without attack, but even without sight of a single Persian, except Glus, the interpreter, and a few others watching their motions.

After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons, the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern side of the Tigris, for four days, to the river Physkus; said to be twenty parasangs.[122] The Physkus was one hundred feet wide, with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near it. Here, at the frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern regions to Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching. An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen at the head of a numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and Ekbatana as a reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to see the Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of two abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent array, and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long a time in passing by the Persian host, that their numbers appeared greater than the reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon the Persian spectators was very imposing.[123] Here Assyria ended and Media began. They marched, still in a northerly direction, for six days through a portion of Media almost unpeopled, until they came to some flourishing villages which formed a portion of the domain of queen Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an exception to the desert character of the remaining march, were situated on the Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have crossed, though he makes no mention of it. According to the order of march stipulated between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, the latter only provided a supply of provisions for the former to purchase; but on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to plunder the villages, which were rich and full of all sorts of subsistence,—yet without carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put an insult on Cyrus, as his personal enemy,[124] through Parysatis, thus proved a sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five more days’ march, called twenty parasangs, brought them to the banks of the river Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows into the Tigris near a town now called Senn. During the first of these five days, they saw on the opposite side of the Tigris a large town called Kænæ, from whence they received supplies of provisions, brought across by the inhabitants upon rafts supported by inflated skins.[125]

On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three days,—days of serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of mistrust, ever since the convention with Tissaphernes, they had followed throughout the whole march, with separate guides of their own, in the rear of his army, always maintaining their encampment apart. During their halt on the Zab, so many various manifestations occurred to aggravate the mistrust, that hostilities seemed on the point of breaking out between the two camps. To obviate this danger Klearchus demanded an interview with Tissaphernes, represented to him the threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted on the necessity of coming to a clear understanding. He impressed upon the satrap that, over and above the solemn oaths which had been interchanged, the Greeks on their side could have no conceivable motive to quarrel with him; that they had everything to hope from his friendship, and everything to fear, even to the loss of all chance of safe return, from his hostility; that Tissaphernes, also, could gain nothing by destroying them, but would find them, if he chose, the best and most faithful instruments for his own aggrandizement and for conquering the Mysians and the Pisidians,—as Cyrus had experienced while he was alive. Klearchus concluded his protest by requesting to be informed, what malicious reporter had been filling the mind of Tissaphernes with causeless suspicions against the Greeks.[126]

“Klearchus (replied the satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent sense from your lips. You remark truly, that if you were to meditate evil against me, it would recoil upon yourselves. I shall prove to you, in my turn, that you have no cause to mistrust either the king or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would be easier. We have superabundant forces for the purpose; there are wide plains in which you would be starved,—besides mountains and rivers which you would be unable to pass, without our help. Having thus the means of destroying you in our hands, and having nevertheless bound ourselves by solemn oaths to save you, we shall not be fools and knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should draw upon ourselves the just indignation of the gods. It is my peculiar affection for my neighbors, the Greeks,—and my wish to attach to my own person, by ties of gratitude, the Greek soldiers of Cyrus,—which have made me eager to conduct you to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are in my service, though the king is the only man who can wear his tiara erect upon his head, I shall be able to wear mine erect upon my heart, in full pride and confidence.”[127]

So powerful was the impression made upon Klearchus by these assurances, that he exclaimed,—“Surely those informers deserve the severest punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such good friends to each other, and have so much reason to be so.” “Yes (replied Tissaphernes), they deserve nothing less; and if you, with the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent to-morrow, I will tell you who the calumniators are.” “To-be-sure I will (rejoined Klearchus), and bring the other generals with me. I shall tell you at the same time, who are the parties that seek to prejudice us against you.” The conversation then ended, the satrap detaining Klearchus to dinner, and treating him in the most hospitable and confidential manner.

On the next morning, Klearchus communicated what had passed to the Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals should go to Tissaphernes pursuant to his invitation; in order to reëstablish that confidence which unworthy calumniators had shaken, and to punish such of the calumniators as might be Greeks. So emphatically did he pledge himself for the good faith and philhellenic dispositions of the satrap, that he overruled the opposition of many among the soldiers; who, still continuing to entertain their former suspicions, remonstrated especially against the extreme imprudence of putting all the generals at once into the power of Tissaphernes. The urgency of Klearchus prevailed. Himself with four other generals,—Proxenus, Menon, Agias, and Sokrates,—and twenty lochages or captains,—went to visit the satrap in his tent; about two hundred of the soldiers going along with them, to make purchases for their own account in the Persian camp-market.[128]

On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernes,—distant nearly three miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit,—the five generals were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained at the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent, betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to come. The lochages and the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied them were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior were detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the Persian court. Here Klearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and Sokrates were beheaded after a short imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from affection to Cyrus, not only furnished many comforts to Klearchus in the prison, by the hands of her surgeon, Ktesias, but used all her influence with her son Artaxerxes to save his life; though her efforts were counteracted, on this occasion, by the superior influence of queen Stateira, his wife. The rivalry between these two royal women, doubtless arising out of many other circumstances besides the death of Klearchus, became soon afterwards so furious, that Parysatis caused Stateira to be poisoned.[129]

Menon was not put to death along with the other generals. He appears to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason of entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes. But his life was only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace and torture,—probably by the requisition of Parysatis, who thus avenged the death of Klearchus. The queen-mother had always power enough to perpetrate cruelties, though not always to avert them.[130] She had already brought to a miserable end every one, even faithful defenders of Artaxerxes, concerned in the death of her son Cyrus.

Though Menon thought it convenient, when brought up to Babylon, to boast of having been the instrument through whom the generals were entrapped into the fatal tent, this boast is not to be treated as matter of fact. For not only does Xenophon explain the catastrophe differently, but in the delineation which he gives of Menon, dark and odious as it is in the extreme, he does not advance any such imputation; indirectly, indeed, he sets it aside.[131] Unfortunately for the reputation of Klearchus, no such reasonable excuse can be offered for his credulity, which brought himself as well as his colleagues to so melancholy an end, and his whole army to the brink of ruin. It appears that the general sentiment of the Grecian army, taking just measure of the character of Tissaphernes, was disposed to greater circumspection in dealing with him. Upon that system Klearchus himself had hitherto acted; and the necessity of it might have been especially present to his mind, since he had served with the Lacedæmonian fleet at Miletus in 411 B.C., and had, therefore, had fuller experience than other men in the army, of the satrap’s real character.[132] On a sudden he now turns round, and on the faith of a few verbal declarations, puts all the military chiefs into the most defenceless posture and the most obvious peril, such as hardly the strongest grounds for confidence could have justified. Though the remark of Machiavel is justified by large experience,—that from the short-sightedness of men and their obedience to present impulse, the most notorious deceiver will always find new persons to trust him,—still such misjudgment on the part of an officer of age and experience is difficult to explain.[133] Polyænus intimates that beautiful women, exhibited by the satrap at his first banquet to Klearchus alone, served as a lure to attract him with all his colleagues to the second; while Xenophon imputes the error to continuance of a jealous rivalry with Menon. The latter,[134] it appears, having always been intimate with Ariæus, had been thus brought into previous communication with Tissaphernes, by whom he had been well received, and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans for detaching the whole Grecian army from Klearchus, so as to bring it all under his (Menon’s) command, into the service of the satrap. Such at least was the suspicion of Klearchus; who, jealous in the extreme of his own military authority, tried to defeat the scheme by bidding still higher himself for the favor of Tissaphernes. Imagining that Menon was the unknown calumniator who prejudiced the satrap against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to disclose his name and dismiss him.[135] Such jealousy seems to have robbed Klearchus of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another impression deeply fixed in his mind; that the salvation of the army was hopeless without the consent of Tissaphernes, and, therefore, since the latter had conducted them thus far in safety, when he might have destroyed them before, that his designs at the bottom could not be hostile.[136]

Notwithstanding these two great mistakes,—one on the present occasion, one previously, at the battle of Kunaxa, in keeping the Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus,—both committed by Klearchus, the loss of that officer was doubtless a great misfortune to the army; while, on the contrary, the removal of Menon was a signal benefit,—perhaps a condition of ultimate safety. A man so treacherous and unprincipled as Xenophon depicts Menon, would probably have ended by really committing towards the army that treason, for which he falsely took credit at the Persian court in reference to the seizure of the generals.

The impression entertained by Klearchus, respecting the hopeless position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who could appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the enemy had it in their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable in this expedition as the manner in which such means were thrown away,—the spectacle of Persian impotence. First, the whole line of upward march, including the passage of the Euphrates, left undefended; next, the long trench dug across the frontier of Babylonia, with only a passage of twenty feet wide left near the Euphrates, abandoned without a guard; lastly, the line of the Wall of Media and the canals which offered such favorable positions for keeping the Greeks out of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, neglected in like manner, and a convention concluded, whereby the Persians engaged to escort the invaders safe to the Ionian coast, beginning by conducting them through the heart of Babylonia, amidst canals affording inexpugnable defences if the Greeks had chosen to take up a position among them. The plan of Tissaphernes, as far as we can understand it, seems to have been, to draw the Greeks to some considerable distance from the heart of the Persian empire, and then to open his schemes of treasonable hostility, which the imprudence of Klearchus enabled him to do, on the banks of the Great Zab, with chances of success such as he could hardly have contemplated. We have here a fresh example of the wonderful impotence of the Persians. We should have expected that, after having committed so flagrant an act of perfidy, Tissaphernes would at least have tried to turn it to account; that he would have poured, with all his forces and all his vigor, on the Grecian camp, at the moment when it was unprepared, disorganized, and without commanders. Instead of which, when the generals (with those who accompanied them to the Persian camp) had been seized or slain, no attack whatever was made except by small detachments of Persian cavalry upon individual Greek stragglers in the plain. One of the companions of the generals, an Arcadian named Nikarchus, ran wounded into the Grecian camp, where the soldiers were looking from afar at the horsemen scouring the plain without knowing what they were about,—exclaiming that the Persians were massacring all the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers. Immediately the Greek soldiers hastened to put themselves in defence, expecting a general attack to be made upon their camp; but no more Persians came near than a body of about three hundred horse, under Ariæus and Mithridates (the confidential companions of the deceased Cyrus), accompanied by the brother of Tissaphernes. These men, approaching the Greek lines as friends, called for the Greek officers to come forth, as they had a message to deliver from the king. Accordingly, Kleanor and Sophænetus, with an adequate guard, came to the front, accompanied by Xenophon, who was anxious to hear news about Proxenus. Ariæus then acquainted them that Klearchus, having been detected in a breach of the convention to which he had sworn, had been put to death; that Proxenus and Menon, who had divulged his treason, were in high honor at the Persian quarters. He concluded by saying,—the king calls upon you to surrender your arms, which now (he says) belong to him, since they formerly belonged to his slave Cyrus.[137]

The step here taken seems to testify a belief on the part of these Persians, that the generals being now in their power, the Grecian soldiers had become defenceless, and might be required to surrender their arms, even to men who had just been guilty of the most deadly fraud and injury towards them. If Ariæus entertained such an expectation, he was at once undeceived by the language of Kleanor and Xenophon, who breathed nothing but indignant reproach; so that he soon retired and left the Greeks to their own reflections.

While their camp thus remained unmolested, every man within it was a prey to the most agonizing apprehensions. Ruin appeared impending and inevitable, though no one could tell in what precise form it would come. The Greeks were in the midst of a hostile country, ten thousand stadia from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked up by impassable mountains and rivers, without guides, without provisions, without cavalry to aid their retreat, without generals to give orders. A stupor of sorrow and conscious helplessness seized upon all. Few came to the evening muster; few lighted fires to cook their suppers; every man lay down to rest where he was; yet no man could sleep, for fear, anguish, and yearning after relatives whom he was never again to behold.[138]

Amidst the many causes of despondency which weighed down this forlorn army, there was none more serious than the fact, that not a single man among them had now either authority to command, or obligation to take the initiative. Nor was any ambitious candidate likely to volunteer his pretensions, at a moment when the post promised nothing but the maximum of difficulty as well as of hazard. A new, self-kindled, light—and self-originated stimulus—was required, to vivify the embers of suspended hope and action, in a mass paralyzed for the moment, but every way capable of effort. And the inspiration now fell, happily for the army, upon one in whom a full measure of soldierly strength and courage was combined with the education of an Athenian, a democrat, and a philosopher.

It is in true Homeric vein, and in something like Homeric language, that Xenophon (to whom we owe the whole narrative of the expedition) describes his dream, or the intervention of Oneirus, sent by Zeus, from which this renovating impulse took its rise.[139] Lying mournful and restless, like his comrades, he caught a short repose; when he dreamt that he heard thunder, and saw the burning thunder-bolt fall upon his paternal house, which became forthwith encircled by flames. Awaking, full of terror, he instantly sprang up; upon which the dream began to fit on and blend itself with his waking thoughts, and with the cruel realities of his position. His pious and excited fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was sent by Zeus[140] the King, since it was from him that thunder and lightning proceeded. In one respect, the sign was auspicious,—that a great light had appeared to him from Zeus, in the midst of peril and suffering. But on the other hand, it was alarming, that the house had appeared to be completely encircled by flames, preventing all egress, because this seemed to indicate that he would remain confined where he was in the Persian dominions, without being able to overcome the difficulties which hedged him in. Yet doubtful as the promise was, it was still the message of Zeus addressed to himself, serving as a stimulus to him to break through the common stupor and take the initiative movement.[141] “Why am I lying here? Night is advancing; at daybreak the enemy will be on us, and we shall be put to death with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of defence. Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for any man of a different city, to begin?”

With these reflections, interesting in themselves and given with Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the lochagi or captains who had served under his late friend Proxenus; and impressed upon them emphatically the necessity of standing forward to put the army in a posture of defence. “I cannot sleep, gentlemen; neither, I presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon us at daybreak,—prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his worst enemies. For my part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury has put an end to a truce by which we were the great losers; a truce under which we, mindful of our oaths, have passed through all the rich possessions of the king, without touching anything except what we could purchase with our own scanty means. Now, we have our hands free; all these rich spoils stand between us and him, as prizes for the better man. The gods, who preside over the match, will assuredly be on the side of us, who have kept our oaths in spite of strong temptations, against these perjurers. Moreover, our bodies are more enduring, and our spirits more gallant, than theirs. They are easier to wound, and easier to kill, than we are, under the same favor of the gods as we experienced at Kunaxa.

“Probably others also are feeling just as we feel. But let us not wait for any one else to come as monitors to us; let us take the lead, and communicate the stimulus of honor to others. Do you show yourselves now the best among the lochages,—more worthy of being generals than the generals themselves. Begin at once, and I desire only to follow you. But if you order me into the front rank, I shall obey without pleading my youth as an excuse,—accounting myself of complete maturity, when the purpose is to save myself from ruin.”[142]

All the captains who heard Xenophon cordially concurred in his suggestion, and desired him to take the lead in executing it. One captain alone,—Apollonides, speaking in the Bœotian dialect,—protested against it as insane; enlarging upon their desperate position, and insisting upon submission to the king, as the only chance of safety. “How (replied Xenophon)? Have you forgotten the courteous treatment which we received from the Persians in Babylonia, when we replied to their demand for the surrender of our arms by showing a bold front? Do not you see the miserable fate which has befallen Klearchus, when he trusted himself unarmed in their hands, in reliance on their oaths? And yet you scout our exhortations to resistance, again advising us to go and plead for indulgence! My friends, such a Greek as this man, disgraces not only his own city, but all Greece besides. Let us banish him from our counsels, cashier him, and make a slave of him to carry baggage.”—“Nay (observed Agasias of Stymphalus), the man has nothing to do with Greece; I myself have seen his ears bored, like a true Lydian.” Apollonides was degraded accordingly.[143]

Xenophon with the rest then distributed themselves in order to bring together the chief remaining officers in the army, who were presently convened, to the number of about one hundred. The senior captain of the earlier body next desired Xenophon to repeat to this larger body the topics upon which he had just before been insisting. Xenophon obeyed, enlarging yet more emphatically on the situation, perilous, yet not without hope,—on the proper measures to be taken,—and especially on the necessity that they, the chief officers remaining, should put themselves forward prominently, first fix upon effective commanders, then afterwards submit the names to be confirmed by the army, accompanied with suitable exhortations and encouragement. His speech was applauded and welcomed, especially by the Lacedæmonian general Cheirisophus, who had joined Cyrus with a body of seven hundred hoplites at Issus in Kilikia. Cheirisophus urged the captains to retire forthwith, and agree upon other commanders instead of the four who had been seized; after which the herald must be summoned, and the entire body of soldiers convened without delay. Accordingly Timasion of Dardanus was chosen instead of Klearchus; Xanthiklês in place of Sokrates; Kleanor in place of Agias; Philesius in place of Menon; and Xenophon instead of Proxenus.[144] The captains, who had served under each of the departed generals, separately chose a successor to the captain thus promoted. It is to be recollected that the five now chosen were not the only generals in the camp; thus for example, Cheirisophus had the command of his own separate division, and there may have been one or two others similarly placed. But it was now necessary for all the generals to form a Board and act in concert.

At daybreak the newly constituted Board of generals placed proper outposts in advance, and then convened the army in general assembly, in order that the new appointments might be submitted and confirmed. As soon as this had been done, probably on the proposition of Cheirisophus (who had been in command before), that general addressed a few words of exhortation and encouragement to the soldiers. He was followed by Kleanor, who delivered, with the like brevity, an earnest protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernes and Ariæus. Both of them left to Xenophon the task, alike important and arduous at this moment of despondency, of setting forth the case at length,—working up the feelings of the soldiers to that pitch of resolution which the emergency required,—and above all, extinguishing all those inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous proposals from the enemy, which the perils of the situation would be likely to suggest.

Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military costume at this his first official appearance before the army, when the scales seemed to tremble between life and death. Taking up the protest of Kleanor against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted that any attempt to enter into convention or trust with such liars, would be utter ruin,—but that if energetic resolution were taken to deal with them only at the point of the sword, and punish their misdeeds, there was good hope of the favor of the gods and of ultimate preservation. As he pronounced this last word, one of the soldiers near him happened to sneeze. Immediately the whole army around shouted with one accord the accustomed invocation to Zeus the Preserver; and Xenophon, taking up the accident, continued,—“Since, gentlemen, this omen from Zeus the Preserver has appeared at the instant when we were talking about preservation, let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice to that god, and at the same time to sacrifice to the remaining gods as well as we can, in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let every man who agrees with me, hold up his hand.” All held up their hands; all then joined in the vow, and shouted the pæan.

This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the rhetorical skill of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out of the depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to listen to his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the gods were on their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he recalled to their memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes,—how the vast hosts of Persia had been disgracefully repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy of such forefathers; and they would for the future be yet bolder, knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for Ariæus and his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion was rather a gain than a loss. The enemy were superior in horsemen; but men on horseback were, after all, only men, half-occupied in the fear of losing their seats,—incapable of prevailing against infantry firm on the ground,—and only better able to run away. Now that the satrap refused to furnish them with provisions to buy, they on their side were released from their covenant, and would take provisions without buying. Then as to the rivers; those were indeed difficult to be crossed in the middle of their course; but the army would march up to their sources, and could then pass them without wetting the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce the idea of retreat, and establish themselves permanently in the king’s own country, defying all his force, like the Mysians and Pisidians. “If (said Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease in a rich country, with these tall, stately, and beautiful Median and Persian women for our companions,[145]—we shall be only too ready, like the Lotophagi, to forget our way home. We ought first to go back to Greece, and tell our countrymen that if they remain poor, it is their own fault, when there are rich settlements in this country awaiting all who choose to come, and who have courage to seize them. Let us burn our baggage-waggons and tents, and carry with us nothing but what is of the strictest necessity. Above all things, let us maintain order, discipline, and obedience to the commanders, upon which our entire hope of safety depends. Let every man promise to lend his hand to the commanders in punishing any disobedient individuals; and let us thus show the enemy that we have ten thousand persons like Klearchus, instead of that one whom they have so perfidiously seized. Now is the time for action. If any man, however obscure, has anything better to suggest, let him come forward and state it; for we have all but one object,—the common safety.”

It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that the speech of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction; for when Cheirisophus put the question, that the meeting should sanction his recommendations, and finally elect the new generals proposed,—every man held up his hand. Xenophon then moved that the army should break up immediately, and march to some well-stored villages, rather more than two miles distant; that the march should be in a hollow oblong, with the baggage in the centre; that Cheirisophus, as a Lacedæmonian, should lead the van; while Kleanor, and the other senior officers, would command on each flank,—and himself with Timasion, as the two youngest of the generals, would lead the rear-guard.

This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke up, proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another, every man’s superfluous baggage,—and then to take their morning meal previous to the march.

The scene just described is interesting and illustrative in more than one point of view.[146] It exhibits that susceptibility to the influence of persuasive discourse which formed so marked a feature in the Grecian character,—a resurrection of the collective body out of the depth of despair, under the exhortation of one who had no established ascendency, nor anything to recommend him, except his intelligence, his oratorical power, and his community of interest with themselves. Next, it manifests, still more strikingly, the superiority of Athenian training as compared with that of other parts of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been before in office as one of the generals, but was also a native of Sparta, whose supremacy and name was at that moment all-powerful. Kleanor had been before, not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the second rank of officers;—he was an elderly man,—and he was an Arcadian, while more than the numerical half of the army consisted of Arcadians and Achæans. Either of these two, therefore, and various others besides, enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or established starting-point, for taking the initiative in reference to the dispirited army. But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, with little military experience;—he was not an officer at all, either in the first or second grade, but simply a volunteer, companion of Proxenus;—he was, moreover, a native of Athens, a city at that time unpopular among the great body of Greeks, and especially of Peloponnesians, with whom her recent long war had been carried on. Not only, therefore, he had no advantages compared with others, but he was under positive disadvantages. He had nothing to start with except his personal qualities and previous training; in spite of which we find him not merely the prime mover, but also the ascendent person for whom the others make way. In him are exemplified those peculiarities of Athens, attested not less by the denunciation of her enemies than by the panegyric of her own citizens,[147]—spontaneous and forward impulse, as well in conception as in execution,—confidence under circumstances which made others despair,—persuasive discourse and publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business, so as at once to appeal to the intelligence, and stimulate the active zeal, of the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in Spartans,—mistrust in conception, slackness in execution, secrecy in counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though Spartans and Athenians formed the two extremities of the scale, other Greeks stood nearer on this point to the former than to the latter.

If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia of Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the vehemence of the Athenian Alkibiades,—much more was it necessary under the depressing circumstances which now overclouded the unofficered Grecian army, that an Athenian bosom should be found as the source of new life and impulse. Nor would any one, probably, except an Athenian, either have felt or obeyed the promptings to stand forward as a volunteer at that moment, when there was every motive to decline responsibility, and no special duty to impel him. But if by chance, a Spartan or an Arcadian had been found thus forward, he would have been destitute of such talents as would enable him to work on the minds of others[148]—of that flexibility, resource, familiarity with the temper and movements of an assembled crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and touching the opportune chords, which Athenian democratical training imparted. Even Brasidas and Gylippus, individual Spartans of splendid merit, and equal or superior to Xenophon in military resource, would not have combined with it that political and rhetorical accomplishment which the position of the latter demanded. Obvious as the wisdom of his propositions appears, each of them is left to him not only to imitate, but to enforce;—Cheirisophus and Kleanor, after a few words of introduction, consign to him the duty of working up the minds of the army to the proper pitch. How well he performed this, may be seen by his speech to the army, which bears in its general tenor a remarkable resemblance to that of Perikles addressed to the Athenian public in the second year of the war, at the moment when the miseries of the epidemic, combined with those of invasion, had driven them almost to despair. It breathes a strain of exaggerated confidence, and an undervaluing of real dangers, highly suitable for the occasion, but which neither Perikles nor Xenophon would have employed at any other moment.[149] Throughout the whole of his speech, and especially in regard to the accidental sneeze near at hand which interrupted the beginning of it, Xenophon displayed that skill and practice in dealing with a numerous audience and a given situation, which characterized more or less every educated Athenian. Other Greeks, Lacedæmonians or Arcadians, could act, with bravery and in concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who could think, speak, and act, with equal efficiency.[150] It was this tripartite accomplishment which an aspiring youth was compelled to set before himself as an aim, in the democracy of Athens, and which the sophists as well as the democratical institutions, both of them so hardly depreciated, helped and encouraged him to acquire. It was this tripartite accomplishment, the exclusive possession of which, in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Bœotian officers and comrades of Proxenus,[151] elevated Xenophon into the most ascendent person of the Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time when it broke up,—as will be seen in the subsequent history.

I think it the more necessary to notice this fact,—that the accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such extraordinary ascendency, and rendered such eminent service to his army, were accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to the Athenian democracy and education,—because Xenophon himself has throughout his writings treated Athens not merely without the attachment of a citizen, but with feelings more like the positive antipathy of an exile. His sympathies are all in favor of the perpetual drill, the mechanical obedience, the secret government proceedings, the narrow and prescribed range of ideas, the silent and deferential demeanor, the methodical, though tardy, action—of Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his preference, certain it is, that the qualities whereby he was himself enabled to contribute so much both to the rescue of the Cyreian army, and to his own reputation,—were Athenian far more than Spartan.

While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the propositions of Xenophon, were taking their morning meal before they commenced their march, Mithridates, one of the Persians previously attached to Cyrus, appeared with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended friendship. But it was soon found out that his purposes were treacherous, and that he came merely to seduce individual soldiers to desertion,—with a few of whom he succeeded. Accordingly, the resolution was taken to admit no more heralds or envoys.

Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage, and refreshed, the army now crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on the other side, having their baggage and attendants in the centre, and Cheirisophus leading the van, with a select body of three hundred hoplites.[152] As no mention is made of a bridge, we are to presume that they forded the river,—which furnishes a ford (according to Mr. Ainsworth), still commonly used, at a place between thirty and forty miles from its junction with the Tigris. When they had got a little way forward, Mithridates again appeared with a few hundred cavalry and bowmen. He approached them like a friend; but as soon as he was near enough, suddenly began to harass the rear with a shower of missiles. What surprises us most, is, that the Persians, with their very numerous force, made no attempt to hinder them from crossing so very considerable a river; for Xenophon estimates the Zab at four hundred feet broad,—and this seems below the statement of modern travellers, who inform us that it contains not much less water than the Tigris; and though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much narrower at any fordable place.[153] It is to be recollected that the Persians, habitually marching in advance of the Greeks, must have reached the river first, and were, therefore, in possession of the crossing, whether bridge or ford. Though on the watch for every opportunity of perfidy, Tissaphernes did not dare to resist the Greeks even in the most advantageous position, and ventured only upon sending Mithridates to harass the rear; which he executed with considerable effect. The bowmen and darters of the Greeks, few in number, were at the same time inferior to those of the Persians; and when Xenophon employed his rear guard, hoplites and peltasts, to charge and repel them, he not only could never overtake any one, but suffered much in getting back to rejoin his own main body. Even when retiring, the Persian horseman could discharge his arrow or cast his javelin behind him with effect; a dexterity which the Parthians exhibited afterwards still more signally, and which the Persian horsemen of the present day parallel with their carbines. This was the first experience which the Greeks had of marching under the harassing attack of cavalry. Even the small detachment of Mithridates greatly delayed their progress; so that they accomplished little more than two miles, reaching the villages in the evening, with many wounded, and much discouragement.[154]

“Thank Heaven,” (said Xenophon in the evening, when Cheirisophus reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge cavalry, whom yet he could not reach.) “Thank Heaven, that our enemies attacked us with a small detachment only, and not with their great numbers. They have given us a valuable lesson, without doing us any serious harm.” Profiting by the lesson, the Greek leaders organized during the night and during the halt of the next day, a small body of fifty cavalry; with two hundred Rhodian slingers, whose slings, furnished with leaden bullets, both carried farther and struck harder than those of the Persians hurling large stones. On the ensuing morning, they started before daybreak, since there lay in their way a ravine difficult to pass. They found the ravine undefended (according to the usual stupidity of Persian proceedings), but when they had got nearly a mile beyond it, Mithridates reappeared in pursuit with a body of four thousand horsemen and darters. Confident from his achievement of the preceding day, he had promised, with a body of that force, to deliver the Greeks into the hands of the satrap. But the latter were now better prepared. As soon as he began to attack them, the trumpet sounded,—and forthwith the horsemen, slingers, and darters, issued forth to charge the Persians, sustained by the hoplites in the rear. So effective was the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding their superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded their flight that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners made. The Greek soldiers of their own accord mutilated the dead bodies, in order to strike terror into the enemy.[155] At the end of the day’s march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city of Larissa, the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which (twenty-five feet in thickness, one hundred feet high, seven miles in circumference) attested its former grandeur. Near this place was a stone pyramid, one hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred feet high; the summit of which was crowded with fugitives out of the neighboring villages. Another day’s march up the course of the Tigris brought the army to a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly opposite to the modern city of Mosul. Although these two cities, which seem to have formed the continuation or the substitute of the once colossal Nineveh or Ninus, were completely deserted,—yet the country around them was so well furnished with villages and population, that the Greeks not only obtained provisions, but also strings for the making of new bows, and lead for bullets to be used for the slingers.[156]

During the next day’s march, in a course generally parallel with the Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, coming up along with some other grandees, and with a numerous army, enveloped the Greeks both in flanks and rear. In spite of his advantage of numbers, he did not venture upon any actual charge, but kept up a fire of arrows, darts, and stones. He was, however, so well answered by the newly-trained archers and slingers of the Greeks, that on the whole they had the advantage, in spite of the superior size of the Persian bows, many of which were taken and effectively employed on the Grecian side. Having passed the night in a well-stocked village, they halted there the next day in order to stock themselves with provisions, and then pursued their march for four successive days along a level country, until, on the fifth day, they reached hilly ground with the prospect of still higher hills beyond. All this march was made under unremitting annoyance from the enemy, insomuch that though the order of the Greeks was never broken, a considerable number of their men were wounded. Experience taught them, that it was inconvenient for the whole army to march in one inflexible, undivided, hollow square; and they accordingly constituted six lochi or regiments of one hundred men each, subdivided into companies of fifty, and enômoties or smaller companies of twenty-five, each with a special officer (conformably to the Spartan practice) to move separately on each flank, and either to fall back, or fall in, as might suit the fluctuations of the central mass, arising from impediments in the road or menaces of the enemy.[157] On reaching the hills, in sight of an elevated citadel or palace, with several villages around it, the Greeks anticipated some remission of the Persian attack. But after having passed over one hill, they were proceeding to ascend the second, when they found themselves assailed with unwonted vigor by the Persian cavalry from the summit of it, whose leaders were seen flogging on the men to the attack.[158] This charge was so efficacious, that the Greek light troops were driven in with loss, and forced to take shelter within the ranks of the hoplites. After a march both slow and full of suffering, they could only reach their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get possession of some ground above the Persians, who thus became afraid of a double attack.

The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr. Ainsworth to have been in the fertile country under the modern town called Zakhu),[159] were unusually rich in provisions; magazines of flour, barley, and wine, having been collected there for the Persian satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order to tend the numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the most competent persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the fourth day they resumed their march, descending into the plain. But experience had now satisfied them that it was imprudent to continue in march under the attack of cavalry, so that when Tissaphernes appeared and began to harass them, they halted at the first village, and when thus in station, easily repelled him. As the afternoon advanced, the Persian assailants began to retire; for they were always in the habit of taking up their night-post at a distance of near seven miles from the Grecian position; being very apprehensive of nocturnal attack in their camp, when their horses were tied by the leg and without either saddle or bridle.[160] As soon as they had departed, the Greeks resumed their march, and made so much advance during the night, that the Persians did not overtake them either on the next day or the day after.

On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but in occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging immediately the road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the plain. When Cheirisophus approached, he at once saw that descent was impracticable in the face of an enemy thus posted. He therefore halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and desired him to bring forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not think it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw Tissaphernes, with another portion of the army, just coming up; so that the Grecian army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by the enemy closing upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground in front could not be directly assailed. But Xenophon observed, that on the right of the Grecian army, there was an accessible mountain-summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for a flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out this summit to Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops in front, he urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a detachment to take possession of it, and offered to Cheirisophus the choice either of going, or staying with the army. “Choose yourself,” said Cheirisophus. “Well, then, (said Xenophon), I will go; since I am the younger of the two.” Accordingly, at the head of a select detachment from the van and centre of the army, he immediately commenced his flank march up the steep ascent to this highest summit. So soon as the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached troops on their side, hoping to get to the summit first; and the two detachments were seen mounting at the same time, each struggling with the utmost efforts to get before the other,—each being encouraged by shouts and clamor from the two armies respectively.

As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them on and reminding them that their chance of seeing their country and their families all depended upon success in the effort before them, a Sikyonian hoplite in the ranks, named Sotêridas, said to him,—“You and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are on horseback; I am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield to carry.” Stung with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, pushed Sotêridas out of his place in the ranks, took his shield as well as his place, and began to march forward afoot along with the rest. Though thus weighed down at once by the shield belonging to an hoplite, and by the heavy cuirass of a horseman (who carried no shield), he nevertheless put forth all his strength to advance, under such double incumbrance, and to continue his incitement to the rest. But the soldiers around him were so indignant at the proceeding of Sotêridas, that they reproached and even struck him, until they compelled him to resume his shield as well as his place in the ranks. Xenophon then remounted and ascended the hill on horseback as far as the ground permitted; but was obliged again to dismount presently, in consequence of the steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic efforts enabled him and his detachment to reach the summit first. As soon as the enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent, and dispersed in all directions; leaving the forward march open to the main Grecian army, which Cheirisophus accordingly conducted safely down into the plain. Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on descending from the summit. All found themselves in comfortable quarters, amidst several well-stocked villages on the banks of the Tigris. They acquired moreover an additional booty of large droves of cattle, intercepted when on the point of being transported across the river; where a considerable body of horse were seen assembled on the opposite bank.[161]

Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks on the part of the Persians, who burnt several of the villages which lay in their forward line of march, the Greeks became seriously embarrassed whither to direct their steps; for on their left flank was the Tigris, so deep that their spears found no bottom,—and on their right, mountains of exceeding height. As the generals and the lochages were taking counsel, a Rhodian soldier came to them with a proposition for transporting the whole army across to the other bank of the river by means of inflated skins, which could be furnished in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this ingenious scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank; and as the villages in their front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return back one day’s march to those in which they had before halted. Here the generals again deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as to the different bearings of the country. The road from the south was that in which they had already marched from Babylon and Media; that to the westward, going to Lydia and Ionia, was barred to them by the interposing Tigris; eastward (they were informed) was the way to Ekbatana and Susa; northward, lay the rugged and inhospitable mountains of the Karduchians,—fierce freemen who despised the Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer them; having once destroyed a Persian invading army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. On the other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich Persian satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphrates and the Tigris could be crossed near their sources, and from whence could choose their farther course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory surrounded on all sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned only in the cities and on the plains.[162]

Determining to fight their way across these difficult mountains into Armenia, but refraining from any public announcement, for fear that the passes should be occupied beforehand,—the generals sacrificed forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a moment’s notice. They then began their march a little after midnight, so that soon after daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with his front division and all the light troops, made haste to ascend the pass, and having got over the first mountain, descended on the other side to some villages in the valley or nooks beneath; while Xenophon with the heavy-armed and the baggage, followed at a slower pace,—not reaching the villages until dark, as the road was both steep and narrow. The Karduchians, taken completely by surprise, abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached, and took refuge on the mountains; leaving to the intruders plenty of provisions, comfortable houses, and especially, abundance of copper vessels. At first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite the natives to amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would come near, and at length necessity drove the Greeks to take what was necessary for refreshment. It was just when Xenophon and the rear guard were coming in at night, that some few Karduchians first set upon them; by surprise and with considerable success,—so that if their numbers had been greater, serious mischief might have ensued.[163]

Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains,—an earnest of resistance during the next day; which satisfied the Greek generals that they must lighten the army, in order to ensure greater expedition as well as a fuller complement of available hands during the coming march. They therefore gave orders to burn all the baggage except what was indispensable, and to dismiss all the prisoners; planting themselves in a narrow strait, through which the army had to pass, in order to see that their directions were executed. The women, however, of whom there were many with the army, could not be abandoned; and it seems farther that a considerable stock of baggage was still retained;[164] nor could the army make more than slow advance, from the narrowness of the road and the harassing attack of the Karduchians, who were now assembled in considerable numbers. Their attack was renewed with double vigor on the ensuing day, when the Greeks were forced, from want of provisions, to hasten forward their march, though in the midst of a terrible snow-storm. Both Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear, were hard pressed by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen; the latter, men of consummate skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows of more than two cubits, so strong that the Greeks when they took them could dart them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow paths, approached so near and drew the bow with such surprising force, resting one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek warriors were mortally wounded even through both shield and corslet into the reins, and through the brazen helmet into their heads; among them especially, two distinguished men, a Lacedæmonian named Kleonymus, and an Arcadian named Basias.[165] The rear division, more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually to halt to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one occasion, however, a body of these latter were entrapped into an ambush, driven back with loss, and (what was still more fortunate) two of their number were made prisoners.

Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages entreating Cheirisophus to slacken the march of the van division; but instead of obeying, Cheirisophus only hastened the faster, urging Xenophon to follow him. The march of the army became little better than a rout, so that the rear division reached the halting-place in extreme confusion; upon which Xenophon proceeded to remonstrate with Cheirisophus for prematurely hurrying forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But the other,—pointing out to his attention the hill before them, and the steep path ascending it, forming their future line of march, which was beset with numerous Karduchians,—defended himself by saying that he had hastened forward in hopes of being able to reach this pass before the enemy, in which attempt however he had not succeeded.[166]

To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless; yet the guides declared that no other could be taken. Xenophon then bethought him of the two prisoners whom he had just captured, and proposed that these two should be questioned also. They were accordingly interrogated apart; and the first of them,—having persisted in denying, notwithstanding all menaces, that there was any road except that before them,—was put to death under the eyes of the second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave more comfortable intelligence; saying that he knew of a different road, more circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts of burden, whereby the pass before them and the occupying enemy might be turned; but that there was one particular high position commanding the road, which it was necessary to master beforehand by surprise, as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two thousand Greeks, having the guide bound along with them, were accordingly despatched late in the afternoon, to surprise this post by a night-march; while Xenophon, in order to distract the attention of the Karduchians in front, made a feint of advancing as if about to force the direct pass. As soon as he was seen crossing the ravine which led to this mountain, the Karduchians on the top immediately began to roll down vast masses of rock, which bounded and dashed down the roadway, in such manner as to render it unapproachable. They continued to do this all night, and the Greeks heard the noise of the descending masses long after they had returned to their camp for supper and rest.[167]

Meanwhile the detachment of two thousand, marching by the circuitous road, and reaching in the night the elevated position, (though there was another above yet more commanding), held by the Karduchians, surprised and dispersed them, passing the night by their fires. At daybreak, and under favor of a mist, they stole silently towards the position occupied by the other Karduchians in front of the main Grecian army. On coming near they suddenly sounded their trumpets, shouted aloud, and commenced the attack, which proved completely successful. The defenders, taken unprepared, fled with little resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their activity and knowledge of the country; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian force, on hearing the trumpet which had been previously concerted as the signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front; some along the regular path, others climbing up as they could and pulling each other up by means of their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus joined each other on the summit, so that the road became open for farther advance.

Xenophon, however, with the rear guard, marched on the circuitous road taken by the two thousand, as the most practicable for the baggage animals, whom he placed in the centre of his division,—the whole array covering a great length of ground, since the road was very narrow. During this interval, the dispersed Karduchians had rallied, and reoccupied two or three high peaks, commanding the road,—from whence it was necessary to drive them. Xenophon’s troops stormed successively these three positions, the Karduchians not daring to affront close combat, yet making destructive use of their missiles. A Grecian guard was left on the hindermost of the three peaks, until all the baggage train should have passed by. But the Karduchians, by a sudden and well-timed movement, contrived to surprise this guard, slew two out of the three leaders, with several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump down the crags as they could, in order to join their comrades in the road. Encouraged by such success, the assailants pressed nearer to the marching army, occupying a crag over against that lofty summit on which Xenophon was posted. As it was within speaking distance, he endeavored to open a negotiation with them in order to get back the dead bodies of the slain. To this demand the Karduchians at first acceded, on condition that their villages should not be burnt; but finding their numbers every moment increasing, they resumed the offensive. When Xenophon with the army had begun his descent from the last summit, they hurried onward in crowds to occupy it; beginning again to roll down masses of rock, and renew their fire of missiles, upon the Greeks. Xenophon himself was here in some danger, having been deserted by his shield-bearer; but he was rescued by an Arcadian hoplite named Eurylochus, who ran to give him the benefit of his own shield as a protection for both in the retreat.[168]

After a march thus painful and perilous, the rear division at length found themselves in safety among their comrades in villages with well-stocked houses and abundance of corn and wine. So eager, however, were Xenophon and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of the slain for burial, that they consented to purchase them by surrendering the guide, and to march onward without any guide;—a heavy sacrifice in this unknown country, attesting their great anxiety about the burial.[169]

For three more days did they struggle and fight their way through the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian mountains, beset throughout by these formidable bowmen and slingers; whom they had to dislodge at every difficult turn, and against whom their own Kretan bowmen were found inferior, indeed, but still highly useful. Their seven days’ march through this country, with its free and warlike inhabitants, were days of the utmost fatigue, suffering and peril; far more intolerable than anything which they had experienced from Tissaphernes and the Persians. Right glad were they once more to see a plain, and to find themselves near the banks of the river Kentritês, which divided these mountains from the hillocks and plains of Armenia,—enjoying comfortable quarters in villages, with the satisfaction of talking over past miseries.[170]

Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the Armenian side of the Kentritês, for a breadth of fifteen miles, was unpeopled and destitute of villages.[171] But the approach of the Greeks having become known to Tiribazus, satrap of Armenia, the banks of the river were lined with his cavalry and infantry to oppose their passage; a precaution, which if Tissaphernes had taken at the Great Zab at the moment when he perfidiously seized Klearchus and his colleagues, the Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of that river. In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks, nevertheless, attempted the passage of the Kentritês, seeing a regular road on the other side. But the river was two hundred feet in breadth (only half the breadth of the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely rapid, and with a bottom full of slippery stones; insomuch that they could not hold their shields in the proper position, from the force of the stream, while if they lifted the shields above their heads, they were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap’s troops. After various trials, the passage was found impracticable, and they were obliged to resume their encampment on the left bank. To their great alarm they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in their rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared nearly desperate. In the night, Xenophon had a dream,—the first, which he has told us, since his dream on the terrific night after the seizure of the generals,—but on this occasion, of augury more unequivocally good. He dreamed that he was bound in chains, but that his chains on a sudden dropped off spontaneously; on the faith of which, he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he had good hopes of preservation; and when the generals offered sacrifice, the victims were at once favorable. As the army were taking their morning meal, two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious news that they had accidentally found another ford near half a mile up the river, where the water was not even up to their middle, and where the rocks came so close on the right bank that the enemy’s horse could offer no opposition. Xenophon, starting from his meal in delight, immediately offered libations to those gods who had revealed both the dream to himself in the night, and the unexpected ford afterwards to these youths; two revelations which he ascribed to the same gods.[172]

Presently they marched in their usual order, Cheirisophus commanding the van and Xenophon the rear, along the river to the newly-discovered ford; the enemy marching parallel with them on the opposite bank. Having reached the ford, halted, and grounded arms, Cheirisophus placed a wreath on his head, took it off again, and then resumed his arms, ordering all the rest to follow his example.[173] Each lochus (company of one hundred men) was then arranged in column or single file, with Cheirisophus himself in the centre. Meanwhile the prophets were offering sacrifice to the river. So soon as the signs were pronounced to be favorable, all the soldiers shouted the pæan, and all the women joined in chorus with their feminine yell. Cheirisophus then at the head of the army, entered the river and began to ford it; while Xenophon, with a large portion of the rear division, made a feint of hastening back to the original ford, as if he were about to attempt the passage there. This distracted the attention of the enemy’s horse; who became afraid of being attacked on both sides, galloped off to guard the passage at the other point, and opposed no serious resistance to Cheirisophus. As soon as the latter had reached the other side, and put his division into order, he marched up to attack the Armenian infantry, who were on the high banks a little way above; but this infantry, deserted by its cavalry, dispersed without awaiting his approach. The handful of Grecian cavalry, attached to the division of Cheirisophus, pursued and took some valuable spoils.[174]

As soon as Xenophon saw his colleague successfully established on the opposite bank, he brought back his detachment to the ford over which the baggage and attendants were still passing, and proceeded to take precautions against the Karduchians on his own side, who were assembling in the rear. He found some difficulty in keeping his rear division together, for many of them, in spite of orders, quitted their ranks, and went to look after their mistresses or their baggage in the crossing of the water.[175] The peltasts and bowmen, who had gone over with Cheirisophus, but whom that general now no longer needed, were directed to hold themselves prepared on both flanks of the army crossing, and to advance a little way into the water, in the attitude of men just about to recross. When Xenophon was left with only the diminished rear-guard, the rest having got over,—the Karduchians rushed upon him, and began to shoot and sling. But on a sudden, the Grecian hoplites charged with their accustomed pæan, upon which the Karduchians took to flight,—having no arms for close combat on the plain. The trumpet now being heard to sound, they ran away so much the faster; while this was the signal, according to orders before given by Xenophon, for the Greeks to suspend their charge, to turn back, and to cross the river as speedily as possible. By favor of this able manœuvre, the passage was accomplished by the whole army, with little or no loss, about mid-day.[176]

They now found themselves in Armenia; a country of even, undulating surface, but very high above the level of the sea, and extremely cold at the season when they entered it,—December. Though the strip of land bordering on Karduchia furnished no supplies, one long march brought them to a village, containing abundance of provisions, together with a residence of the satrap Tiribazus; after which, in two farther marches, they reached the river Teleboas, with many villages on its banks. Here Tiribazus himself, appearing with a division of cavalry, sent forward his interpreter to request a conference with the leaders; which being held, it was agreed that the Greeks should proceed unmolested through his territory, taking such supplies as they required,—but should neither burn nor damage the villages. They accordingly advanced onward for three days, computed at fifteen parasangs, or three pretty full days’ march; without any hostility from the satrap, though he was hovering within less than two miles of them. They then found themselves amidst several villages, wherein were regal or satrapical residences, with a plentiful stock of bread, meat, wine, and all sorts of vegetables. Here, during their nightly bivouac, they were overtaken by so heavy a fall of snow, that the generals, on the next day, distributed the troops into separate quarters among the villages. No enemy appeared near, while the snow seemed to forbid any rapid surprise. Yet at night, the scouts reported that many fires were discernible, together with traces of military movements around; insomuch that the generals thought it prudent to put themselves on their guard, and again collected the army into one bivouac. Here, in the night, they were overwhelmed by a second fall of snow, still heavier than the preceding; sufficient to cover over the sleeping men and their arms, and to benumb the cattle. The men, however, lay warm under the snow and were unwilling to rise, until Xenophon himself set the example of rising, and employing himself, without his arms, in cutting wood and kindling a fire.[177] Others followed his example, and great comfort was found in rubbing themselves with pork-fat, oil of almonds, or of sesame, or turpentine. Having sent out a clever scout named Demokrates, who captured a native prisoner, they learned that Tiribazus was laying plans to intercept them in a lofty mountain-pass lying farther on in their route; upon which they immediately set forth, and by two days of forced march, surprising in their way the camp of Tiribazus, got over the difficult pass in safety. Three days of additional march brought them to the Euphrates river,[178]—that is, to the eastern branch, now called Murad. They found a ford and crossed it, without having the water higher than the navel; and they were informed that its sources were not far off.

Their four days of march, next on the other side of the Euphrates, were toilsome and distressing in the extreme; through a plain covered with deep snow (in some places six feet deep), and at times in the face of a north wind so intolerably chilling and piercing, that at length one of the prophets urged the necessity of offering sacrifices to Boreas; upon which (says Xenophon[179]) the severity of the wind abated conspicuously, to the evident consciousness of all. Many of the slaves and beasts of burden, and a few even of the soldiers, perished; some had their feet frost-bitten, others became blinded by the snow, others again were exhausted by hunger. Several of these unhappy men were unavoidably left behind; others lay down to perish, near a warm spring which had melted the snow around, from extremity of fatigue and sheer wretchedness, though the enemy were close upon the rear. It was in vain that Xenophon, who commanded the rear-guard, employed his earnest exhortations, prayers, and threats, to induce them to move forward. The sufferers, miserable and motionless, answered only by entreating him to kill them at once. So greatly was the army disorganized by wretchedness, that we hear of one case in which a soldier, ordered to carry a disabled comrade, disobeyed the order, and was about to bury him alive.[180] Xenophon made a sally, with loud shouts and clatter of spear with shield, in which even the exhausted men joined,—against the pursuing enemy. He was fortunate enough to frighten them away, and drive them to take shelter in a neighboring wood. He then left the sufferers lying down, with assurance that relief should be sent to them on the next day,—and went forward, seeing all along the line of march the exhausted soldiers lying on the snow, without even the protection of a watch. He and his rear-guard, as well as the rest, were obliged thus to pass the night without either food or fire, distributing scouts in the best way the case admitted. Meanwhile, Cheirisophus with the van division had got into a village, which they reached so unexpectedly, that they found the women fetching water from a fountain outside the wall, and the headman of the village in his house within. This division here obtained rest and refreshment, and at daybreak some of their soldiers were sent to look after the rear. It was with delight that Xenophon saw them approach, and sent them back to bring up in their arms, into the neighboring village, those exhausted soldiers who had been left behind.[181]

Repose was now indispensable after the recent sufferings. There were several villages near at hand, and the generals, thinking it no longer dangerous to divide the army, quartered the different divisions among them according to lot. Polykrates, an Athenian, one of the captains in the division of Xenophon, requested his permission to go at once and take possession of the village assigned to him, before any of the inhabitants could escape. Accordingly, running at speed with a few of the swiftest soldiers, he came upon the village so suddenly as to seize the headman, with his newly-married daughter, and several young horses intended as a tribute for the king. This village, as well as the rest, was found to consist of houses excavated in the ground (as the Armenian villages are at the present day), spacious within, but with a narrow mouth like a well, entered by a descending ladder. A separate entrance was dug for conveniently admitting the cattle. All of them were found amply stocked with live cattle of every kind, wintered upon hay; as well as with wheat, barley, vegetables, and a sort of barley-wine or beer, in tubs, with the grains of barley on the surface. Reeds or straws, without any joint in them, were lying near, through which they sucked the liquid.[182] Xenophon did his utmost to conciliate the headman (who spoke Persian, and with whom he communicated through the Perso-Grecian interpreter of the army), promising him that not one of his relations should be maltreated, and that he should be fully remunerated if he would conduct the army safely out of the country, into that of the Chalybes which he described as being adjacent. By such treatment the headman was won over, promised his aid, and even revealed to the Greeks the subterranean cellars wherein the wine was deposited; while Xenophon, though he kept him constantly under watch, and placed his youthful son as a hostage under the care of Episthenes, yet continued to treat him with studied attention and kindness. For seven days did the fatigued soldiers remain in these comfortable quarters, refreshing themselves and regaining strength. They were waited upon by the native youths, with whom they communicated by means of signs. The uncommon happiness which all of them enjoyed after their recent sufferings, stands depicted in the lively details given by Xenophon; who left here his own exhausted horse, and took young horses in exchange, for himself and the other officers.[183]

After this week of repose, the army resumed its march through the snow. The headman, whose house they had replenished as well as they could, accompanied Cheirisophus in the van as guide, but was not put in chains or under guard; his son remained as an hostage with Episthenes, but his other relations were left unmolested at home. As they marched for three days without reaching a village, Cheirisophus began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so out of humor, though the man affirmed that there were no villages in the track, as to beat him,—yet without the precaution of putting him afterwards in fetters. The next night, accordingly, this headman made his escape; much to the displeasure of Xenophon, who severely reproached Cheirisophus, first for his harshness, and next for his neglect. This was the only point of difference between the two (says Xenophon), during the whole march; a fact very honorable to both, considering the numberless difficulties against which they had to contend. Episthenes retained the headman’s youthful son, carried him home in safety, and became much attached to him.[184]

Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do no better than march up the course of a river; and thus, from the villages which had proved so cheering and restorative, they proceeded seven days’ march all through snow, up the river Phasis; a river not verifiable, but certainly not the same as is commonly known under that name by Grecian geographers; it was one hundred feet in breadth.[185] Two more days’ march brought them from this river to the foot of a range of mountains; near a pass occupied by an armed body of Chalybes, Taochi, and Phasiani.

Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty ground, Cheirisophus halted until all the army came up; in order that the generals might take counsel. Here Kleanor began by advising that they should storm the pass with no greater delay than was necessary to refresh the soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far better to avoid the loss of life which must thus be incurred, and to amuse the enemy by feigned attack, while a detachment should be sent by stealth, at night, to ascend the mountain at another point and turn the position. “However (continued he, turning to Cheirisophus), stealing a march upon the enemy is more your trade than mine. For I understand that you, the full citizens and peers at Sparta, practise stealing from your boyhood upward;[186] and that it is held no way base, but even honorable, to steal such things as the law does not distinctly forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the greatest effect, and take pains to do it in secret, the custom is, to flog you if you are found out. Here, then, you have an excellent opportunity for displaying your training. Take good care that we be not found out in stealing an occupation of the mountain now before us; for if we are found out, we shall be well beaten.

“Why, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you Athenians, also, as I learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money, and that too in spite of prodigious peril to the thief; nay, your most powerful men steal most of all,—at least, if it be the most powerful men among you who are raised to official command. So that this is a time for you to exhibit your training as well as for me to exhibit mine.”[187]

We have here an interchange of raillery between the two Grecian officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the history of the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially illustrates that which I noted in a former chapter as true both of Sparta and Athens[188],—the readiness to take bribes, so general in individuals clothed with official power; and the readiness, in official Athenians, to commit such peculation, in spite of serious risk of punishment. Now this chance of punishment proceeded altogether from those accusing orators commonly called demagogues, and from the popular judicature whom they addressed. The joint working of both greatly abated the evil, yet was incompetent to suppress it. But according to the pictures commonly drawn of Athens, we are instructed to believe that the crying public evil was,—too great a license of accusation, and too much judicial trial. Assuredly, such was not the conception of Cheirisophus; nor shall we find it borne out by any fair appreciation of the general evidence. When the peculation of official persons was thus notorious in spite of serious risks, what would it have become if the door had been barred to accusing demagogues, and if the numerous popular dikasts had been exchanged for a few select judges of the same stamp and class as the official men themselves?

Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his colleagues that he had just captured a few guides by laying an ambush for certain native plunderers who beset the rear; and that these guides acquainted him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured by goats and oxen. He farther offered himself to take command of the marching detachment. But this being overruled by Cheirisophus, some of the best among the captains, Aristonymus, Aristeas, and Nichomachus, volunteered their services and were accepted. After refreshing the soldiers, the generals marched with the main army near to the foot of the pass, and there took up their night-station, making demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the next morning. But as soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment started, and ascending the mountain at another point, obtained without resistance a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon, however, saw them and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak these two detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the Greeks were completely victorious, while Cheirisophus was marching up the pass to attack the main body. His light troops, encouraged by seeing this victory of their comrades, hastened on to the charge faster than their hoplites could follow. But the enemy was so dispirited by seeing themselves turned, that they fled with little or no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw away their light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey of the conquerors.[189]

Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the level ground on the other side, where they found themselves in some villages well-stocked with provisions and comforts; the first in the country of the Taochi. Probably they halted here some days; for they had seen no villages, either for rest or for refreshment, during the last nine days’ march, since leaving those Armenian villages in which they had passed a week so eminently restorative, and which apparently had furnished them with a stock of provisions for the onward journey. Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry up their families and provisions into inaccessible strongholds, so that the Greeks found no supplies, during five days’ march through the territory. Their provisions were completely exhausted, when they arrived before one of these strongholds, a rock on which were seen the families and the cattle of the Taochi; without houses or fortification, but nearly surrounded by a river, so as to leave only one narrow ascent, rendered unapproachable by vast rocks which the defenders hurled or rolled from the summit. By an ingenious combination of bravery and stratagem, in which some of the captains much distinguished themselves, the Greeks overcame this difficulty, and took the height. The scene which then ensued was awful. The Taochian women seized their children, flung them over the precipice, and then cast themselves headlong also, followed by the men. Almost every soul thus perished, very few surviving to become prisoners. An Arcadian captain named Æneas, seeing one of them in a fine dress about to precipitate himself with the rest, seized him with a view to prevent it. But the man in return grasped him firmly, dragged him to the edge of the rock, and leaped down to the destruction of both. Though scarcely any prisoners were taken, however, the Greeks obtained abundance of oxen, asses, and sheep, which fully supplied their wants.[190]

They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes, which they were seven days in passing through. These were the bravest warriors whom they had seen in Asia. Their equipment was a spear of fifteen cubits long, with only one end pointed,—a helmet, greaves, stuffed corselet, with a kilt or dependent flaps,—a short sword which they employed to cut off the head of a slain enemy, displaying the head in sight of their surviving enemies with triumphant dance and song. They carried no shield; perhaps because the excessive length of the spear required the constant employment of both hands,—yet they did not shrink from meeting the Greeks occasionally in regular, stand-up fight. As they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts, the Greeks could obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon the cattle which they had acquired from the Taochi. After seven days of march and combat,—the Chalybes perpetually attacking their rear,—they reached the river Harpasus (four hundred feet broad), where they passed into the territory of the Skythini. It rather seems that the territory of the Chalybes was mountainous; that of the Skythini was level, and containing villages, wherein they remained three days, refreshing themselves, and stocking themselves with provisions.[191]

Four days of additional march brought them to a sight, the like of which they had not seen since Opis and Sittakê on the Tigris in Babylonia,—a large and flourishing city called Gymnias; an earnest of the neighborhood of the sea, of commerce, and of civilization. The chief of this city received them in a friendly manner, and furnished them with a guide who engaged to conduct them, after five days’ march, to a hill from whence they would have a view of the sea. This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for the chief of Gymnias wished to send them through the territory of some neighbors to whom he was hostile; which territory, as soon as they reached it, the guide desired them to burn and destroy. However, the promise was kept, and on the fifth day, marching still apparently through the territory of the Skythini, they reached the summit of a mountain called Thêchê, from whence the Euxine Sea was visible.[192]

An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the van-guard testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spectacle, assuring as it seemed to do, their safety and their return home. To Xenophon and to the rear-guard,—engaged in repelling the attack of natives who had come forward to revenge the plunder of their territory,—the shout was unintelligible. They at first imagined that the natives had commenced attack in front as well as in the rear, and that the van-guard was engaged in battle. But every moment the shout became louder, as fresh men came to the summit and gave vent to their feelings; so that Xenophon grew anxious, and galloped up to the van with his handful of cavalry to see what had happened. As he approached, the voice of the overjoyed crowd was heard distinctly crying out, Thalatta, Thalatta (The sea, the sea), and congratulating each other in ecstasy. The main body, the rear-guard, the baggage-soldiers driving up their horses and cattle before them, became all excited by the sound, and hurried up breathless to the summit. The whole army, officers and soldiers, were thus assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions by tears, embraces, and outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With spontaneous impulse they heaped up stones to decorate the spot by a monument and commemorative trophy; putting on the stones such homely offerings as their means afforded,—sticks, hides, and a few of the wicker shields just taken from the natives. To the guide, who had performed his engagement of bringing them in five days within sight of the sea, their gratitude was unbounded. They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl, a Persian costume, and ten darics in money; besides several of the soldiers’ rings, which he especially asked for. Thus loaded with presents, he left them, having first shown them a village wherein they could find quarters,—as well as the road which they were to take through the territory of the Makrônes.[193]

When they reached the river which divided the land of the Makrônes from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former assembled in arms on the opposite side to resist their passage. The river not being fordable, they cut down some neighboring trees to provide the means of crossing. While these Makrônes were shouting and encouraging each other aloud, a peltast in the Grecian army came to Xenophon, saying that he knew their language, and that he believed this to be his country. He had been a slave at Athens, exported from home during his boyhood,—he had then made his escape (probably during the Peloponnesian war, to the garrison of Dekeleia), and afterwards taken military service. By this fortunate accident, the generals were enabled to open negotiations with the Makrônes, and to assure them that the army would do them no harm, desiring nothing more than a free passage and a market to buy provisions. The Makrônes, on receiving such assurance in their own language from a countryman, exchanged pledges of friendship with the Greeks, assisted them to pass the river, and furnished the best market in their power during the three days’ march across their territory.[194]

The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, who were found in hostile array, occupying the summit of a considerable mountain which formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having marshalled the soldiers for attack, with each lochus (company of one hundred men) in single file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or continuous front with only a scanty depth,—addressed to them the following pithy encouragement,—“Now, gentlemen, these enemies before us are the only impediment that keeps us away from reaching the point at which we have been so long aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we can do so.”

Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each in single file, now began to ascend the hill; the peltasts and bowmen being partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks. Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread their peltasts in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who accordingly weakened their centre in order to strengthen their wings. Hence the Arcadian peltasts and hoplites in the Greek centre were enabled to attack and disperse the centre with little resistance; and all the Kolchians presently fled, leaving the Greeks in possession of their camp, as well as of several well-stocked villages in their rear. Amidst these villages the army remained to refresh themselves for several days. It was here that they tasted the grateful, but unwholesome honey, which this region still continues to produce,—unaware of its peculiar properties. Those soldiers who ate little of it were like men greatly intoxicated with wine; those who ate much, were seized with the most violent vomiting and diarrhœa, lying down like madmen in a state of delirium. From this terrible distemper some recovered on the ensuing day, others two or three days afterwards. It does not appear that any one actually died.[195]

Two more days’ march brought them to the sea, at the Greek maritime city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of Sinôpê on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here the Trapezuntines received them with kindness and hospitality, sending them presents of bullocks, barley-meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the severe hardships which they had undergone. While the Trapezuntines brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kolchians on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the plain were in a state of semi-dependence upon Trapezus; so that the Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the Greeks to leave them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks.

These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they had made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver, during that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately on the massacre of their generals by Tissaphernes. To Zeus the Preserver, to Hêraklês the Conductor, and to various other gods, they offered an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the sea; and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were given as prizes to competitors in running, wrestling, boxing, and the pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully accordant with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army, was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius; a man whose destiny recalls that of Patroklus and other Homeric heroes,—for he had been exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another boy with a short sword. Various departures from Grecian custom, however, were admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony hill-side overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain; and the numerous hard falls of the competitors afforded increased interest to the bystanders. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted to run for the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have been obtained. Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the ardor of the competitors, was much enhanced by the number of their mistresses present.[196]

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXX.

ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND AFTER THEY QUITTED THE TIGRIS AND ENTERED THE KARDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS.

It would be injustice to this gallant and long-suffering body of men not to present the reader with a minute description of the full length of their stupendous march. Up to the moment when the Greeks enter Karduchia, the line of march may be indicated upon evidence which, though not identifying special halting-places or localities, makes us certain that we cannot be far wrong on the whole. But after that moment, the evidence gradually disappears, and we are left with nothing more than a knowledge of the terminus, the general course, and a few negative conditions.

Mr. Ainsworth has given, in his Book IV. (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 155 seq.) an interesting topographical comment on the march through Karduchia, and on the difficulties which the Greeks would have to surmount. He has farther shown what may have been their probable line of march through Karduchia; but the most important point which he has established here, seems to be the identity of the river Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, an eastern affluent of the Tigris—distinguishing it from the river of Bitlis on the west and the river Khabur on the south-east, with both of which it had been previously confounded (p. 167). The Buhtan-Chai falls into the Tigris at a village called Til, and “constitutes at the present day, a natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia” (p. 166). In this identification of the Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, Professor Koch agrees (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 78).

If the Greeks crossed the Kentritês near its confluence with the Tigris, they would march up its right bank in one day to a situation near the modern town of Sert (Mr. Ainsworth thinks), though Xenophon takes no notice of the river of Bitlis, which nevertheless they must have passed. Their next two days of march, assuming a direction nearly north, would carry them (as Xenophon states, iv. 4, 2) beyond the sources of the Tigris; that is, “beyond the headwaters of the eastern tributaries to the Tigris.”

Three days of additional march brought them to the river Teleboas—“of no great size, but beautiful” (iv. 4, 4). There appear sufficient reasons to identify this river with the Kara-Su or Black River, which flows through the valley or plain of Mush into the Murad or Eastern Euphrates (Ainsworth, p. 172; Ritter, Erdkunde, part x. s. 37. p. 682). Though Kinneir (Journey through Asia Minor and Kurdistan, 1818, p. 484), Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, p. 207) and Bell (System of Geography, iv. p. 140) identify it with the Ak-Su or river of Mush—this, according to Ainsworth, “is only a small tributary to the Kara-Su, which is the great river of the plain and district.”

Professor Koch, whose personal researches in and around Armenia give to his opinion the highest authority, follows Mr. Ainsworth in identifying the Teleboas with the Kara-Su. He supposes, however, that the Greeks crossed the Kentritês, not near its confluence with the Tigris, but considerably higher up, near the town of Sert or Sort. From hence he supposes that they marched nearly north-east in the modern road from Sert to Bitlis, thus getting round the head or near the head of the river called Bitlis-Su, which is one of the eastern affluents to the Tigris (falling first into the Buhtan-Chai), and which Xenophon took for the Tigris itself. They then marched farther, in a line not far distant from the Lake of Van, over the saddle which separates that lake from the lofty mountain Ali-Dagh. This saddle is the water-shed which separates the affluents to the Tigris from those to the Eastern Euphrates, of which latter the Teleboas or Kara-Su is one (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 82-84).

After the river Teleboas, there seems no one point in the march which can be identified with anything approaching to certainty. Nor have we any means even of determining the general line of route, apart from specific places, which they followed from the river Teleboas to Trebizond.

Their first object was to reach and cross the Eastern Euphrates. They would of course cross at the nearest point where they could find a ford. But how low down its course does the river continue to be fordable, in mid-winter, with snow on the ground? Here professor Koch differs from Mr. Ainsworth and colonel Chesney. He affirms that the river would be fordable a little above its confluence with the Tscharbahur, about latitude 39° 3′. According to Mr. Ainsworth, it would not be fordable below the confluence with the river of Khanus (Khinnis). Koch’s authority, as the most recent and systematic investigator of these regions, seems preferable, especially as it puts the Greeks nearly in the road now travelled over from Mush to Erzerum, which is said to be the only pass over the mountains open throughout all the winter, passing by Khinnis and Koili; see Ritter, Erdkunde, x. p. 387. Xenophon mentions a warm spring, which the army passed by during the third or fourth day after crossing the Euphrates (Anab. iv, 5, 15). Professor Koch believes himself to have identified this warm spring—the only one, as he states (p. 90-93), south of the range of mountains called the Bingöldagh—in the district called Wardo, near the village of Bashkan.

To lay down, with any certainty, the line which the Greeks followed from the Euphrates to Trebizond, appears altogether impossible. I cannot admit the hypothesis of Mr. Ainsworth, who conducts the army across the Araxes to its northern bank, carries them up northward to the latitude of Teflis in Georgia, then brings them back again across the Harpa Chai (a northern affluent of the Araxes, which he identifies with the Harpasus mentioned by Xenophon) and the Araxes itself, to Gymnias, which he places near the site of Erzerum. Professor Koch (p. 104-108), who dissents with good reason from Mr. Ainsworth, proposes (though with hesitation and uncertainty) a line of his own which appears to me open greatly to the same objection as that of Mr. Ainsworth. It carries the Greeks too much to the northward of Erzerum, more out of their line of march from the place where they crossed the Eastern Euphrates, than can be justified by any probability. The Greeks knew well that, in order to get home they must take a westerly direction (see Anab. iii. 5, 15).

Their great and constant purpose would be to make way to the westward, as soon as they had crossed the Euphrates; and the road from that river, passing near the site of Erzerum to Trebizond, would thus coincide, in the main, with their spontaneous tendency. They had no motive to go northward of Erzerum, nor ought we to suppose it without some proof. I trace out, therefore, a line of march much less circuitous; not meaning it to be understood as the real road which the army can be proved to have taken, but simply because it seems a possible line, and because it serves as a sort of approximation to complete the reader’s idea of the entire ground travelled over by the Ten Thousand.

Koch hardly makes sufficient account of the overwhelming hardships with which the Greeks had to contend, when he states (p. 96) that if they had taken a line as straight, or nearly as straight as was practicable, they might have marched from the Euphrates to Trebizond in sixteen or twenty days, even allowing for the bad time of year. Considering that it was mid-winter, in that very high and cold country, with deep snow throughout; that they had absolutely no advantages or assistance of any kind; that their sick and disabled men, together with their arms, were to be carried by the stronger; that there were a great many women accompanying them; that they had beasts to drive along, carrying baggage and plunder,—the prophet Silanus, for example, having preserved his three thousand darics in coin from the field of Kunaxa until his return; that there was much resistance from the Chalybes and Taochi; that they had to take provisions where provisions were discoverable; that even a small stream must have impeded them, and probably driven them out of their course to find a ford,—considering the intolerable accumulation of these and other hardships, we need not wonder at any degree of slowness in their progress. It rarely happens that modern travellers go over these regions in mid-winter; but we may see what travelling is at that season, by the dreadful description which Mr. Baillie Fraser gives of his journey from Tauris to Erzerum in the month of March (Travels in Koordhistan, Letter XV). Mr. Kinneir says (Travels, p. 353)—“The winters are so severe that all communication between Baiburt and the circumjacent villages is cut off for four months in the year, in consequence of the depth of the snow.”

Now if we measure on Kiepert’s map the rectilinear distance,—the air-line—from Trebizond to the place where Koch represents the Greeks to have crossed the Eastern Euphrates,—we shall find it one hundred and seventy English miles. The number of days’ journey-marches which Xenophon mentions are fifty-four; even if we include the five days of march undertaken from Gymnias (Anab. iv. 7, 20), which, properly speaking, were directed against the enemies of the governor of Gymnias, more than for the promotion of their retreat. In each of those fifty-four days, therefore, they must have made 3.14 miles of rectilinear progress. This surely is not an unreasonably slow progress to suppose, under all the disadvantages of their situation; nor does it imply any very great actual departure from the straightest line practicable. Indeed Koch himself (in his Introduction, p. 4) suggests various embarrassments which must have occurred on the march, but which Xenophon has not distinctly stated.

The river which Xenophon calls the Harpasus seems to be probably the Tchoruk-su, as colonel Chesney and Prof. Koch suppose. At least it is difficult to assign any other river with which the Harpasus can be identified.

I cannot but think it probable that the city which Xenophon calls Gymnias (Diodorus, xiv. 29, calls it Gymnasia) was the same as that which is now called Gumisch-Khana (Hamilton), Gumush-Kaneh (Ainsworth), Gemisch-Khaneh (Kinneir). “Gumisch-Khana (says Mr. Hamilton, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 168; ch. xiv. p. 234) is celebrated as the site of the most ancient and considerable silver-mines in the Ottoman dominions.” Both Mr. Kinneir and Mr. Hamilton passed through Gumisch-Khana on the road from Trebizond to Erzerum.

Now here is not only great similarity of name, and likelihood of situation,—but the existence of the silver mines furnishes a plausible explanation of that which would otherwise be very strange; the existence of this “great, flourishing, inhabited, city,” inland, in the midst of such barbarians,—the Chalybes, the Skythini, the Makrônes, etc.

Mr. Kinneir reached Gumisch-Khana at the end of the third day after quitting Trebizond; the two last days having been very long and fatiguing. Mr. Hamilton, who also passed through Gumisch-Khana, reached it at the end of two long days. Both these travellers represent the road near Gumisch-Khana as extremely difficult. Mr. Ainsworth, who did not himself pass through Gumisch-Khana, tells us (what is of some importance in this discussion) that it lies in the winter-road from Erzerum to Trebizond (Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p. 394). “The winter-road, which is the longest, passes by Gumisch-Khana, and takes the longer portion of valley; all the others cross over the mountain at various points, to the east of the road by the mines. But whether going by the mountains or the valley, the muleteers often go indifferently to the west as far as Ash Kaleh, and at other times turn off by the villages of Bey Mausour and Kodjah Bunar, where they take to the mountains.”

Mr. Hamilton makes the distance from Trebizond to Gumisch-Khana eighteen hours, or fifty-four calculated post miles; that is, about forty English miles (Appendix to Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p. 389).

Now we are not to suppose that the Greeks marched in any direct road from Gymnias to Trebizond. On the contrary, the five days’ march which they undertook immediately from Gymnias were conducted by a guide sent from that town, who led them over the territories of people hostile to Gymnias, in order that they might lay waste the lands (iv. 7, 20). What progress they made, during these marches, towards Trebizond, is altogether doubtful. The guide promised that on the fifth day he would bring them to a spot from whence they could view the sea, and he performed his promise by leading them to the top of the sacred mountain Thêchê.

Thêchê was a summit (ἄκρον, iv. 7, 25), as might be expected. But unfortunately it seems impossible to verify the particular summit on which the interesting scene described by Xenophon took place. Mr. Ainsworth presumes it to be the mountain called Kop-Dagh; from whence, however, according to Koch, the sea cannot be discerned. D’Anville and some other geographers identify it with the ridge called Tekieh-Dagh, to the east of Gumisch-Khana; nearer to the sea than that place. This mountain, I think, would suit pretty well for the narrative in respect to position; but Koch and other modern travellers affirm that it is neither high enough, nor near enough to the sea, to permit any such view as that which Xenophon relates. It stands on Kiepert’s map at a distance of full thirty-five English miles from the sea, the view of which, moreover, seems intercepted by the still higher mountain-chain now called Kolath-Dagh, a portion of the ancient Paryadres, which runs along parallel to the coast. It is to be recollected that in the first half of February, the time of Xenophon’s visit, the highest peaks would certainly be all covered with snow, and therefore very difficult to ascend.

There is a striking view obtained of the sea from the mountain called Karakaban. This mountain, more than four thousand feet high, lies rather above twenty miles from the sea, to the south of Trebizond, and immediately north of the still higher chain of Kolath-Dagh. From the Kolath-Dagh chain, which runs east and west, there strike out three or four parallel ridges to the northward, formed of primitive slate, and cut down precipitously so as to leave deep and narrow valleys between. On leaving Trebizond, the traveller ascends the hill immediately above the town, and then descends into the valley on the other side. His road to Karakaban lies partly along the valley, partly along the crest of one of the four ridges just mentioned. But throughout all this road, the sea is never seen; being hidden by the hills immediately above Trebizond. He does not again see the sea until he reaches Karakaban, which is sufficiently high to enable him to see over those hills. The guides (as I am informed by Dr. Holland, who twice went over the spot) point out with great animation this view of the sea, as particularly deserving of notice. It is enjoyed for a short space while the road winds round the mountain, and then again lost.

Here is a view of the sea at once distant, sudden, impressive, and enjoyed from an eminence not too high to be accessible to the Cyreian army. In so far, it would be suitable to the description of Xenophon. Yet again it appears that a person coming to this point from the land-side (as Xenophon of course did), would find it in his descending route, not in his ascending; and this can hardly be reconciled with the description which we read in the Greek historian. Moreover, the subsequent marches which Xenophon mentions after quitting the mountain summit Thêchê, can hardly be reconciled with the supposition that it was the same as what is now called Karakaban. It is, indeed, quite possible, (as Mr. Hamilton suggests), that Thêchê may have been a peak apart from any road, and that the guide may have conducted the soldiers thither for the express purpose of showing the sea, guiding them back again into the road afterwards. This increases the difficulty of identifying the spot. However, the whole region is as yet very imperfectly known, and perhaps it is not impossible that there may be some particular locality even on Tekiah-Dagh, whence, through an accidental gap in the intervening mountains, the sea might become visible.

CHAPTER LXXI.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.

We now commence a third act in the history of this memorable body of men. After having followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as mercenaries to procure the throne for Cyrus,—then from Kunaxa to Trapezus as men anxious only for escape, and purchasing their safety by marvellous bravery, endurance, and organization, we shall now track their proceedings among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and at the Bosphorus of Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against the meanness of the Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against the treachery and arbitrary harshness of the Lacedæmonian commanders Anaxibius and Aristarchus.

Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose, was a colony from Sinôpê, as were also Kerasus and Kotyôra, farther westward; each of them receiving an harmost or governor from the mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its southern coast. At Sinôpê itself, the land stretches out into a defensible peninsula, with a secure harbor, and a large breadth of adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians, even before the year 600 B.C., to plant a colony there, and enabled Sinôpê to attain much prosperity and power. Farther westward, not more than a long day’s journey for a rowing vessel from Byzantium, was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the territory of the Mariandyni.

The native tenants of this line of coast, upon whom the Greek settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were the Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the Tibarêni, Chalybes, Mosynœki, Drilæ, and Kolchians. Here, as elsewhere, these natives found the Greek seaports useful, in giving a new value to inland produce, and in furnishing the great men with ornaments and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had no access. The citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence a considerable portion of the neighboring Mariandyni, and held them in a relation resembling that of the natives of Esthonia and Livonia to the German colonies in the Baltic. Some of the Kolchian villages were also subject, in the same manner, to the Trapezuntines;[197] and Sinôpê doubtless possessed a similar inland dominion of greater or less extent. But the principal wealth of this important city arose from her navy and maritime commerce; from the rich thunny fishery attached to her promontory; from the olives in her immediate neighborhood, which was a cultivation not indigenous, but only naturalized by the Greeks on the seaboard; from the varied produce of the interior, comprising abundant herds of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and copper in the neighboring mountains, wood for ship-building, as well as for house furniture, and native slaves.[198] The case was similar with the three colonies of Sinôpê, more to the eastward,—Kotyôra, Kerasus, and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the shore, left to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land. For these cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered and absorbed by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus and the cities on the eastern coast of Asia Minor had been. The Paphlagonians were at this time the only indigenous people in those regions who formed a considerable aggregated force, under a prince named Korylas; a prince tributary to Persia, yet half independent,—since he had disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes to come up and help in repelling Cyrus[199]—and now on terms of established alliance with Sinôpê, though not without secret designs, which he wanted only force to execute, against that city.[200] The other native tribes to the eastward were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on their own heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.

Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a detachment of Athenian colonists to Sinôpê,[201] and had expelled from thence the despot Timesilaus,—yet neither that city nor any of their neighbors appear to have taken a part in the Peloponnesian war, either for or against Athens; nor were they among the number of tributaries to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward march of Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not ignorant of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it was with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that they saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only recognized as the abode of Kolchians, Makrônes, and other analogous tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.

Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of the retreat, the Greeks still numbered, when mustered at Kerasus,[202] eight thousand six hundred hoplites, with peltasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers, etc., making a total of above ten thousand military persons. Such a force had never before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the numbers and the now-acquired discipline and self-confidence of the Cyreians, even Sinôpê herself could have raised no force capable of meeting them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor receive orders from any established government. They were like those mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the fourteenth century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking service sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one could predict what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner they might deal with the established communities on the shores of the Euxine. If we imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared in Sicily, a little time before the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, it would have been probably enlisted by Leontini and Katana in their war against Syracuse. If the inhabitants of Trapezus had wished to throw off the dominion of Sinôpê,—or if Korylas, the Paphlagonian, were meditating war against that city,—here were formidable auxiliaries to second their wishes. Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the formation of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original Greek settlers, would probably have overtopped Sinôpê herself. There was no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in Greece during the next generation,—but established citizens who had come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full intention, after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their homes and families.[203] We shall find such gravitation towards home steadily operative throughout the future proceedings of the army. But at the moment when they first emerged from the mountains, no one could be sure that it would be so. There was ample ground for uneasiness among the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose supremacy had never before been endangered.

An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to recover from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and to take pride in the anticipated effect which their unparalleled achievement could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged their vows and celebrated their festival to the gods, they held an assembly to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thurian soldier, named Antileon, exclaimed,—“Comrades, I am already tired of packing up, marching, running, carrying arms, falling into line, keeping watch, and fighting. Now that we have the sea here before us, I desire to be relieved from all these toils, to sail the rest of the way, and to arrive in Greece outstretched and asleep, like Odysseus.” This pithy address being received with vehement acclamations, and warmly responded to by all,—Cheirisophus offered, if the army chose to empower him, to sail forthwith to Byzantium, where he thought he could obtain from his friend the Lacedæmonian admiral, Anaxibius, sufficient vessels for transport. His proposition was gladly accepted; and he departed to execute the project.

Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced to maintain itself by marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains. Such expeditions, accordingly, must be put under regulation; neither individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go out at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover, the camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the event of surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also to take the best measures in their power for procuring vessels; since, after all, Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing an adequate number. They ought to borrow a few ships of war from the Trapezuntines, and detain all the merchant ships which they saw; unshipping the rudders, placing the cargoes under guard, and maintaining the crew during all the time that the ships might be required for transport of the army. Many such merchant vessels were often sailing by;[204] so that they would thus acquire the means of transport, even though Cheirisophus should bring few or none from Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to require the Grecian cities to repair and put in order the road along the coast, for a land-march; since, perhaps, with all their efforts, it would be found impossible to get together a sufficient stock of transports.

All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army, except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put that question to the vote. He took upon himself, however, to send messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging them to repair the roads, in order that the departure of the army might be facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry his wishes into effect, as far as Kotyôra.[205]

The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was compelled to stay away for a considerable time. A pentekonter (or armed ship with fifty oars) was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and committed to the charge of a Lacedæmonian Periœkus, named Dexippus, for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an Athenian, Polykrates; who brought in successively several merchant vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports. It became, however, gradually more and more difficult to supply the camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian lochi or companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were destroyed, to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary for the camp; while the Trapezuntines,—tired of the protracted stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage the natives in their own immediate neighborhood,—conducted the detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access. It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself, attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilæ,—the most warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighborhood of the Euxine; well armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions. After a difficult march and attack which Xenophon describes in interesting detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small hazard of ruinous defeat,—they returned in the end completely successful, and with a plentiful booty.[206]

At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them to leave Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and of the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board, under the command of Philesius and Sophænetus, the two oldest generals; while the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had been just made good under the representations of Xenophon. In three days they reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the Sinopeans, still in the territory called Kolchian; there they halted ten days, mustered and numbered the army, and divided the money acquired by the sale of their prisoners. Eight thousand six hundred hoplites, out of a total probably greater than eleven thousand, were found still remaining; besides targeteers and various light troops.[207]

During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the army became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of outrage occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues of treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his company to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, which had furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which rested secure on the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to make off separately with the booty in one of the vessels; but his attack was repelled, and he himself slain. The injured villagers despatched three elders, as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian authorities; but these heralds being seen in Kerasus by some of the repulsed plunderers, were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in which even the magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only escaped the pursuing soldiers by running into the sea. This enormity, though it occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from the numbers concerned in it.

Between Kerasus and Kotyôra, there was not then (nor is there now) any regular road.[208] This march cost the Cyreian army not less than ten days, by an inland track departing from the sea-shore, and through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous tribes Mosynœki and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their iron works, were under dependence to the former. As the Mosynœki refused to grant a friendly passage across their territory, the army were compelled to fight their way through it as enemies, with the aid of one section of these people themselves; which alliance was procured for them by the Trapezuntine Timesitheos, who was proxenus of the Mosynœki, and understood their language. The Greeks took the mountain fastnesses of this people, and plundered the wooden turrets which formed their abodes. Of their peculiar fashions Xenophon gives an interesting description, which I have not space to copy.[209] The territory of the Tibarêni was more easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks with presents, and tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at first declined the presents,—preferring to treat them as enemies and plunder them; which in fact they would have done, had they not been deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.[210]

Near Kotyôra, which was situated on the coast of the Tibarêni, yet on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry them away by sea. The Sinopian harmost or governor, did not permit them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls. But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress, but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their victuals partly from the Kotyôrite villages, partly from the neighboring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived from Sinôpê to remonstrate against their proceedings.

These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers in the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most eloquent among them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant exploits and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyôra and Sinôpê, as the mother city of Kotyôra, had suffered at their hands, in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings were continued, he intimated that Sinôpê would be compelled in her own defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Korylas, or any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid against the Greeks.[211] Xenophon replied that if the Kotyôrites had sustained any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to the Sinopian harmost in the place; that the generals were under the necessity of procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room for the sick, and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men were lying within the town, but at their own cost, while the other soldiers were all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial friendship with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good offices; that they sought no enemies except through necessity, being anxious only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become master of the wealthy city of Sinôpê, and would speedily attempt some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his auxiliaries.[212]

This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much, that they went the length of protesting against what he had said, and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them an hospitable reception at Sinôpê, if they should visit that town on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the inhabitants of Kotyôra, and a good understanding established.

Such an interchange of good will with the powerful city of Sinôpê was an unspeakable advantage to the army,—indeed, an essential condition to their power of reaching home. If they continued their march by land, it was only through Sinopian guidance and mediation that they could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia; while for a voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient number of vessels except from Sinôpê, since no news had been received of Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a strong interest in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus removing formidable neighbors for whose ulterior purposes there could be no guarantee. After some preliminary conversation with the Sinopian envoys, the generals convoked the army in assembly, and entreated Hekatonymus and his companions to advise them as to the best mode of proceeding westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus, after apologizing for the menacing insinuations of his former speech, and protesting that he had no other object in view except to point out the safest and easiest plan of route for the army, began to unfold the insuperable difficulties of a march through Paphlagonia. The very entrance into the country must be achieved through a narrow aperture in the mountains, which it was impossible to force if occupied by the enemy. Even assuming this difficulty to be surmounted, there were spacious plains to be passed over, wherein the Paphlagonian horse, the most numerous and bravest in Asia, would be found almost irresistible. There were also three or four great rivers, which the army would be unable to pass,—the Thermodon and the Iris, each three hundred feet in breadth,—the Halys, two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile in breadth,—the Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array of obstacles (he affirmed) rendered the project of marching through Paphlagonia impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyôra to Sinôpê, and from Sinôpê to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit from the latter place, either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across Thrace, yet easier.[213]

Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of marching and fighting, in favor of the sea-voyage; though there were not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But Xenophon, in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, distinctly apprised him that they would on no account permit themselves to be divided; that they would either depart or remain all in a body, and that vessels must be provided sufficient for the transport of all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys of their own to Sinôpê to make the necessary arrangements. Three envoys were accordingly sent,—Ariston, an Athenian, Kalimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an Achæan; the Athenian, probably, as possessing the talent of speaking in the Sinopian senate or assembly.[214]

During the absence of these envoys, the army still continued near Kotyôra with a market provided by the town, and with traders from Sinôpê and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as had no money wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the neighboring frontier of Paphlagonia.[215] But they were receiving no pay; every man was living on his own resources; and instead of carrying back a handsome purse to Greece, as each soldier had hoped when he first took service under Cyrus, there seemed every prospect of their returning poorer than when they left home.[216] Moreover, the army was now moving onward without any definite purpose, with increasing dissatisfaction and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon foresaw the difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders when they should come within the stricter restraints and obligations of the Grecian world.

It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and colonization in the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population, possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many indigenous neighbors. He seems to have thought first of attacking and conquering some established non-Hellenic city; an act which his ideas of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had contracted no special convention with the inhabitants,—though he (as well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing wrong to any innocent Hellenic community.[217] He contemplated the employment of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other native city; after which, when the establishment was once safely effected, those soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as settlers, might do so without emperiling those who stayed, and probably with their own purses filled by plunder and conquest in the neighborhood. To settle as one of the richest proprietors and chiefs,—perhaps even the recognized Œkist, like Agnon at Amphipolis,—of a new Hellenic city such as could hardly fail to become rich, powerful, and important,—was a tempting prospect for one who had now acquired the habits of command. Moreover, the sequel will prove, how correctly Xenophon appreciated the discomfort of leading the army back to Greece without pay and without certain employment.

It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master Sokrates,[218] in grave and doubtful cases, where the most careful reflection was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of an oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation to any person whom they favored. Accordingly Xenophon, previous to any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was anxious to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice; for which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus, the chief prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already mentioned), before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that Artaxerxes would not fight for ten days,—and the prophecy came to pass; which made such an impression on Cyrus that he rewarded him with the prodigious present of three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. While others were returning poor, Silanus, having contrived to preserve this sum throughout all the hardships of the retreat, was extremely rich, and anxious only to hasten home with his treasure in safety. He heard with strong repugnance the project of remaining in the Euxine, and determined to traverse it by intrigue. As far as concerned the sacrifices, indeed, which he offered apart with Xenophon, he was obliged to admit that the indications of the victims were favorable;[219] Xenophon himself being too familiar with the process to be imposed upon. But he at the same time tried to create alarm by declaring that a nice inspection disclosed evidence of treacherous snares laid for Xenophon; which latter indications he himself began to realize, by spreading reports among the army that the Athenian general was laying clandestine plans for keeping them away from Greece without their own concurrence.[220]

Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found some supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially among those officers who were jealous of the ascendency of Xenophon. Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming the Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them that unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for the soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the Euxine, and would employ the transports when they arrived, not for the homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition This news spread so much terror both at Sinôpê and Herakleia, that large offers of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on condition that he would ensure the departure of the army, as soon as the vessels should be assembled at Kotyôra. Accordingly these officers, convening an assembly of the soldiers, protested against the duplicity of Xenophon in thus preparing momentous schemes without any public debate or decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax, not only strenuously urged the army to return, but went so far as to promise to them, on the faith of the assurances from Herakleia and Sinôpê, future pay on a liberal scale, to commence from the first new moon after their departure; together with a hospitable reception in his native city of Dardanus on the Hellespont, from whence they could make incursions on the rich neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus.[221]

It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from more than one quarter,—until the Achæans Philesius and Lykon had loudly accused Xenophon of underhand manœuvring to cheat the army into remaining against their will,—that the latter rose to repel the imputation; saying, that all that he had done was, to consult the gods whether it would be better to lay his project before the army or to keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the gods, as conveyed through the victims and testified even by Silanus himself, proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless, (he remarked) Silanus had begun to lay snares for him, realizing by his own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to be visible in the victims. “If (added Xenophon) you had continued as destitute and unprovided as you were just now,—I should still have looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which would have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the rest stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any necessity; since Herakleia and Sinôpê are sending transports, and Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon. Nothing can be better; you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who were favorable to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together until we are on safe ground; and let the man who lags behind or runs off, be condemned as a wrong-doer.”[222]

Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every hand was held up in its favor. There was no man more disconcerted with the vote than the prophet Silanus, who loudly exclaimed against the injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the soldiers put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that they would assuredly punish him if they caught him running off. His intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment. But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took his opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to Greece with the three thousand darics.[223]

If Silanus gained little by his manœuvre, Timasion and his partners gained still less. For so soon as it became known that the army had taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and that Xenophon himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians and the Herakleots felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels, but withheld the money which they had promised to Timasion and Thorax. Hence these officers were exposed to dishonor and peril; for, having positively engaged to find pay for the army, they were now unable to keep their word. So keen were their apprehensions, that they came to Xenophon and told him that they had altered their views, and that they now thought it best to employ the newly-arrived transports in conveying the army, not to Greece, but against the town and territory of Phasis at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.[224] Xenophon replied, that they might convene the soldiers and make the proposition, if they chose; but that he would have nothing to say to it. To make the very proposition themselves, for which they had so much inveighed against Xenophon, was impossible without some preparation; so that each of them began individually to sound his captains, and get the scheme suggested by them. During this interval, the soldiery obtained information of the manœuvre, much to their discontent and indignation; of which Neon (the lieutenant of the absent Cheirisophus) took advantage, to throw the whole blame upon Xenophon; alleging that it was he who had converted the other officers to his original project, and that he intended as soon as the soldiers were on shipboard, to convey them fraudulently to Phasis instead of to Greece. There was something so plausible in this glaring falsehood, which represented Xenophon as the author of the renewed project, once his own,—and something so improbable in the fact that the other officers should spontaneously have renounced their own strong opinions to take up his,—that we can hardly be surprised at the ready credence which Neon’s calumny found among the army. Their exasperation against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected in fierce groups; and there was even a fear that they would break out into mutinous violence, as they had before done against the magistrates of Kerasus.

Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal assemblages, and the importance of the habitual solemnities of convocation and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or legitimate defence,[225]—Xenophon immediately sent round the herald to summon the army into the regular agora, with customary method and ceremony. The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, and Xenophon then addressed them,—refraining, with equal generosity and prudence, from saying anything about the last proposition which Timasion and others had made to him. Had he mentioned it, the question would have become one of life and death between him and those other officers.

“Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you to Phasis. Hear me, then, in the name of the gods. If I am shown to be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece, he must go westward,—if to the barbaric territories, he must go eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and persuade you that the sun rises on this side, and sets on that? Can any one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows you away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there is no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against your own consent,—I being only in one ship, you in a hundred and more? Imagine, however, that I could even succeed in deluding you to Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that we are not in Greece; and what fate can I then expect,—a detected impostor in the midst of ten thousand men with arms in their hands? No,—these stories all proceed from foolish men, who are jealous of my influence with you; jealous, too, without reason,—for I neither hinder them from outstripping me in your favor, if they can render you greater service,—nor you from electing them commanders, if you think fit. Enough of this, now; I challenge any one to come forward and say how it is possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid to my charge.”[226]

Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, and dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction in his own favor, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce the growing disorders in the army; which he depicted as such that, if no corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must fall upon all. As he paused after this general remonstrance, the soldiers loudly called upon him to go into particulars; upon which he proceeded to recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the outrages which had been committed at and near Kerasus,—the unauthorized and unprovoked attack made by Klearetus and his company on a neighboring village which was in friendly commerce with the army,—the murder of the three elders of the village, who had come as heralds to complain to the generals about such wrong,—the mutinous attack made by disorderly soldiers even upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the very moment when they were remonstrating with the generals on what had occurred; exposing these magistrates to the utmost peril, and putting the generals themselves to ignominy.[227] “If such are to be our proceedings, (continued Xenophon), look you well into what condition the army will fall. You, the aggregate body,[228] will no longer be the sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom you please; each individual among you will conduct the army against any point which he may choose. And even if men should come to you as envoys, either for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain by any single enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public communications whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage shall have chosen commanders, will have no authority; while any self-elected general who chooses to give the word, Cast! Cast! (i. e. darts or stones), may put to death, without trial, either officer or soldier, as it suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey him, as it happened near Kerasus. Look, now, what these self-elected leaders have done for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was really guilty of wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with impunity; if he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from you, as the only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial. Those who stoned the heralds to death, have brought matters to such a pass, that you alone, among all Greeks, cannot enter the town of Kerasus in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot even send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who were slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial; though at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious to give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in as herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury the bodies for us.”[229]

Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in impressing his own sentiment, heartily and unanimously, upon the soldiers. They passed a vote that the ringleaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be punished; that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future, he should be put upon his trial by the generals, before the lochages or captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death; and that trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony was also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon and the prophets, to purify the army.[230]

This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though deeper and more predominant among its better sections. In the miscellaneous aggregate, and temporary society, now mustered at Kotyôra, Xenophon insists on the universal suffrage of the whole body, as the legitimate sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual will; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected, as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority; the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of each separate man or fraction; as the condition of all success, all safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling. No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards, though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion. And what is not less important to notice,—the influence of Xenophon himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, seems to have been sensibly augmented,—certainly no way diminished.

The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition of Xenophon himself[231] that the generals themselves should be tried before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochages or captains, in case any one had complaint to make against them for past matters; agreeably to the Athenian habit of subjecting every magistrate to a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course of this investigation, Philesius and Xanthiklês were fined twenty minæ, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus for the transport of the army; Sophænetus, who had the general superintendence of this property, but had been negligent in that duty, was fined ten minæ. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by far the severest and most difficult, especially during the intense cold and deep snow; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out that he had given him blows, because the man, having been intrusted with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the duty by burying the dying man alive.[232] This interesting debate (given in the Anabasis at length) ended by full approbation, on the part of the army, of Xenophon’s conduct, accompanied with regret that he had not handled the man yet more severely.

The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a discreet and well-tempered officer. “I acknowledge (said he to the soldiers) to have struck many men for disorderly conduct; men who were content to owe their preservation to your orderly march and constant fighting, while they themselves ran about to plunder and enrich themselves at your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we should have perished to a man. Sometimes, too, I struck men who were lagging behind with cold and fatigue, or were stopping the way so as to hinder others from getting forward; I struck them with my fist,[233] in order to save them from the spear of the enemy. You yourselves stood by, and saw me; you had arms in your hands, yet none of you interfered to prevent me. I did it for their good as well as for yours, not from any insolence of disposition; for it was a time when we were all alike suffering from cold, hunger, and fatigue; whereas I now live comparatively well, drink more wine, and pass easy days,—and yet I strike no one. You will find that the men who failed most in those times of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders in the army. There is Boïskus,[234] the Thessalian pugilist, who pretended sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen of carrying his shield,—and now, as I am informed, he has stripped several citizens of Kotyôra of their clothes. If (he concluded) the blows which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are now brought in evidence,—I call upon those among you also, to whom I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify in my favor.”[235]

Many individuals responded to this appeal, insomuch that Xenophon was not merely acquitted, but stood higher than before in the opinion of the army. We learn from his defence that for a commanding officer to strike a soldier with his fist, if wanting in duty, was not considered improper; at least under such circumstances as those of the retreat. But what deserves notice still more, is, the extraordinary influence which Xenophon’s powers of speaking gave him over the minds of the army. He stood distinguished from the other generals, Lacedæmonian, Arcadian, Achæan, etc., by having the power of working on the minds of the soldiers collectively; and we see that he had the good sense, as well as the spirit, not to shrink from telling them unpleasant truths. In spite of such frankness—or rather, partly by means of such frankness,—his ascendency as commander not only remained unabated, as compared with that of the others, but went on increasing. For whatever may be said about the flattery of orators as a means of influence over the people,—it will be found that though particular points may be gained in this way, yet wherever the influence of an orator has been steady and long-continued (like that of Perikles[236] or Demosthenes) it is owing in part to the fact that he has an opinion of his own, and is not willing to accommodate himself constantly to the prepossessions of his hearers. Without the oratory of Xenophon, there would have existed no engine for kindling or sustaining the sensus communis of the ten thousand Cyreians assembled at Kotyôra, or for keeping up the moral authority of the aggregate over the individual members and fractions. The other officers could doubtless speak well enough to address short encouragements, or give simple explanations, to the soldiers; without this faculty, no man was fit for military command over Greeks. But the oratory of Xenophon was something of a higher order. Whoever will study the discourse pronounced by him at Kotyôra, will perceive a dexterity in dealing with assembled multitudes,—a discriminating use sometimes of the plainest and most direct appeal, sometimes of indirect insinuation or circuitous transitions to work round the minds of the hearers,—a command of those fundamental political convictions which lay deep in the Grecian mind, but were often so overlaid by the fresh impulses arising out of each successive situation, as to require some positive friction to draw them out from their latent state—lastly, a power of expansion and varied repetition—such as would be naturally imparted both by the education and the practice of an intelligent Athenian, but would rarely be found in any other Grecian city. The energy and judgment displayed by Xenophon in the retreat were doubtless not less essential to his influence than his power of speaking; but in these points we may be sure that other officers were more nearly his equals.

The important public proceedings above described not only restored the influence of Xenophon, but also cleared off a great amount of bad feeling, and sensibly abated the bad habits, which had grown up in the army. A scene which speedily followed was not without effect in promoting cheerful and amicable sympathies. The Paphlagonian prince Korylas, weary of the desultory warfare carried on between the Greeks and the border inhabitants, sent envoys to the Greek camp with presents of horses and fine robes,[237] and with expressions of a wish to conclude peace. The Greek generals accepted the presents, and promised to submit the proposition to the army. But first they entertained the envoys at a banquet, providing at the same time games and dances, with other recreations amusing not only to them but also to the soldiers generally. The various dances, warlike and pantomimic, of Thracians, Mysians, Ænianes, Magnêtes, etc., are described by Xenophon in a lively and interesting manner. They were followed on the next day by an amicable convention concluded between the army and the Paphlagonians.[238]

Not long afterwards,—a number of transports, sufficient for the whole army, having been assembled from Herakleia and Sinôpê,—all the soldiers were conveyed by sea to the latter place, passing by the mouth of the rivers Thermodon, Iris, and Halys, which they would have found impracticable to cross in a land-march through Paphlagonia. Having reached Sinôpê after a day and a night of sailing with a fair wind, they were hospitably received, and lodged in the neighboring seaport of Armênê, where the Sinopians sent to them a large present of barley-meal and wine, and where they remained for five days.

It was here that they were joined by Cheirisophus, whose absence had been so unexpectedly prolonged. But he came with only a single trireme, bringing nothing except a message from Anaxibius, the Lacedæmonian admiral in the Bosphorus; who complimented the army, and promised that they should be taken into pay as soon as they were out of the Euxine. The soldiers, severely disappointed on seeing him arrive thus empty-handed, became the more strongly bent on striking some blow to fill their own purses before they reached Greece. Feeling that it was necessary to the success of any such project that it should be prepared not only skilfully, but secretly, they resolved to elect a single general in place of that board of six (or perhaps more) who were still in function. Such was now the ascendency of Xenophon, that the general sentiment of the army at once turned towards him; and the lochages or captains, communicating to him what was in contemplation, intimated to him their own anxious hopes that he would not decline the offer. Tempted by so flattering a proposition, he hesitated at first what answer he should give. But at length the uncertainty of being able to satisfy the exigencies of the army, and the fear of thus compromising the reputation which he had already realized, outweighed the opposite inducements. As in other cases of doubt, so in this,—he offered sacrifice to Zeus Basileus; and the answer returned by the victims was such as to determine him to refusal. Accordingly, when the army assembled, with predetermination to choose a single chief, and proceeded to nominate him,—he respectfully and thankfully declined, on the ground that Cheirisophus was a Lacedæmonian, and that he himself was not; adding that he should cheerfully serve under any one whom they might name. His excuse, however, was repudiated by the army; and especially by the lochages. Several of these latter were Arcadians; and one of them, Agasias, cried out, with full sympathy of the soldiers, that if that principle were admitted, he, as an Arcadian, ought to resign his command. Finding that his former reason was not approved, Xenophon acquainted the army that he had sacrificed to know whether he ought to accept the command, and that the gods had peremptorily forbidden him to do so.[239]

Cheirisophus was then elected sole commander, and undertook the duty; saying that he would have willingly served under Xenophon, if the latter had accepted the office, but that it was a good thing for Xenophon himself to have declined,—since Dexippus had already poisoned the mind of Anaxibius against him, although he (Cheirisophus) had emphatically contradicted the calumnies.[240]

On the next day, the army sailed forward, under the command of Cheirisophus, to Herakleia; near which town they were hospitably entertained, and gratified with a present of meal, wine, and bullocks, even greater than they had received at Sinôpê. It now appeared that Xenophon had acted wisely in declining the sole command; and also that Cheirisophus, though elected commander, yet having been very long absent, was not really of so much importance in the eyes of the soldiers as Xenophon. In the camp near Herakleia, the soldiers became impatient that their generals (for the habit of looking upon Xenophon as one of them still continued) took no measures to procure money for them. The Achæan Lykon proposed that they should extort a contribution of no less than three thousand staters of Kyzikus (about sixty thousand Attic drachmæ, or ten talents, equal to two thousand three hundred pounds) from the inhabitants of Herakleia; another man immediately outbid this proposition, and proposed that they should require ten thousand staters—a full month’s pay for the army. It was moved that Cheirisophus and Xenophon should go to the Herakleots as envoys with this demand. But both of them indignantly refused to be concerned in so unjust an extortion from a Grecian city which had just received the army kindly, and sent handsome presents. Accordingly, Lykon with two Arcadian officers undertook the mission, and intimated the demand, not without threats in case of non-compliance, to the Herakleots. The latter replied that they would take it into consideration. But they waited only for the departure of the envoys, and then immediately closed their gates, manned their walls, and brought in their outlying property.

The project being thus baffled, Lykon and the rest turned their displeasure upon Cheirisophus and Xenophon, whom they accused of having occasioned its miscarriage. And they now began to exclaim, that it was disgraceful to the Arcadians and Achæans; who formed more than one numerical half of the army and endured all the toil—to obey as well as to enrich generals from other Hellenic cities; especially a single Athenian who furnished no contingent to the army. Here again it is remarkable that the personal importance of Xenophon caused him to be still regarded as a general, though the sole command had been vested, by formal vote, in Cheirisophus. So vehement was the dissatisfaction, that all the Arcadian and Achæan soldiers in the army, more than four thousand and five hundred hoplites in number, renounced the authority of Cheirisophus, formed themselves into a distinct division, and chose ten commanders from out of their own numbers. The whole army thus became divided into three portions—first, the Arcadians and Achæans; secondly, one thousand and four hundred hoplites and seven hundred peltasts, who adhered to Cheirisophus; lastly, one thousand seven hundred hoplites, three hundred peltasts, and forty horsemen, (all the horsemen in the army) attaching themselves to Xenophon; who however was taking measures to sail away individually from Herakleia and quit the army altogether, which he would have done had he not been restrained by unfavorable sacrifices.[241]

The Arcadian division, departing first, in vessels from Herakleia, landed at the harbor of Kalpê; an untenanted promontory of the Bithynian or Asiatic Thrace, midway between Herakleia and Byzantium. From thence they marched at once into the interior of Bithynia, with the view of surprising the villages, and acquiring plunder. But through rashness and bad management, they first sustained several partial losses, and ultimately became surrounded upon an eminence, by a large muster of the indigenous Bithynians from all the territory around. They were only rescued from destruction by the unexpected appearance of Xenophon with his division; who had left Herakleia somewhat later, but heard by accident, during their march, of the danger of their comrades. The whole army thus became re-assembled at Kalpê, where the Arcadians and Achæans, disgusted at the ill-success of their separate expedition, again established the old union and the old generals. They chose Neon in place of Cheirisophus, who,—afflicted by the humiliation put upon him, in having been first named sole commander and next deposed within a week,—had fallen sick of a fever and died. The elder Arcadian captains farther moved a resolution, that if any one henceforward should propose to separate the army into fractions, he should be put to death.[242]

The locality of Kalpê was well suited for the foundation of a colony, which Xenophon evidently would have been glad to bring about, though he took no direct measures tending towards it; while the soldiers were so bent on returning to Greece, and so jealous lest Xenophon should entrap them into remaining, that they almost shunned the encampment. It so happened that they were detained there for some days without being able to march forth even in quest of provisions, because the sacrifices were not favorable. Xenophon refused to lead them out, against the warning of the sacrifices—although the army suspected him of a deliberate manœuvre for the purpose of detention. Neon, however, less scrupulous, led out a body of two thousand men who chose to follow him, under severe distress for want of provisions. But being surprised by the native Bithynians, with the aid of some troops of the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, he was defeated with the loss of no less than five hundred men; a misfortune which Xenophon regards as the natural retribution for contempt of the sacrificial warning. The dangerous position of Neon with the remainder of the detachment was rapidly made known at the camp; upon which Xenophon, unharnessing a waggon-bullock as the only animal near at hand, immediately offered sacrifice. On this occasion, the victim was at once favorable; so that he led out without delay the greater part of the force, to the rescue of the exposed detachment, which was brought back in safety to the camp. So bold had the enemy become, that in the night the camp was attacked. The Greeks were obliged on the next day to retreat into stronger ground, surrounding themselves with a ditch and palisade. Fortunately a vessel arrived from Herakleia, bringing to the camp at Kalpê a supply of barley-meal, cattle, and wine; which restored the spirits of the army, enabling them to go forth on the ensuing morning, and assume the aggressive against the Bithynians and the troops of Pharnabazus. These troops were completely defeated and dispersed, so that the Greeks returned to their camp at Kalpê in the evening, both safe and masters of the country.[243]

At Kalpê they remained some time, awaiting the arrival of Kleander from Byzantium, who was said to be about to bring vessels for their transport. They were now abundantly provided with supplies, not merely from the undisturbed plunder of the neighboring villages, but also from the visits of traders who came with cargoes. Indeed the impression—that they were preparing, at the instance of Xenophon, to found a new city at Kalpê—became so strong, that several of the neighboring native villages sent envoys to ask on what terms alliance would be granted to them. At length Kleander came, but with two triremes only.[244]

Kleander was the Lacedæmonian harmost or governor of Byzantium. His appearance opens to us a new phase in the eventful history of this gallant army, as well as an insight into the state of the Grecian world under the Lacedæmonian empire. He came attended by Dexippus, who had served in the Cyreian army until their arrival at Trapezus, and who had there been entrusted with an armed vessel for the purpose of detaining transports to convey the troops home, but had abused the confidence reposed in him by running away with the ship to Byzantium.

It so happened that at the moment when Kleander arrived, the whole army was out on a marauding excursion. Orders had been already promulgated, that whatever was captured by every one when the whole army was out, should be brought in and dealt with as public property; though on days when the army was collectively at rest, any soldier might go out individually and take to himself whatever he could pillage. On the day when Kleander arrived, and found the whole army out, some soldiers were just coming back with a lot of sheep which they had seized. By right, the sheep ought to have been handed into the public store. But these soldiers, desirous to appropriate them wrongfully, addressed themselves to Dexippus, and promised him a portion if he would enable them to retain the rest. Accordingly the latter interfered, drove away those who claimed the sheep as public property, and denounced them as thieves to Kleander; who desired him to bring them before him. Dexippus arrested one of them, a soldier belonging to the lochus or company of one of the best friends of Xenophon,—the Arcadian Agasias. The latter took the man under his protection; while the soldiers around, incensed not less at the past than at the present conduct of Dexippus, broke out into violent manifestations, called him a traitor and pelted him with stones. Such was their wrath that not Dexippus alone, but the crew of the triremes also, and even Kleander himself, fled in alarm; in spite of the intervention of Xenophon and the other generals, who on the one hand explained to Kleander, that it was an established army-order which these soldiers were seeking to enforce—and on the other hand controlled the mutineers. But the Lacedæmonian harmost was so incensed as well by his own fright as by the calumnies of Dexippus, that he threatened to sail away at once, and proclaim the Cyreian army enemies to Sparta, so that every Hellenic city should be interdicted from giving them reception.[245] It was in vain that the generals, well knowing the formidable consequences of such an interdict, entreated him to relent. He would consent only on condition that the soldier who had begun to throw stones, as well as Agasias the interfering officer, should be delivered up to him. This latter demand was especially insisted upon by Dexippus, who, hating Xenophon, had already tried to prejudice Anaxibius against him, and believed that Agasias had acted by his order.[246]

The situation became now extremely critical; since the soldiers would not easily be brought to surrender their comrades,—who had a perfectly righteous cause, though they had supported it by undue violence,—to the vengeance of a traitor like Dexippus. When the army was convened in assembly, several of them went so far as to treat the menace of Kleander with contempt. But Xenophon took pains to set them right upon this point. “Soldiers (said he), it will be no slight misfortune if Kleander shall depart as he threatens to do, in his present temper towards us. We are here close upon the cities of Greece; now the Lacedæmonians are the imperial power in Greece, and not merely their authorized officers, but even each one of their individual citizens, can accomplish what he pleases in the various cities. If then Kleander begins by shutting us out from Byzantium, and next enjoins the Lacedæmonian harmosts in the other cities to do the same, proclaiming us lawless and disobedient to Sparta,—if, besides, the same representation should be conveyed to the Lacedæmonian admiral of the fleet, Anaxibius,—we shall be hard pressed either to remain or to sail away; for the Lacedæmonians are at present masters, both on land and at sea.[247] We must not, for the sake of any one or two men, suffer the whole army to be excluded from Greece. We must obey whatever the Lacedæmonians command, especially as our cities, to which we respectively belong, now obey them. As to what concerns myself, I understand that Dexippus has told Kleander that Agasias would never have taken such a step except by my orders. Now, if Agasias himself states this, I am ready to exonerate both him and all of you, and to give myself up to any extremity of punishment. I maintain too, that any other man whom Kleander arraigns, ought in like manner to give himself up for trial, in order that you collectively may be discharged from the imputation. It will be hard indeed, if just as we are reaching Greece, we should not only be debarred from the praise and honor which we anticipated, but should be degraded even below the level of others, and shut out from the Grecian cities.”[248]

After this speech from the philo-Laconian Xenophon,—so significant a testimony of the unmeasured ascendency and interference of the Lacedæmonians throughout Greece,—Agasias rose and proclaimed, that what he had done was neither under the orders, nor with the privity, of Xenophon; that he had acted on a personal impulse of wrath, at seeing his own honest and innocent soldier dragged away by the traitor Dexippus; but that he now willingly gave himself up as a victim, to avert from the army the displeasure of the Lacedæmonians. This generous self-sacrifice, which at the moment promised nothing less than a fatal result to Agasias, was accepted by the army; and the generals conducted both him and the soldier whom he had rescued, as prisoners to Kleander. Presenting himself as the responsible party, Agasias at the same time explained to Kleander the infamous behavior of Dexippus to the army, and said that towards no one else would he have acted in the same manner; while the soldier whom he had rescued and who was given up at the same time, also affirmed that he had interfered merely to prevent Dexippus and some others from overruling, for their own individual benefit, a proclaimed order of the entire army. Kleander, having observed that if Dexippus had done what was affirmed, he would be the last to defend him, but that no one ought to have been stoned without trial,—desired that the persons surrendered might be left for his consideration, and at the same time retracted his expressions of displeasure as regarded all the others.[249]

The generals then retired, leaving Kleander in possession of the prisoners, and on the point of taking his dinner. But they retired with mournful feelings, and Xenophon presently convened the army to propose that a general deputation should be sent to Kleander to implore his lenity towards their two comrades. This being cordially adopted, Xenophon, at the head of a deputation comprising Drakontius, the Spartan, as well as the chief officers, addressed an earnest appeal to Kleander, representing that his honor had been satisfied with the unconditional surrender of the two persons required; that the army, deeply concerned for two meritorious comrades, entreated him now to show mercy and spare their lives; that they promised him in return the most implicit obedience, and entreated him to take the command of them, in order that he might have personal cognizance of their exact discipline, and compare their worth with that of Dexippus. Kleander was not merely soothed, but completely won over by this address; and said in reply that the conduct of the generals belied altogether the representations made to him, (doubtless by Dexippus) that they were seeking to alienate the army from the Lacedæmonians. He not only restored the two men in his power, but also accepted the command of the army, and promised to conduct them back into Greece.[250]

The prospects of the army appeared thus greatly improved; the more so, as Kleander, on entering upon his new functions as commander, found the soldiers so cheerful and orderly, that he was highly gratified, and exchanged personal tokens of friendship and hospitality with Xenophon. But when sacrifices came to be offered, for beginning the march homeward, the signs were so unpropitious, for three successive days, that Kleander could not bring himself to brave such auguries at the outset of his career. Accordingly, he told the generals, that the gods plainly forbade him, and reserved it for them, to conduct the army into Greece; that he should therefore sail back to Byzantium, and would receive the army in the best way he could, when they reached the Bosphorus. After an interchange of presents with the soldiers, he then departed with his two triremes.[251]

The favorable sentiment now established in the bosom of Kleander will be found very serviceable hereafter to the Cyreians at Byzantium; but they had cause for deeply regretting the unpropitious sacrifices which had deterred him from assuming the actual command at Kalpê. In the request preferred to him by them that he would march as their commander to the Bosphorus, we may recognize a scheme, and a very well-contrived scheme, of Xenophon; who had before desired to leave the army at Herakleia, and who saw plainly that the difficulties of a commander, unless he were a Lacedæmonian of station and influence, would increase with every step of their approach to Greece. Had Kleander accepted the command, the soldiers would have been better treated, while Xenophon himself might either have remained as his adviser, or might have gone home. He probably would have chosen the latter course.

Under the command of their own officers, the Cyreians now marched from Kalpê across Bithynia to Chrysopolis,[252] (in the territory of Chalkêdon on the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus, immediately opposite to Byzantium, as Scutari now is to Constantinople), where they remained seven days, turning into money the slaves and plunder which they had collected. Unhappily for them, the Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius was now at Byzantium, so that their friend Kleander was under his superior command. And Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap of the north-western regions of Asia Minor, becoming much alarmed lest they should invade his satrapy, despatched a private message to Anaxibius; whom he prevailed upon, by promise of large presents, to transport the army forthwith across to the European side of the Bosphorus.[253] Accordingly, Anaxibius, sending for the generals and the lochages across to Byzantium, invited the army to cross, and gave them his assurance that as soon as the soldiers should be in Europe, he would provide pay for them. The other officers told him that they would return with this message and take the sense of the army; but Xenophon, on his own account, said that he should not return; that he should now retire from the army, and sail away from Byzantium. It was only on the pressing instance of Anaxibius that he was induced to go back to Chrysopolis and conduct the army across; on the understanding that he should depart immediately afterwards.

Here at Byzantium, he received his first communication from the Thracian prince Seuthes; who sent Medosadês to offer him a reward if he would bring the army across. Xenophon replied that the army would cross; that no reward from Seuthes was needful to bring about that movement; but that he himself was about to depart, leaving the command in other hands. In point of fact, the whole army crossed with little delay, landed in Europe, and found themselves within the walls of Byzantium.[254] Xenophon, who had come along with them, paid a visit shortly afterwards to his friend the harmost Kleander, and took leave of him as about to depart immediately. But Kleander told him that he must not think of departing until the army was out of the city, and that he would be held responsible if they stayed. In truth Kleander was very uneasy so long as the soldiers were within the walls, and was well aware that it might be no easy matter to induce them to go away. For Anaxibius had practised a gross fraud in promising them pay, which he had neither the ability nor the inclination to provide. Without handing to them either pay or even means of purchasing supplies, he issued orders that they must go forth with arms and baggage, and muster outside of the gates, there to be numbered for an immediate march; any one who stayed behind being held as punishable. This proclamation was alike unexpected and offensive to the soldiers, who felt that they had been deluded, and were very backward in obeying. Hence Kleander, while urgent with Xenophon to defer his departure until he had conducted the army outside of the walls, added—“Go forth as if you were about to march along with them; when you are once outside, you may depart as soon as you please.”[255] Xenophon replied that this matter must be settled with Anaxibius, to whom accordingly both of them went, and who repeated the same directions, in a manner yet more peremptory. Though it was plain to Xenophon that he was here making himself a sort of instrument to the fraud which Anaxibius had practised upon the army, yet he had no choice but to obey. Accordingly, he as well as the other generals put themselves at the head of the troops, who followed, however reluctantly, and arrived most of them outside of the gates. Eteonikus (a Lacedæmonian officer of consideration, noticed more than once in my last preceding volume) commanding at the gate, stood close to it in person; in order that when all the Cyreians had gone forth, he might immediately shut it and fasten it with the bar.[256]

Anaxibius knew well what he was doing. He fully anticipated that the communication of the final orders would occasion an outbreak among the Cyreians, and was anxious to defer it until they were outside. But when there remained only the rearmost companies still in the inside and on their march, all the rest having got out—he thought the danger was over, and summoned to him the generals and captains, all of whom were probably near the gates superintending the march through. It seems that Xenophon, having given notice that he intended to depart, did not answer to this summons as one of the generals, but remained outside among the soldiers. “Take what supplies you want (said Anaxibius) from the neighboring Thracian villages, which are well furnished with wheat, barley, and other necessaries. After thus providing yourselves, march forward to the Chersonesus, and there Kyniskus will give you pay.”[257]

This was the first distinct intimation given by Anaxibius that he did not intend to perform his promise of finding pay for the soldiers. Who Kyniskus was, we do not know, nor was he probably known to the Cyreians; but the march here enjoined was at least one hundred and fifty English miles, and might be much longer. The route was not indicated, and the generals had to inquire from Anaxibius whether they were to go by what was called the Holy Mountain (that is, by the shorter line, skirting the northern coast of the Propontis), or by a more inland and circuitous road through Thrace;—also whether they were to regard the Thracian prince, Seuthes, as a friend or an enemy.[258]

Instead of the pay which had been formally promised to them by Anaxibius if they would cross over from Asia to Byzantium, the Cyreians thus found themselves sent away empty-handed, to a long march,—through another barbarous country, with chance supplies to be ravished only by their own efforts,—and at the end of it a lot unknown and uncertain; while, had they remained in Asia, they would have had at any rate the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus within their reach. To perfidy of dealing was now added a brutal ejectment from Byzantium, without even the commonest manifestations of hospitality; contrasting pointedly with the treatment which the army had recently experienced at Trapezus, Sinôpê, and Herakleia; where they had been welcomed not only by compliments on their past achievements, but also by an ample present of flour, meat, and wine. Such behavior could not fail to provoke the most violent indignation in the bosoms of the soldiery; and Anaxibius had therefore delayed giving the order until the last soldiers were marching out, thinking that the army would hear nothing of it until the generals came out of the gates to inform them; so that the gates would be closed, and the walls manned to resist any assault from without. But his calculations were not realized. Either one of the soldiers passing by heard him give the order, or one of the captains forming his audience stole away from the rest, and hastened forward to acquaint his comrades on the outside. The bulk of the army, already irritated by the inhospitable way in which they had been thrust out, needed nothing farther to inflame them into spontaneous mutiny and aggression. While the generals within (who either took the communication more patiently, or at least, looking farther forward, felt that any attempt to resent or resist the ill usage of the Spartan admiral would only make their position worse) were discussing with Anaxibius the details of the march just enjoined, the soldiers without, bursting into spontaneous movement, with a simultaneous and fiery impulse, made a rush back to get possession of the gate. But Eteonikus, seeing their movement, closed it without a moment’s delay, and fastened the bar. The soldiers on reaching the gate and finding it barred, clamored loudly to get it opened, threatened to break it down, and even began to knock violently against it. Some ran down to the sea-coast, and made their way into the city round the line of stones at the base of the city wall, which protected it against the sea; while the rearmost soldiers who had not yet marched out, seeing what was passing, and fearful of being cut off from their comrades, assaulted the gate from the inside, severed the fastenings with axes, and threw it wide open to the army.[259] All the soldiers then rushed up, and were soon again in Byzantium.

Nothing could exceed the terror of the Lacedæmonians as well as of the native Byzantines, when they saw the excited Cyreians again within the walls. The town seemed already taken and on the point of being plundered. Neither Anaxibius nor Eteonikus took the smallest means of resistance, nor stayed to brave the approach of the soldiers, whose wrath they were fully conscious of having deserved. Both fled to the citadel—the former first running to the sea-shore, and jumping into a fishing-boat to go thither by sea. He even thought the citadel not tenable with its existing garrison, and sent over to Chalkêdon for a reinforcement. Still more terrified were the citizens of the town. Every man in the market-place instantly fled; some to their houses, others to the merchant vessels in the harbor, others to the triremes or ships of war, which they hauled down to the water, and thus put to sea.[260]

To the deception and harshness of the Spartan admiral, there was thus added a want of precaution in the manner of execution, which threatened to prove the utter ruin of Byzantium. For it was but too probable that the Cyreian soldiers, under the keen sense of recent injury, would satiate their revenge, and reimburse themselves for the want of hospitality towards them, without distinguishing the Lacedæmonian garrison from the Byzantine citizens; and that too from mere impulse, not merely without orders, but in spite of prohibitions, from their generals. Such was the aspect of the case, when they became again assembled in a mass within the gates; and such would probably have been the reality, had Xenophon executed his design of retiring earlier, so as to leave the other generals acting without him. Being on the outside along with the soldiers, Xenophon felt at once, as soon as he saw the gates forced open and the army again within the town, the terrific emergency which was impending; first, the sack of Byzantium,—next, horror and antipathy, throughout all Greece, towards the Cyreian officers and soldiers indiscriminately,—lastly, unsparing retribution inflicted upon all by the power of Sparta. Overwhelmed with these anxieties, he rushed into the town along with the multitude, using every effort to pacify them and bring them into order. They on their parts, delighted to see him along with them, and conscious of their own force, were eager to excite him to the same pitch as themselves, and to prevail on him to second and methodize their present triumph. “Now is your time, Xenophon, (they exclaimed), to make yourself a man. You have here a city,—you have triremes,—you have money,—you have plenty of soldiers. Now then, if you choose, you can enrich us; and we in return can make you powerful.”—“You speak well (replied he); I shall do as you propose; but if you want to accomplish anything, you must fall into military array forthwith.” He knew that this was the first condition of returning to anything like tranquillity; and by great good fortune, the space called the Thrakion, immediately adjoining the gate inside, was level, open, and clear of houses; presenting an excellent place of arms or locality for a review. The whole army,—partly from their long military practice,—partly under the impression that Xenophon was really about to second their wishes and direct some aggressive operation,—threw themselves almost of their own accord into regular array on the Thrakion; the hoplites eight deep, the peltasts on each flank. It was in this position that Xenophon addressed them as follows:—

“Soldiers! I am not surprised that you are incensed, and that you think yourselves scandalously cheated and ill-used. But if we give way to our wrath, if we punish these Lacedæmonians now before us for their treachery, and plunder this innocent city,—reflect what will be the consequence. We shall stand proclaimed forthwith as enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their allies; and what sort of a war that will be, those who have witnessed and who still recollect recent matters of history may easily fancy. We Athenians entered into the war against Sparta with a powerful army and fleet, an abundant revenue, and numerous tributary cities in Asia as well as Europe,—among them this very Byzantium in which we now stand. We have been vanquished in the way that all of you know. And what then will be the fate of us soldiers, when we shall have as united enemies, Sparta with all her old allies and Athens besides,—Tissaphernes and the barbaric forces on the coast,—and most of all, the Great King whom we marched up to dethrone and slay, if we were able? Is any man fool enough to think that we have a chance of making head against so many combined enemies? Let us not plunge madly into dishonor and ruin, nor incur the enmity of our own fathers and friends; who are in the cities which will take arms against us,—and will take arms justly, if we, who abstained from seizing any barbaric city, even when we were in force sufficient, shall nevertheless now plunder the first Grecian city into which we have been admitted. As far as I am concerned, may I be buried ten thousand fathoms deep in the earth, rather than see you do such things; and I exhort you, too, as Greeks, to obey the leaders of Greece. Endeavor, while thus obedient, to obtain your just rights; but if you should fail in this, rather submit to injustice than cut yourselves off from the Grecian world. Send to inform Anaxibius that we have entered the city, not with a view to commit any violence, but in the hope, if possible, of obtaining from him the advantages which he promised us. If we fail, we shall at least prove to him that we quit the city, not under his fraudulent manœuvres, but under our own sense of the duty of obedience.”[261]

This speech completely arrested the impetuous impulse of the army, brought them to a true sense of their situation, and induced them to adopt the proposition of Xenophon. They remained unmoved in their position on the Thrakion, while three of the captains were sent to communicate with Anaxibius. While they were thus waiting, a Theban named Kœratadas approached, who had once commanded in Byzantium under the Lacedæmonians, during the previous war. He had now become a sort of professional Condottiero or general, looking out for an army to command, wherever he could find one, and offering his services to any city which would engage him. He addressed the assembled Cyreians, and offered, if they would accept him for their general, to conduct them against the Delta of Thrace (the space included between the north-west corner of the Propontis and the south-west corner of the Euxine), which he asserted to be a rich territory presenting great opportunity to plunder; he farther promised to furnish them with ample subsistence during the march. Presently the envoys returned, bearing the reply of Anaxibius, who received the message favorably, promising that not only the army should have no cause to regret their obedience, but that he would both report their good conduct to the authorities at home, and do everything in his own power to promote their comfort.[262] He said nothing farther about taking them into pay; that delusion having now answered its purpose. The soldiers, on hearing his communication, adopted a resolution to accept Kœratadas as their future commander, and then marched out of the town. As soon as they were on the outside, Anaxibius, not content with closing the gates against them, made public proclamation that if any one of them were found in the town, he should be sold forthwith into slavery.

There are few cases throughout Grecian history in which an able discourse has been the means of averting so much evil, as was averted by this speech of Xenophon to the army in Byzantium. Nor did he ever, throughout the whole period of his command, render to them a more signal service. The miserable consequences, which would have ensued, had the army persisted in their aggressive impulse,—first, to the citizens of the town, ultimately to themselves, while Anaxibius, the only guilty person, had the means of escaping by sea, even under the worst circumstances,—are stated by Xenophon rather under than above the reality. At the same time no orator ever undertook a more difficult case, or achieved a fuller triumph over unpromising conditions. If we consider the feelings and position of the army at the instant of their breaking into the town, we shall be astonished that any commander could have arrested their movements. Though fresh from all the glory of their retreat, they had been first treacherously entrapped over from Asia, next roughly ejected, by Anaxibius; and although it may be said truly that the citizens of Byzantium had no concern either in the one or the other, yet little heed is commonly taken, in military operations, to the distinction between garrison and citizens in an assailed town. Having arms in their hands, with consciousness of force arising out of their exploits in Asia, the Cyreians were at the same time inflamed by the opportunity both of avenging a gross recent injury, and enriching themselves in the process of execution; to which we may add, the excitement of that rush whereby they had obtained the reëntry, and the farther fact, that without the gates they had nothing to expect except poor, hard, uninviting service in Thrace. With soldiers already possessed by an overpowering impulse of this nature, what chance was there that a retiring general, on the point of quitting the army, could so work upon their minds as to induce them to renounce the prey before them? Xenophon had nothing to invoke except distant considerations, partly of Hellenic reputation, chiefly of prudence; considerations indeed of unquestionable reality and prodigious magnitude, yet belonging all to a distant future, and therefore of little comparative force, except when set forth in magnified characters by the orator. How powerfully he worked upon the minds of his hearers, so as to draw forth these far-removed dangers from the cloud of present sentiment by which they were overlaid,—how skilfully he employed in illustration the example of his own native city,—will be seen by all who study his speech. Never did his Athenian accomplishments,—his talent for giving words to important thoughts,—his promptitude in seizing a present situation and managing the sentiments of an impetuous multitude,—appear to greater advantage than when he was thus suddenly called forth to meet a terrible emergency. His pre-established reputation and the habit of obeying his orders, were doubtless essential conditions of success. But none of his colleagues in command would have been able to accomplish the like memorable change on the minds of the soldiers, or to procure obedience for any simple authoritative restraint; nay, it is probable, that if Xenophon had not been at hand, the other generals would have followed the passionate movement, even though they had been reluctant,—from simple inability to repress it.[263] Again,—whatever might have been the accomplishments of Xenophon, it is certain that even he would not have been able to work upon the minds of these excited soldiers, had they not been Greeks and citizens as well as soldiers,—bred in Hellenic sympathies and accustomed to Hellenic order, with authority operating in part through voice and persuasion, and not through the Persian whip and instruments of torture. The memorable discourse on the Thrakion at Byzantium illustrates the working of that persuasive agency which formed one of the permanent forces and conspicuous charms of Hellenism. It teaches us that if the orator could sometimes accuse innocent defendants and pervert well-disposed assemblies,—a part of the case which historians of Greece often present as if it were the whole,—he could also, and that in the most trying emergencies, combat the strongest force of present passion, and bring into vivid presence the half-obscured lineaments of long-sighted reason and duty.

After conducting the army out of the city, Xenophon sent, through Kleander, a message to Anaxibius, requesting that he himself might be allowed to come in again singly, in order to take his departure by sea. His request was granted, though not without much difficulty; upon which he took leave of the army, under the strongest expressions of affection and gratitude on their part,[264] and went into Byzantium along with Kleander; while on the next day Kœratadas came to assume the command according to agreement, bringing with him a prophet, and beasts to be offered in sacrifice. There followed in his train twenty men carrying sacks of barley-meal, twenty more with jars of wine, three bearing olives, and one man with a bundle of garlic and onions. All these provisions being laid down, Kœratadas proceeded to offer sacrifice, as a preliminary to the distribution of them among the soldiers. On the first day, the sacrifices being unfavorable, no distribution took place; on the second day, Kœratadas was standing with the wreath on his head at the altar, and with the victims beside him, about to renew his sacrifice,—when Timasion and the other officers interfered, desired him to abstain, and dismissed him from the command. Perhaps the first unfavorable sacrifices may have partly impelled them to this proceeding. But the main reason was, the scanty store, inadequate even to one day’s subsistence for the army, brought by Kœratadas,—and the obvious insufficiency of his means.[265]

On the departure of Kœratadas, the army marched to take up its quarters in some Thracian villages not far from Byzantium, under its former officers; who however could not agree as to their future order of march. Kleanor and Phryniskus, who had received presents from Seuthes, urged the expediency of accepting the service of that Thracian prince; Neon insisted on going to the Chersonese under the Lacedæmonian officers in that peninsula (as Anaxibius had projected); in the idea that he, as a Lacedæmonian, would there obtain the command of the whole army; while Timasion, with the view of re-establishing himself in his native city of Dardanus, proposed returning to the Asiatic side of the strait.

Though this last plan met with decided favor among the army, it could not be executed without vessels. These Timasion had little or no means of procuring; so that considerable delay took place, during which the soldiers, receiving no pay, fell into much distress. Many of them were even compelled to sell their arms in order to get subsistence; while others got permission to settle in some of the neighboring towns, on condition of being disarmed. The whole army was thus gradually melting away, much to the satisfaction of Anaxibius, who was anxious to see the purposes of Pharnabazus accomplished. By degrees, it would probably have been dissolved altogether, had not a change of interest on the part of Anaxibius induced him to promote its reorganization. He sailed from Byzantium to the Asiatic coast, to acquaint Pharnabazus that the Cyreians could no longer cause uneasiness, and to require his own promised reward. It seems moreover that Xenophon himself departed from Byzantium by the same opportunity. When they reached Kyzikus, they met the Lacedæmonian Aristarchus; who was coming out as newly-appointed harmost of Byzantium, to supersede Kleander, and who acquainted Anaxibius that Polus was on the point of arriving to supersede him as admiral. Anxious to meet Pharnabazus and make sure of his bribe, Anaxibius impressed his parting injunction upon Aristarchus to sell for slaves all the Cyreians whom he might find at Byzantium on his arrival, and then pursued his voyage along the southern coast of the Propontis to Parium. But Pharnabazus, having already received intimation of the change of admirals, knew that the friendship of Anaxibius was no longer of any value, and took no farther heed of him; while he at the same time sent to Byzantium to make the like compact with Aristarchus against the Cyreian army.[266]

Anaxibius was stung to the quick at this combination of disappointment and insult on the part of the satrap. To avenge it, he resolved to employ those very soldiers whom he had first corrupted and fraudulently brought across to Europe, next cast out from Byzantium, and lastly, ordered to be sold into slavery, so far as any might yet be found in that town; bringing them back into Asia for the purpose of acting against Pharnabazus. Accordingly he addressed himself to Xenophon, and ordered him without a moment’s delay to rejoin the army, for the purpose of keeping it together, of recalling the soldiers who had departed, and transporting the whole body across into Asia. He provided him with an armed vessel of thirty oars to cross over from Parium to Perinthus, sending over a peremptory order to the Perinthians to furnish him with horses in order that he might reach the army with the greatest speed.[267] Perhaps it would not have been safe for Xenophon to disobey this order, under any circumstances. But the idea of acting with the army in Asia against Pharnabazus, under Lacedæmonian sanction, was probably very acceptable to him. He hastened across to the army, who welcomed his return with joy, and gladly embraced the proposal of crossing to Asia, which was a great improvement upon their forlorn and destitute condition. He accordingly conducted them to Perinthus, and encamped under the walls of the town; refusing, in his way through Selymbria, a second proposition from Seuthes to engage the services of the army.

While Xenophon was exerting himself to procure transports for the passage of the army at Perinthus, Aristarchus the new harmost arrived there with two triremes from Byzantium. It seems that not only Byzantium, but also both Perinthus and Selymbria, were comprised in his government as harmost. On first reaching Byzantium to supersede Kleander, he found there no less than four hundred of the Cyreians, chiefly sick and wounded; whom Kleander, in spite of the ill-will of Anaxibius, had not only refused to sell into slavery, but had billeted upon the citizens, and tended with solicitude; so much did his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come into play. We read with indignation that Aristarchus, immediately on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented with sending these four hundred men out of the town; but seized them,—Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were,—and sold them all into slavery.[268] Apprised of the movements of Xenophon with the army, he now came to Perinthus to prevent their transit into Asia; laying an embargo on the transports in the harbor, and presenting himself personally before the assembled army to prohibit the soldiers from crossing. When Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius had given them orders to cross, and had sent him expressly to conduct them,—Aristarchus replied, “Anaxibius is no longer in functions as admiral, and I am harmost in this town. If I catch any of you at sea, I will sink you.” On the next day, he sent to invite the generals and the captains (lochages) to a conference within the walls. They were just about to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who was among them, received a private warning, that if he went in, Aristarchus would seize him, and either put him to death or send him prisoner to Pharnabazus. Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the others, and remained himself with the army, alleging the obligation of sacrificing. The behavior of Aristarchus,—who, when he saw the others without Xenophon, sent them away, and desired that they would all come again in the afternoon,—confirmed the justice of his suspicions, as to the imminent danger from which he had been preserved by this accidental warning.[269] It need hardly be added that Xenophon disregarded the second invitation no less than the first; moreover a third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards sent, was disregarded by all.

We have here a Lacedæmonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a snare of treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernes had practised on the banks of the Zab to entrap Klearchus and his colleagues,—and that too against a Greek, and an officer of the highest station and merit, who had just saved Byzantium from pillage, and was now actually in execution of orders received from the Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius. Had the accidental warning been withheld, Xenophon would assuredly have fallen into this snare, nor could we reasonably have charged him with imprudence,—so fully was he entitled to count upon straightforward conduct under the circumstances. But the same cannot be said of Klearchus, who undoubtedly manifested lamentable credulity, nefarious as was the fraud to which he fell a victim.

At the second interview with the other officers, Aristarchus, while he forbade the army to cross the water, directed them to force their way by land through the Thracians who occupied the Holy mountain, and thus to arrive at the Chersonese; where (he said) they should receive pay. Neon the Lacedæmonian, with about eight hundred hoplites who adhered to his separate command, advocated this plan as the best. To be set against it, however, there was the proposition of Seuthes to take the army into pay; which Xenophon was inclined to prefer, uneasy at the thoughts of being cooped up in the narrow peninsula of the Chersonese, under the absolute command of the Lacedæmonian harmost, with great uncertainty both as to pay and as to provisions.[270] Moreover it was imperiously necessary for these disappointed troops to make some immediate movement; for they had been brought to the gates of Perinthus in hopes of passing immediately on shipboard; it was mid-winter,—they were encamped in the open field, under the severe cold of Thrace,—they had neither assured supplies, nor even money to purchase, if a market had been near.[271] Xenophon, who had brought them to the neighborhood of Perinthus, was now again responsible for extricating them from this untenable situation, and began to offer sacrifices, according to his wont, to ascertain whether the gods would encourage him to recommend a covenant with Seuthes. The sacrifices were so favorable, that he himself, together with a confidential officer from each of the generals, went by night and paid a visit to Seuthes, for the purpose of understanding distinctly his offers and purposes.

Mæsadês, the father of Seuthes, had been apparently a dependent prince under the great monarchy of the Odrysian Thracians; so formidable in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. But intestine commotions had robbed him of his principality over three Thracian tribes; which it was now the ambition of Seuthes to recover, by the aid of the Cyreian army. He offered to each soldier one stater of Kyzikus (about twenty Attic drachmæ, or nearly the same as that which they originally received from Cyrus) as pay per month; twice as much to each lochage or captain,—four times as much to each of the generals. In case they should incur the enmity of the Lacedæmonians by joining him, he guaranteed to them all the right of settlement and fraternal protection in his territory. To each of the generals, over and above pay, he engaged to assign a fort on the sea-coast, with a lot of land around it, and oxen for cultivation. And to Xenophon in particular, he offered the possession of Bisanthê, his best point on the coast. “I will also (he added, addressing Xenophon) give you my daughter in marriage; and if you have any daughter, I will buy her from you in marriage according to the custom of Thrace.”[272] Seuthes farther engaged never on any occasion to lead them more than seven days’ journey from the sea, at farthest.

These offers were as liberal as the army could possibly expect; and Xenophon himself, mistrusting the Lacedæmonians, as well as mistrusted by them, seems to have looked forward to the acquisition of a Thracian coast-fortress and territory (such as Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other Athenian leaders had obtained before him) as a valuable refuge in case of need.[273] But even if the promise had been less favorable, the Cyreians had no alternative; for they had not even present supplies,—still less any means of subsistence throughout the winter; while departure by sea was rendered impossible by the Lacedæmonians. On the next day, Seuthes was introduced by Xenophon and the other generals to the army, who accepted his offers and concluded the bargain.

They remained for two months in his service, engaged in warfare against various Thracian tribes, whom they enabled him to conquer and despoil; so that at the end of that period, he was in possession of an extensive dominion, a large native force, and a considerable tribute. Though the sufferings of the army from cold were extreme, during these two months of full winter and amidst the snowy mountains of Thrace, they were nevertheless enabled by their expeditions along with Seuthes to procure plentiful subsistence; which they could hardly have done in any other manner. But the pay which he had offered was never liquidated; at least, in requital of their two months of service, they received pay only for twenty days and a little more. And Xenophon himself, far from obtaining fulfilment of those splendid promises which Seuthes had made to him personally, seems not even to have received his pay as one of the generals. For him, the result was singularly unhappy; since he forfeited the good-will of Seuthes by importunate demand and complaint for the purpose of obtaining the pay due to the soldiers; while they on their side, imputing to his connivance the non-fulfilment of the promise, became thus in part alienated from him. Much of this mischief was brought about by the treacherous intrigues and calumny of a corrupt Greek from Maroneia, named Herakleides; who acted as minister and treasurer to Seuthes.

Want of space compels me to omit the narrative given by Xenophon, both of the relations of the army with Seuthes, and of the warfare carried on against the hostile Thracian tribes,—interesting as it is from the juxtaposition of Greek and Thracian manners. It seems to have been composed by Xenophon under feelings of acute personal disappointment, and probably in refutation of calumnies against himself as if he had wronged the army. Hence we may trace in it a tone of exaggerated querulousness, and complaint that the soldiers were ungrateful to him. It is true that a portion of the army, under the belief that he had been richly rewarded by Seuthes while they had not obtained their stipulated pay, expressed virulent sentiments and falsehoods against him.[274] Until such suspicions were refuted, it is no wonder that the army were alienated; but they were perfectly willing to hear both sides,—and Xenophon triumphantly disproved the accusation. That in the end, their feelings towards him were those of esteem and favor, stands confessed in his own words,[275] proving that the ingratitude of which he complains was the feeling of some indeed, but not of all.

It is hard to say, however, what would have been the fate of this gallant army, when Seuthes, having obtained from their arms in two months all that he desired, had become only anxious to send them off without pay,—had they not been extricated by a change of interest and policy on the part of all-powerful Sparta. The Lacedæmonians had just declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,—sending Thimbron into Asia to commence military operations. They then became extremely anxious to transport the Cyreians across to Asia, which their harmost, Aristarchus had hitherto prohibited,—and to take them into permanent pay; for which purpose two Lacedæmonians, Charmînus and Polynîkus were commissioned by Thimbron to offer to the army the same pay as had been promised, though not paid, by Seuthes; and as had been originally paid by Cyrus. Seuthes and Herakleides, eager to hasten the departure of the soldiers, endeavored to take credit with the Lacedæmonians for assisting their views.[276] Joyfully did the army accept this offer, though complaining loudly of the fraud practised upon them by Seuthes; which Charmînus, at the instance of Xenophon, vainly pressed the Thracian prince to redress.[277] He even sent Xenophon to demand the arrear of pay in the name of the Lacedæmonians, which afforded to the Athenian an opportunity of administering a severe lecture to Seuthes.[278] But the latter was found less accessible to the workings of eloquence than the Cyreian assembled soldiers; nor did Xenophon obtain anything beyond a miserable dividend upon the sum due;—together with civil expressions towards himself personally,—an invitation to remain in his service with one thousand hoplites instead of going to Asia with the army,—and renewed promises, not likely now to find much credit, of a fort and grant of lands.

When the army, now reduced by losses and dispersions to six thousand men,[279] was prepared to cross into Asia, Xenophon was desirous of going back to Athens, but was persuaded to remain with them until the junction with Thimbron. He was at this time so poor, having scarcely enough to pay for his journey home, that he was obliged to sell his horse at Lampsakus, the Asiatic town where the army landed. Here he found Eukleides, a Phliasian prophet with whom he had been wont to hold intercourse and offer sacrifice at Athens. This man, having asked Xenophon how much he had acquired in the expedition, could not believe him when he affirmed his poverty. But when they proceeded to offer sacrifice together, from some animals sent by the Lampsakenes as a present to Xenophon, Eukleides had no sooner inspected the entrails of the victims, than he told Xenophon that he fully credited the statement. “I see (he said) that even if money shall be ever on its way to come to you, you yourself will be a hindrance to it, even if there be no other (here Xenophon acquiesced); Zeus Meilichios (the Gracious)[280] is the real bar. Have you ever sacrificed to him, with entire burnt-offerings, as we used to do together at Athens?” “Never (replied Xenophon), throughout the whole march.” “Do so now, then (said Eukleides), and it will be for your advantage.” The next day, on reaching Ophrynium, Xenophon obeyed the injunction; sacrificing little pigs entire to Zeus Meilichios, as was the custom at Athens during the public festival called Diasia. And on the very same day he felt the beneficial effects of the proceeding; for Biton and another envoy came from the Lacedæmonians with an advance of pay to the army, and with dispositions so favorable to himself, that they bought back for him his horse, which he had just sold at Lampsakus for fifty darics. This was equivalent to giving him more than one year’s pay in hand (the pay which he would have received as general being four darics per month, or four times that of the soldier), at a time when he was known to be on the point of departure, and therefore would not stay to earn it. The short-comings of Seuthes were now made up with immense interest, so that Xenophon became better off than any man in the army; though he himself slurs over the magnitude of the present, by representing it as a delicate compliment to restore to him a favorite horse.

Thus gratefully and instantaneously did Zeus the Gracious respond to the sacrifice which Xenophon, after a long omission, had been admonished by Eukleides to offer. And doubtless Xenophon was more than ever confirmed in the belief, which manifests itself throughout all his writings, that sacrifice not only indicates, by the interior aspect of the immolated victims, the tenor of coming events,—but also, according as it is rendered to the right god and at the right season, determines his will, and therefore the course of events, for dispensations favorable or unfavorable.

But the favors of Zeus the Gracious, though begun, were not yet ended. Xenophon conducted the army through the Troad, and across mount Ida, to Antandrus; from thence along the coast to Lydia, through the plain of Thêbê and the town of Adramyttium, leaving Atarneus on the right hand, to Pergamus in Mysia, a hill-town overhanging the river and plain of Käikus. This district was occupied by the descendants of the Eretrian Gongylus, who, having been banished for embracing the cause of the Persians when Xerxes invaded Greece, had been rewarded (like the Spartan king Demaratus) with this sort of principality under the Persian empire. His descendant, another Gongylus, now occupied Pergamus, with his wife Hellas and his sons Gorgion and Gongylus. Xenophon was here received with great hospitality. Hellas acquainted him that a powerful Persian, named Asidates, was now dwelling, with his wife, family, and property, in a tower not far off, on the plain; and that a sudden night-march, with three hundred men, would suffice for the capture of this valuable booty, to which her own cousin should guide him. Accordingly, having sacrificed and ascertained that the victims were favorable, Xenophon communicated his plan after the evening meal to those captains who had been most attached to him throughout the expedition, wishing to make them partners in the profit. As soon as it became known, many volunteers, to the number of six hundred, pressed to be allowed to join. But the captains repelled them, declining to take more than three hundred, in order that the booty might afford an ampler dividend to each partner.

Beginning their march in the evening, Xenophon and his detachment of three hundred reached about midnight the tower of Asidates; it was large, lofty, thickly built, and contained a considerable garrison. It served for protection to his cattle and cultivating slaves around, like a baronial castle in the middle ages; but the assailants neglected this outlying plunder, in order to be more sure of taking the castle itself. Its walls however were found much stronger than was expected; and although a breach was made by force about daybreak, yet so vigorous was the defence of the garrison, that no entrance could be effected. Signals and shouts of every kind were made by Asidates to procure aid from the Persian forces in the neighborhood; numbers of whom soon began to arrive, so that Xenophon and his company were obliged to retreat. And their retreat was at last only accomplished, after severe suffering and wounds to nearly half of them, through the aid of Gongylus with his forces from Pergamus, and of Proklês (the descendant of Demaratus) from Halisarna, a little farther off seaward.[281]

Though his first enterprise thus miscarried, Xenophon soon laid plans for a second, employing the whole army; and succeeded in bringing Asidates prisoner to Pergamus, with his wife, children, horses, and all his personal property. Thus (says he, anxious above all things for the credit of sacrificial prophecy) the “previous sacrifices (those which had promised favorably before the first unsuccessful attempt) now came true.”[282] The persons of this family were doubtless redeemed by their Persian friends for a large ransom;[283] which, together with the booty brought in, made up a prodigious total to be divided.

In making the division, a general tribute of sympathy and admiration was paid to Xenophon, to which all the army,—generals, captains, and soldiers,—and the Lacedæmonians besides,—unanimously concurred. Like Agamemnon at Troy, he was allowed to select for himself the picked lots of horses, mules, oxen, and other items of booty; insomuch that he became possessor of a share valuable enough to enrich him at once, in addition to the fifty darics which he had before received. “Here then Xenophon (to use his own language[284]) had no reason to complain of the god” (Zeus Meilichios). We may add,—what he ought to have added, considering the accusations which he had before put forth,—that neither had he any reason to complain of the ingratitude of the army.

As soon as Thimbron arrived with his own forces, and the Cyreians became a part of his army, Xenophon took his leave of them. Having deposited in the temple at Ephesus that portion which had been confided to him as general, of the tithe set apart by the army at Kerasus for the Ephesian Artemis,[285] he seems to have executed his intention of returning to Athens.[286] He must have arrived there, after an absence of about two years and a half, within a few weeks, at farthest, after the death of his friend and preceptor Sokrates, whose trial and condemnation have been recorded in my last volume. That melancholy event certainly occurred during his absence from Athens;[287] but whether it had come to his knowledge before he reached the city, we do not know. How much grief and indignation it excited in his mind, we may see by his collection of memoranda respecting the life and conversations of Sokrates, known by the name of Memorabilia, and probably put together shortly after his arrival.

That he was again in Asia, three years afterwards, on military service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, is a fact attested by himself; but at what precise moment he quitted Athens for his second visit to Asia, we are left to conjecture. I incline to believe that he did not remain many months at home, but that he went out again in the next spring to rejoin the Cyreians in Asia,—became again their commander,—and served for two years under the Spartan general Derkyllidas before the arrival of Agesilaus. Such military service would doubtless be very much to his taste; while a residence at Athens, then subject and quiescent, would probably be distasteful to him; both from the habits of command which he had contracted during the previous two years, and from feelings arising out of the death of Sokrates. After a certain interval of repose, he would be disposed to enter again upon the war against his old enemy Tissaphernes; and his service went on when Agesilaus arrived to take the command.[288]

But during the two years after this latter event, Athens became a party to the war against Sparta, and entered into conjunction with the king of Persia as well as with the Thebans and others; while Xenophon, continuing his service as commander of the Cyreians, and accompanying Agesilaus from Asia back into Greece, became engaged against the Athenian troops and their Bœotian allies at the bloody battle of Korôneia. Under these circumstances, we cannot wonder that the Athenians passed sentence of banishment against him; not because he had originally taken part in aid of Cyrus against Artaxerxes,—nor because his political sentiments were unfriendly to democracy, as has been sometimes erroneously affirmed,—but because he was now openly in arms, and in conspicuous command, against his own country.[289] Having thus become an exile, Xenophon was allowed by the Lacedæmonians to settle at Skillus, one of the villages of Triphylia, near Olympia in Peloponnesus, which they had recently emancipated from the Eleians. At one of the ensuing Olympic festivals, Megabyzus, the superintendent of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, came over as a spectator; bringing with him the money which Xenophon had dedicated therein to the Ephesian Artemis. This money Xenophon invested in the purchase of lands at Skillus, to be consecrated in permanence to the goddess; having previously consulted her by sacrifice to ascertain her approval of the site contemplated, which site was recommended to him by its resemblance in certain points to that of the Ephesian temple. Thus, there was near each of them a river called by the same name Selinus, having in it fish and a shelly bottom. Xenophon constructed a chapel, an altar, and a statue of the goddess made of cypress-wood: all exact copies, on a reduced scale, of the temple and golden statue at Ephesus. A column near them was inscribed with the following words,—“This spot is sacred to Artemis. Whoever possesses the property and gathers its fruits, must sacrifice to her the tithe every year, and keep the chapel in repair out of the remainder. Should any one omit this duty the goddess herself will take the omission in hand.”[290]

Immediately near the chapel was an orchard of every description of fruit-trees, while the estate around comprised an extensive range of meadow, woodland, and mountain,—with the still loftier mountain called Pholoê adjoining. There was thus abundant pasture for horses, oxen, sheep, etc., and excellent hunting-ground near for deer and other game; advantages not to be found near the Artemision at Ephesus. Residing hard by on his own property, allotted to him by the Lacedæmonians, Xenophon superintended this estate as steward for the goddess; looking perhaps to the sanctity of her name for protection from disturbance by the Eleians, who viewed with a jealous eye the Lacedæmonian[291] settlers at Skillus, and protested against the peace and convention promoted by Athens after the battle of Leuktra, because it recognized that place, along with the townships of Triphylia, as autonomous. Every year he made a splendid sacrifice, from the tithe of all the fruits of the property; to which solemnity not only all the Skilluntines, but also all the neighboring villages, were invited. Booths were erected for the visitors, to whom the goddess furnished (this is the language of Xenophon) an ample dinner of barley-meal, wheaten loaves, meat, game, and sweetmeats;[292] the game being provided by a general hunt, which the sons of Xenophon conducted, and in which all the neighbors took part if they chose. The produce of the estate, saving this tithe and subject to the obligation of keeping the holy building in repair, was enjoyed by Xenophon himself. He had a keen relish for both hunting and horsemanship, and was among the first authors, so far as we know, who ever made these pursuits, with the management of horses and dogs, the subject of rational study and description.

Such was the use to which Xenophon applied the tithe voted by the army at Kerasus to the Ephesian Artemis; the other tithe, voted at the same time to Apollo, he dedicated at Delphi in the treasure-chamber of the Athenians, inscribing upon the offering his own name and that of Proxenus. His residence being only at a distance of twenty stadia from the great temple of Olympia, he was enabled to enjoy society with every variety of Greeks,—and to obtain copious information about Grecian politics, chiefly from philo-Laconian informants, and with the Lacedæmonian point of view predominant in his own mind; while he had also leisure for the composition of his various works. The interesting description which he himself gives of his residence at Skillus, implies a state of things not present and continuing,[293] but past and gone; other testimonies too, though confused and contradictory, seem to show that the Lacedæmonian settlement at Skillus lasted no longer than the power of Lacedæmon was adequate to maintain it. During the misfortunes which befel that city after the battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), Xenophon, with his family and his fellow-settlers, was expelled by the Eleians, and is then said to have found shelter at Corinth. But as Athens soon came to be not only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with Sparta,—the sentence of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so that the latter part of his life was again passed in the enjoyment of his birthright as an Athenian citizen and Knight.[294] Two of his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen at the cavalry combat which preceded the battle of Mantineia, where the former was slain, after manifesting distinguished bravery; while his grandson Xenophon became in the next generation the subject of a pleading before the Athenian Dikastery, composed by the orator Deinarchus.[295]

On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close of that arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honor, I have thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future, in order to take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile (in this point of view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we probably owe many of those compositions from which so much of our knowledge of Grecian affairs is derived. But to the contemporary world, the retreat, which Xenophon so successfully conducted, afforded a far more impressive lesson than any of his literary compositions. It taught in the most striking manner the impotence of the Persian land-force, manifested not less in the generals than in the soldiers. It proved that the Persian leaders were unfit for any systematic operations, even under the greatest possible advantages, against a small number of disciplined warriors resolutely bent on resistance; that they were too stupid and reckless even to obstruct the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or cut off supplies. It more than confirmed the contemptuous language applied to them by Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he proclaimed that he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was ashamed of the worthlessness of his own countrymen.[296] Against such perfect weakness and disorganization, nothing prevented the success of the Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm of fraternal antipathy.[297] And we shall perceive hereafter the military and political leaders of Greece,—Agesilaus, Jason of Pheræ,[298] and others down to Philip and Alexander[299]—firmly persuaded that with a tolerably numerous and well-appointed Grecian force, combined with exemption from Grecian enemies, they could succeed in overthrowing or dismembering the Persian empire. This conviction, so important in the subsequent history of Greece, takes its date from the retreat of the Ten Thousand. We shall indeed find Persia exercising an important influence, for two generations to come,—and at the peace of Antalkidas an influence stronger than ever,—over the destinies of Greece. But this will be seen to arise from the treason of Sparta, the chief of the Hellenic world, who abandons the Asiatic Greeks, and even arms herself with the name and the force of Persia, for purposes of aggrandizement and dominion to herself. Persia is strong by being enabled to employ Hellenic strength against the Hellenic cause; by lending money or a fleet to one side of the Grecian intestine parties, and thus becoming artificially strengthened against both. But the Xenophontic Anabasis betrays her real weakness against any vigorous attack; while it at the same time exemplifies the discipline, the endurance, the power of self-action and adaptation, the susceptibility of influence from speech and discussion, the combination of the reflecting obedience of citizens with the mechanical regularity of soldiers,—which confer such immortal distinction on the Hellenic character. The importance of this expedition and retreat, as an illustration of the Hellenic qualities and excellence, will justify the large space which has been devoted to it in this History.